

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Money and Party in Jacksonian America: A Quantitative Look at New York City's Men of Quality
FRANK OTTO GATELL

The President and His Helpers: A Review-Article
REXFORD G. TUGWELL

Reviews

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Contributors to the June Issue

CHÜN-TU HSÜEH is author of *Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution* (1961) and *The Chinese Communist Movement* (1960-62) and editor of the forthcoming *Revolutionary Leadership in Modern China.* Professor Hsüeh is a member of the department of government and politics of the University of Maryland.

MICHAEL WALZER teaches in the government department at Harvard. His book on Puritanism, *The Revolution of the Saints,* was published in 1965.

Professor JOHN P. WINDMULLER of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, spent 1964-65 as visiting professor at the Free University in Amsterdam under a Fulbright research grant.

FRANK OTTO GATELL is associate professor of history at the University of California, Los Angeles. He specializes in the Jacksonian period of American history.

REXFORD G. TUGWELL, formerly professor of economics at Columbia, later a government official, and then professor of political science at the University of Chicago, is presently a fellow at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California.

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The Cultural Revolution and Leadership Crisis in Communist China

CHÜN-TU HSÜEH
University of Maryland

Ten thousand years are too long
Seize the day, seize the hour!
—*Mao Tse-tung, to the melody of "Man Chiang Hung"*

The proletarian cultural revolution, which was signaled by an attack upon an historical play in November 1965, nurtured by the rampage of the Red Guards beginning in August 1966, and intensified by the Revolutionary Rebels' seizure of power early in 1967, is the most drastic and extensive rectification campaign and purge ever to have occurred in the Chinese Communist regime. It has split the top leadership, rocked the foundations of party rule, and plunged the whole country into internal strife. By the spring of 1967, the central authorities on mainland China had, at one time or another, broken down in a number of major cities as well as in some remote areas. Judging by newspaper headlines, it looked as if mainland China were on the verge of disintegration. While the world has been stunned by the confused and incredible news which originated from all sorts of wall posters, the experts also have, to a staggering degree, been confounded by the turmoil. As recently as the summer of 1966, few specialists would have considered it even remotely plausible that Communist China would be heading toward such a great upheaval. Recent spectacular developments have dramatized once again how little outside analysts really know about that country.

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It may be recalled that in the first few years after the Communist takeover in 1949, opposition to the new regime came mainly from the non-Communist segment of the society. The Communist party was characterized on the whole by its iron discipline and the solidarity of its leadership. The anti-party case of Kao Kang (former chairman of the People's Government of Northeast China) and Jao Shu-shih (director of the party's Department of Organization) in 1955 was the first shake-up of the party's hierarchy, but it appeared to be more of a power struggle than a controversy over major policies.

After the success of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), the revolutionary tempo was further accelerated by the adoption of the program of the "three red banners": the commune system, the great leap forward, and the general line of Socialist construction. Its failure was due partly to unrealistic planning and partly to three years of natural calamities (1959-61). It was further aggravated by the Sino-Soviet disputes and by the sudden and complete withdrawal of the Soviet advisers. The setback was so great that it took several years of tactical retreats and readjustments before the Peking government showed some evidence of recovering from the disaster. The discontent of the people, both in and out of the party, is not difficult to explain. The homemade steel turned out to be useless; production statistics were over-exaggerated; people did not have enough to eat. And yet, for political and revolutionary reasons, the government continued to give financial and material support to other underdeveloped countries.

As a result, the wisdom of the "three red banners" was questioned even in the hierarchy of the party. The anti-party group, allegedly led by P'eng Te-huai (minister of National Defense) and Huang K'o-ch'eng (chief of the General Staff), was purged in September 1959. This was the second shake-up of the party hierarchy since the Communist takeover. But the opposition to Mao's policy did not end with the purge. As Chou En-lai indicated in a report to the Third National People's Congress (December 1964-January 1965), many people in and out of the party actively advocated liberalization and reversal of previous incorrect decisions during the three difficult years. In economic affairs they advocated three freedoms (the extension of peasants' plots for private use, the extension of free markets, and the increase of small enterprises), one

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undertaking (fixing the output quotas at the household level), and "going it alone" (the restoration of individual economy). In the international field they advocated "three reconciliations" (reconciliation with imperialism, with the reactionaries, and reconciliation with modern revisionists) and "one reduction" (reduction of assistance and support to the revolutionary struggle of other peoples in the world).

These views were invariably reflected in philosophic, political, economic, historical, and educational writings, and in the fields of cinema, drama, culture, and art. The economic policy of readjustment and consolidation adopted since 1962 had not only produced improvement but had also raised the danger of the revival of free enterprise and the return of the landlord class in the countryside. Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified, and the elimination of revisionist ideology in the rank-and-file of the party became more urgent than ever. Efforts were made repeatedly to combat the development of bourgeois and revisionist tendencies and ideas. In May 1962, while observing the twentieth anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's "Talk at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature," the intellectuals were told that they should follow conscious self-remodeling. In the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in September 1962, Mao Tse-tung had warned party members not to forget the class struggle. The Socialist educational movement based on class education in the countryside was launched, and a rectification campaign of literature and art was undertaken. These were stressed from time to time, and a number of writers and historians were subjected to citicism and struggle in various degrees because they had lost their proletarian standpoint. Apparently the rectification campaign did not produce the expected results. Class struggle was further emphasized in the educational campaign of 1963. In December Mao found it necessary to point out that in all forms of art—drama, music, the fine arts, the dance, cinema, poetry, and literature—there existed a very serious problem: people engaged in them were numerous and yet in many departments very little had been achieved in Socialist transformation. The "dead" still dominated. It was absurd, Mao held, that many Communists should show interest and enthusiasm in advancing feudal and capitalist art but no zeal in promoting Socialist art.

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In order to combat the revisionist tendency and consolidate the party's control and indoctrination in the government, political departments which followed the pattern of the Liberation Army were established in various governmental ministries and agencies beginning early in 1964. In September class education was stressed to the leading cadres at county, regional, and provincial levels. In June, during the rectification campaign within the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and its affiliated associations, Mao pointed out again that in the last fifteen years these associations and most of their publications had not carried out the policies of the party and had acted as high-and-mighty bureaucrats and had not reflected the Socialist revolution and construction. In recent years they had even slid to the verge of revisionism. If serious steps were not taken to remold them, Mao continued, they were bound at some future date to become groups like the Hungarian Petofi Circle. Consequently, historiography, the writings of "middle characters," and the theory of "combining two into one" (the unity of the opposites as fundamental in discussing the nature of things, as expounded by Higher Party School President Yang Hsien-chen) were criticized. But these were far from numerous persons and not extensive enough to cope with the situation.

Early in 1965 Lu Ting-yi, vice-premier and director of the Party's Propaganda Department, took over the Ministry of Culture of the government. Three vice-ministers of culture were dismissed from their government posts. The Political Bureau formally announced that the emphasis of Socialist education was to purge those in authority in the party who advocated the restoration of capitalism. Meanwhile, a Socialist educational campaign was launched in universities, with the aim of destroying bourgeois academic authorities. In September Mao pointed out once again the need to criticize the "reactionary bourgeois ideology." On November 10 the Shanghai *Wen-hui pao* took the lead in publishing an article criticizing an historical play written by Wu Han, "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office." It was an opening shot that led to the announcement of the cultural revolution. A week later the article was reprinted in the *Liberation Army Daily*, which pointed out that the play was "a poisonous weed." Thus, the cultural revolution did not really come as suddenly as it appeared in the sum-

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mer of 1966. It was the climax of several years of development, in which Mao's efforts at rectification were repeatedly frustrated.

I

Wu Han, an historian and university professor, was then deputy mayor of Peking. Shortly before the official dismissal of P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'o-ch'eng, Wu Han, under a pseudonym, published an article entitled "Hai Jui Scolds the Emperor" in the *People's Daily* of June 16, 1959. In it the mid-sixteenth century official of the Ming dynasty scolded the emperor in these words:

> Now the people have to pay more taxes than before, everywhere. Yet you spend a lot of money on superstition and religion. And you spend more and more money every day. As a result, the people have become very poor. In the past ten years or so every family has become practically penniless.
>
> For a long time the nation has not been satisfied with you. All officials, in and out of the capital, know that your mind is not right, that you are too arbitrary, that you are perverse. You think that you alone are right; you refuse to accept criticism; and your mistakes are many.
>
> The present problem is that the emperor is wrong, and the duty of the official is unclear. This is the most serious thing in the country. If we do not talk about it, what should we talk about?

Wu Han then wrote the story into an historical play, entitled "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office," and had it published in *Peking Literature and Art* in January 1961. It was the story of an honest and courageous official, dismissed from the governorship by the emperor because he understood the sufferings of the people and advocated the return to the peasants of the land taken by the rich landlords. It was criticism of this play nearly five years later that led to the cultural revolution. Wu Han was accused of implying that Chairman Mao was the emperor and Minister P'eng was Hai Jui.

In the same year, 1961, two other historical plays were produced in China. One was written by a famous dramatist, the author of the national anthem of the People's Republic of China, T'ien Han. The play was named after Hsieh Yao-huan, a famous woman official of the T'ang dynasty who protected the interests of the people against the nobility. The other, written by the well known play-

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wright Meng Ch'ao, was named after a concubine in the Sung dynasty, Li Hui-niang, who was murdered by her lover, an influential government minister. She became a ghost who, as a victim of injustice, showed great concern for the sufferings of the people. And in the play she quoted a poem which suggested the return of private land to its owners, after recounting the evils of public land ownership. While both plays were subjected to severe criticism, it was Wu Han who was the main target of the attack, which came to involve his "black gang" and finally developed into the form of mass movement and cultural revolution.

The "black gang" consisted of Wu Han, Teng T'o, and Liao Mo-sha. Wu was deputy mayor of Peking; Liao, member of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party as well as the director of the United Front Department; Teng, a secretary of the Committee and editor of *Frontline*, a theoretical journal of the Committee. He also held at least seven other official titles, including chairman of the Peking branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Between 1954 and 1959 he was editor-in-chief of the party's organ, *People's Daily*. Between March 1961 and September 1962 Teng published 153 articles under the general title "Evening Chats at Yenshan" in the *Peking Evening News*, an organ of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party. These articles were later published in book form in five volumes by the Peking Publishing House.

From October 10, 1961, to July 1964, the three ranking members of the Peking administration jointly published sixty-seven articles under the general title "Notes from a Three-Family Village" in *Frontline*, signing their articles by one pseudonym, Wu Nan-hsing.

One of the "Evening Chats at Yenshan," published on June 15, 1961, was about a story written by a novelist of the Ming dynasty. Part of the story reads as follows:

> A very poor man one day picked up an egg. He was delighted and told his wife that he now had acquired property. The wife asked him where his property was located. He showed her the egg but added that it would take him ten years to become rich. He explained it to her this way: "Now I take this egg to my neighbor and ask my neighbor's hen to produce it into a chicken. When the egg becomes a hen, she will beget more eggs, and from eggs to chickens. In a month I'll have

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fifteen chickens. Chickens beget chickens, and there will be three hundred chickens in two years. I'll sell the three hundred chickens for ten dollars. With ten dollars I'll buy ten young cows. Cows will beget cows. In three years there will be twenty-five cows. Another three years and there will be 150 cows, which should be worth three hundred dollars. I'll lend the money out, and in three more years I shall be able to make five hundred dollars."

There is no need to go into the details of the story. Suffice it to say, this man was so fascinated by his plan that he even revealed that when he became rich he would have a concubine. At this point his wife became so angry that she hit the egg and thus destroyed the man's property.

Teng commented on the story that

it seemed quite reasonable for this man's ten-year plan, for it took time to accumulate wealth. The trouble with his planning was that each step depended on the success of the previous ones. He was in fact building a castle in the air. Eventually he angered his wife and lost the only property he had.

The moral of the story and the intention of the article seemed quite clear. Teng was in fact suggesting that the great leap forward and other economic plans of the party were castles in the air.

On February 4, 1962, Teng published an article entitled "The Spring Festival of the Year," which contains the following sentence: "The cold season brought here by the north wind will soon be over. It will be replaced by the genial east wind. The earth soon will be defrosted." This expression was subsequently attacked and the writer was accused of hoping for "the thaw." Part of another article, entitled "Special Cure for Amnesia" (*Frontline*, July 25, 1962), reads:

There are all sorts of illness in this world, . . . one of which is called "amnesia." Anyone who has this disease has a lot of trouble, because it cannot be easily cured. . . . The man who has this illness . . . often forgets what he has said or done. Gradually he will become temperamental . . . easily angered, and finally mad. . . . Another symptom is that he often faints. If not cured in time, he will become an idiot. Once one of these two symptoms is discovered, he must take a full rest and stop talking or doing things, otherwise the result will be disastrous.

The method suggested for cure by Teng was extremely disrespectful to the patient. It seemed quite clear that it was a veiled

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criticism of Mao and the party. Other articles were equally humorous and sarcastic, criticizing by implication the unrealistic policies, boastful manner, and style of work of the leaders who wished to make China a community of ants, working incessantly under constant propaganda exhortation for the state. Some articles dealt with historical figures who understood the sufferings of the people. In some cases the problem whether the best features of feudal and capitalist morality and ethics could be inherited was discussed. Consequently, the "black gang" was accused of using historical events and characters to mask, attack, and slander the realities of present-day socialism. They were accused of committing the mistakes of blurring class character and class interest; of having falsified historical figures as models for the present; of mistakenly suggesting that people of the present can learn from the virtues of men in the feudal past; of calling for working independently and collectively for the restoration of individual economy, for the return of the land, and for reversing wrong verdicts in rectification campaigns of the past. While these may sound like literary inquisitions which occurred in dynastic Chinese politics, some of the accusations against the "gang" seem to be well founded.

It seems likely that the "black gang" in Peking at first did not realize the seriousness of the attack from Shanghai, which was in fact launched under the personal direction of Mao Tse-tung. It may be recalled that the disappearance of Mao from public view, which had sparked widespread speculation throughout the world, coincided with the first attack on Wu Han's play in November 1965. Looking in retrospect and judging from subsequent party documents, Mao was probably hiding somewhere in or near Shanghai to stage the campaign. Not knowing this, the "gang" took countermeasures. First, all publications of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party, *Peking Daily*, *Peking Evening News*, *Peking Literature and Art*, and *Frontline* tried to shelve the manuscripts critical of Wu Han. When *Peking Daily*, under pressure, was compelled to denounce the writings of the "gang" in the middle of April, efforts were made to shift criticism from the political to the academic sphere. When political mistakes could not be denied, they adopted the tactics of "sacrificing knights to save the queen." Wu and Liao were identified as leaders of the gang, while Teng was put in a subordinate role, an effort to save the man who was

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most closely associated with P'eng Chen, a Political Bureau member, vice-premier, and mayor of Peking. By the middle of June P'eng Chen had been purged; the Peking administration and the editorial committee of *Peking Daily* and *Peking Evening News* had been reorganized; *Frontline* had been suspended for overhauling; and the party leadership at Peking University had been involved and purged. Among the ten crimes which the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party was accused of having committed were: resistance to the cultural revolution; opposing the Socialist educational movement; abandonment of the concepts of classes and class struggle in an attempt to bring about peaceful evolution; preparation of public opinion for the restoration of capitalism and subversion of proletarian political power; the enlistment of capitulationists and turncoats and the formation of factions; the creation of a tight barricade against the Party Central Committee; and the waving of red flags to oppose the red flag.

II

There were several interesting features in the early stage of the development of the cultural revolution. First, it began as a rectification campaign of literature and art, which was then extended into the great cultural revolution. Secondly, it was the *Liberation Army Daily* which took the lead, not the *People's Daily*. On the contrary, *People's Daily* took a defensive and passive position, often reprinting articles from *Liberation Army Daily* without comment. Twice it was even criticized by the army paper. Only after the reorganization of its administration did it regain its leadership, and after June 1 a number of editorials on the cultural revolution began to appear. Thirdly, as a mass movement it escalated from the bottom to the top, advancing from the countryside to the county, province, and capital. And then, after the organization of the Red Guards, the movement spread from the capital down to the provinces and countryside.

Since the takeover the Chinese Communists have undertaken five rectification campaigns of literature and art, but none was so extensive in scope and depth as this one of 1966. Practically every noted leftist writer famous since the nineteen-thirties has been involved; almost no one was immune. It is ironic that many of these

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literary figures of the nineteen-thirties were now purged by the very government they had helped ideologically to establish, and that sympathy and moral support were given to them fully in Taiwan by the very government they had condemned. Chou Yang, the "commander-in-chief" of the revolutionary literary and art movement in China for thirty years, the man who had been regarded as the top authority on the correct party line on literature and art, was now denounced as a "sham leftist and a real rightist," "a political thief, an anti-party conspirator, and a counterrevolutionary revisionist," "the big schemer who waved 'red flags' to oppose the red flag." He was now accused of recruiting prominent writers of the nineteen-thirties to form a clique to promote peaceful evolution and stage a capitalist restoration. Instead of serving the workers, peasants, and soldiers, he brought out a program of literature and art for the people which was out-and-out revisionist, since from Mao's point of view all culture is of class character, and there is no such thing as literature and art acceptable for all classes. Chou was accused of advocating the theory of "truthful writing," the worship of what was foreign, the restoration of what was ancient, and the theory of the "middle character," rather than the portrayal of the ideal worker, peasant, and soldier heroes. As a result, after nearly two decades of Communist victory, the theater was still dominated by stories of emperors and kings, generals and ministers, scholars and beauties.

The rectification campaign and the cultural revolution have shaken the foundation of the Communist propaganda system built since the nineteen-thirties. More than 165 prominent figures in the fields of culture and art had been purged by the end of July 1966. The list includes one vice-premier who was also director of propaganda in the party and minister of culture in the government; three deputy directors of propaganda of the party, one of whom was also the head of the New China News Agency and editor-in-chief of *People's Daily*, while another was also vice-minister of culture in the government; three vice-ministers of culture and one ex-minister of culture in the government; the director and deputy director of the United Front Department of the Party; the head of the Higher Party School; more than twenty university and college presidents and vice-presidents who were responsible in various degrees for the training of the generation to succeed the revolu-

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tionary leaders; a number of university instructors and professors, particularly in the fields of philosophy and history; several leading figures in the Academy of Sciences; a number of officials in charge of culture and propaganda works in various provinces; and a number of prominent figures in journalism, drama, ballet, dance, music, opera, cinema, literature, and art, some of whom were also editors of the leading journals in their fields. By the end of the year, some 250 prominent figures had been purged. Early in January 1967 the *Wen-hui pao*, a Shanghai newspaper that fired the first shot that led to the cultural revolution, became the victim of the revolution itself.

III

The sixteen-point decisions adopted by the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Party early in August 1966 marked the ending of the first stage and the beginning of the second stage of the cultural revolution. These decisions clearly anticipated resistance from "those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road." By this time Lin Piao, minister of National Defense, had emerged as the most important man next to Mao Tse-tung in the party hierarchy. With the support of the army, Mao "boldly aroused the masses" by organizing the Red Guards as a "shock force" which carried the torch from the capital to the provinces. For that purpose, the enrollment of higher educational institutions was postponed for six months and all school and university classes were suspended.[1] Under the Central Committee of the Party, the Cultural Revolutionary Group headed by Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing (Madame Mao Tse-tung) was set up to take charge of the cultural revolution. The fact that Mao had to establish the new cultural revolutionary group under the Party's Cen-

[1] On June 13, 1966, the Central Committee of the Party and the State Council of the government had announced the abolition of the existing admission system of examinations in institutions of higher learning on grounds that the existing educational system shut out many children of workers, peasants, and revolutionary cadres who could not compete with the children of the bourgeoisie in examinations, and that the students were concerned mainly with books and examinations without paying attention to politics. Beginning in the fall of 1966 students would be admitted by recommendation and selection, favoring the children of the workers and peasants. Apparently, this new regulation was not put into practice because of subsequent developments.

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tral Committee and had to use the Red Guards clearly indicates that the existing government apparatus, party structure, and the Young Communist League were inadequate; they were even constituting obstacles to the implementation of his policy. The implication is clear. Sweeping changes should be made throughout the country.

This second stage of the cultural revolution was characterized by the rampage of the Red Guards. They swarmed into streets and railway stations, put up wall posters, broke into private homes, ransacked private properties, and squelched religious practices. They attempted to rename all streets, schools, shops, and public buildings whose names were deemed to have a feudal, capitalist, or revisionist meaning. They destroyed historical and cultural relics, interfered with private life, attacked those with modern-style clothing or haircuts, and harassed the diplomatic personnel of foreign countries. This was in great contrast to the iron discipline and concern with international reputation shown barely two months earlier in the case of a Peking University student who was executed after a public trial, in which thirteen thousand persons took part, for his assault on a foreign guest and a diplomat. That the Red Guards "should show shortcomings of one kind or another" also had been anticipated at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee in August. Decisions had been made that "no measure should be taken against students . . . because of problems that arise in the movement." By the end of November, Mao had reviewed eleven million Red Guards who came to Peking to "exchange revolutionary experiences."

At first the Red Guards were asked to stay away from factories, enterprises, and people's communes below the county level, presumably because of a fear that they would devastate production and cause other economic disruptions. However, the "logic" of the revolution would eventually have to push into other segments of the society. By the end of 1966, the cultural revolution had extended to the working class: into the factories and industrial and mining enterprises.

Beginning in 1967, the cultural revolution turned into a new stage. The central issue now was the seizure of power from the regional party authorities, "who had taken the capitalist road." Violent struggles and bloodshed began to spread from major cities to remote areas. In some cases, the local authorities adopted decep-

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tive tactics. While making a show of self-criticism, they used "economism" and a material-incentives approach to undermine the cultural revolution, making free with the state's fund, increasing wages, and granting all kinds of allowances and subsidies to workers and peasants. They provoked the masses to struggle against each other, tried to sabotage production, incited workers to desert their posts in production, thus bringing some factories to a standstill, and disrupted railway and road traffic. In this third stage of the cultural revolution, Mao had to call on the People's Liberation Army to give active support to the "genuine proletarian revolutionaries." In Harbin and other places the army did intervene at a critical moment on the side of the revolutionary rebels.

Meanwhile, a new pattern of authority began to appear in some major cities and provinces. Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters (or Committees), organized by a number of revolutionary rebel organizations, took over all the powers of the party and government in Shansi, Kweichow, Tsingtao, Heilungkiang, and other places. These "provisional supreme organs" were based on the alliance of leading members of the revolutionary mass organizations, of local People's Liberation Army units and of revolutionary cadres of the party and government. In February 1967, a Shanghai People's Commune, based on the 1871 Paris Commune, was reportedly formed. This appeared to be one of the series of measures through which Mao bypassed the existing power structure and established a new form of authorities. However, the Shanghai People's Commune proved to be short-lived. It was replaced by a Municipal Revolutionary Committee. By the middle of March, revolutionary committees were set up in Peking and various other places as the provisional organs of power based on the "three-in-one" principle, under which the revolutionary committees were formed by the representatives of mass organizations, local army units, and revolutionary leading party cadres.

IV

Throughout the history of the Chinese Communist party the importance of proletarian ideological molding has always been emphasized. In terms of scope, intensity, method, and impact, however, the cultural revolution is an unprecedented rectification cam-

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paign. It is a thorough house-cleaning, the fundamental aim of which is to wipe out the influence of the bourgeoisie, to destroy the old thought, old culture, old customs, and old habits, and to remove all those superstructures which were felt to be unsuitable to the foundation of the Socialist economy. It aims to eliminate possible restoration of the old economic system and the rise of revisionism, and to create and establish new thought, new culture, new customs, and new habits; in short, to transform spiritual energy into material force by indoctrinating and mobilizing 750 million people for Socialist construction. Mao probably believes that the failure of the commune was due to the people's deep-seated belief in traditional culture and thought. Thus he plans to remove the obstacles so as to prepare a new political and social environment for another "leap." The cultural revolution is the climax of several years of Mao's frustrated efforts to liquidate the revisionist thinking that began increasingly to spread after the failure of the commune system and the great leap forward. It is Mao's attempt to combat the prevailing professional military view and the growing demands for the modification of his domestic and foreign policies, which resulted in a series of international setbacks and in the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The culture revolution might also be intended to help the country maintain the guerrilla mentality and the Yenan spirit of self-reliance as an ideological preparation for a possible military confrontation with the United States, similar to the famous rectification campaign of 1942 which paved the way for the subsequent successful armed struggle against the Kuomintang government. Not knowing the intention of the American policy-makers, the bombing of North Vietnam beginning February 1965 and the subsequent tremendous build-up of American military forces in South Vietnam made a military confrontation with the United States look quite possible. Furthermore, Mao has repeatedly expressed in the past his concern that the younger generation has had no experience in revolution. He wishes to make sure that the succeeding generations will not betray the class struggle. The aging leader must have a strong sense of urgency. He must be very conscious of the fate of Stalin, and he might fear the ascension of another "Khrushchev" when he is dead. He wishes, moreover, to make China the center and the base of world Communist revolution, and

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to keep alive the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" after the death of the thinker.

To change the ideology and habits of a people, however, is an extremely difficult task. The rampage of the Red Guards appears similar to the ones that took place on a much smaller scale in the early stages of the Chinese Communist movement forty years ago. Resistance from various segments of the society is inevitable, particularly from the ruling authorities, because the main targets of the attack this time are "those persons within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road." While Mao maintains his revolutionary frenzy, other party leaders and members tend to be in favor of maintaining the *status quo*. After all, as an old Chinese saying goes, one can conquer the country on horseback, but one cannot rule it on horseback. These party leaders realize the need to govern the country by professional and managerial skill rather than by the guerrilla mentality: the problem of "red or expert." They are too numerous and too intrenched to be dismissed one by one.

Confronted with such a situation, Mao characteristically launched a mass movement by mobilizing the teenage students to "seize power from below." In mass movements, one does not go by rules. It is unprecedented in history for a legitimate ruler to organize rebels to overthrow the legitimate authorities. But Mao is not only using these Red Guards or Revolutionary Rebels as instruments for the implementation of his policy, he is also cultivating them as "revolutionary successors."

The cultural revolution has destroyed completely not only the party's propaganda machine built up since the nineteen-thirties; it has also greatly impaired, if not entirely altered, the united front policy adopted for the last thirty years. The united front was one of the "three magics" that helped achieve Communist victory. Logic suggests that so long as a rival government exists on Taiwan, the united front should continue to exist and minor political parties should be allowed to stay. In order to carry out the cultural revolution to the end, however, the united front must be destroyed; otherwise it would be inconsistent to eliminate bourgeois elements within the party while allowing them to survive outside the party. At the end of August 1966, the Red Guards ordered the minor political parties to disband within seventy-two hours. Not all their

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orders have been carried out, and subsequent developments seemed to indicate that this demand was not complied with. But even if the minor political parties were nominally allowed to exist, the united front will lose some of its "magic."

V

Far more important than these developments is the leadership crisis resulting from the cultural revolution, which has destroyed the cohesion and the unity of the party. For twenty years, from 1935 to 1955, the Chinese Communist party had been characterized by the solidarity of its leadership, with the exception of the defection of Chang Kuo-t'ao in 1938. After the takeover, the first purge of the party hierarchy came with the Kao-Jao anti-party group in April 1955. The second crisis came with the P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'o-ch'eng cases in September 1959. Now Mao has found it necessary to downgrade comrades within the inner circle for forty years, including his own heir-apparent. It should be noted, however, that the purge does not mean physical liquidation of the purged. In the Soviet Union, seventy per cent of the Central Committee elected in 1934 was shot. Most of the Peking top leaders who have been under attack, however, are not even named in official party publications, but only in the wall posters.

The current crisis is a continuation of the P'eng-Huang purge. Unlike the previous two cases in which the purges were conducted by the party center, the purge of P'eng Chen came from below, in the form of a mass movement started in Shanghai. Politically, P'eng had been close to Liu Shao-ch'i since the nineteen-thirties. In fact, many of the ranking members who were purged in the early stage of the cultural revolution in Peking had worked closely under Liu in the "student movement of December 9, 1935."

The purge of P'eng Chen in June 1966 led to the downgrading of Liu Shao-ch'i two months later; the latter had been second-in-command of party affairs. Until the end of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee last August, the top leadership of the party consisted of seven members of the standing committee of the Political Bureau. They were Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Vice-Chairmen Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yun, Lin Piao, and Secretary General Teng Hsiao-p'ing. After the meeting,

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which was attended not only by the Central Committee members but was also packed by the revolutionary teachers and students, Lin Piao emerged as the only vice-chairman of the party. Chu Teh and Ch'en Yun were replaced by two other veteran Communists in the party hierarchy, T'ao Chu and K'eng Sheng. Liu Shao-ch'i fell from second to eighth place in the party listing. The Red Guard wall posters reportedly revealed that he had been subject to self-criticism in October. In December, the Red Guards demanded that he and Teng Hsiao-p'ing be dismissed from their positions. In the middle of January 1967, Liu was singled out as the leading enemy of the cultural revolution. Early in April, hundreds of thousands of chanting demonstrators marched past his official residence demanding his overthrow. Definite steps appeared to be under way to remove him from his party post and the office of chief of state.

The leadership crisis was further confused by the downfall of T'ao Chu, who had been the first secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the Party. In the summer of 1966, he moved to Peking to replace Lu Ting-yi as vice-premier and director of the propaganda department of the party and rocketed from ninety-fifth to fourth place in the party hierarchy. However, he was criticized early in November, and before the year was over, he appeared to have fallen from power. Thus, the cultural revolution turned against one of its leaders and beneficiaries. Early in January 1967, Po I-po was reportedly arrested. Until then he was an alternate member of the Politburo, vice-premier and chairman of the State Economic Commission, and director of the Office for Industry and Communications.

Meanwhile, Chu Teh (founder of the Red Army) and Ho Lung (vice-premier, Politburo member, and vice-chairman of the party's Military Committee) were under attack, and leading army personnel were reshuffled. The cultural revolution and purge appeared to have extended in a minor degree to the army with the appointment in January 1967 of Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien as the chief, and Chiang Ch'ing as the adviser, of the newly reorganized Cultural Revolutionary Group of the Army under the Military Committee and the Cultural Revolutionary Group of the Central Committee of the Party. As a military leader, Hsu was close to Chang Kuo-t'ao in the nineteen-thirties, and therefore had been "frozen" by Mao for years. He was now elevated as a Politburo member.

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Mao's wife, the former actress Chiang Ch'ing, who has been playing an active part in the cultural revolution, has been the subject of considerable interest and conjecture. A simple explanation of her importance may be that the aging leader, having purged almost all the leading figures in culture and art, could not find suitable and trustworthy persons to take charge of the task, and so decided to rely on his wife as his eyes and ears for the implementation of his policy. The role of his confident and private secretary, Ch'en Po-ta, may also be explained in this light. To inflate Ch'en's leadership unduly would seem to be a complete misunderstanding of "who is who" in Chinese politics.

It may be mentioned that far more has been written than is actually known about the top leadership of the Peking government. The decision-making process within the inner circle remains remote to outsiders. Commentators and specialists are often caught by surprise by Peking's behavior, and at every turn rationalization is used to explain the situation. Through the years, the explanations have been inconsistent and contradictory. For example, in the nineteen-forties and early nineteen-fifties one of the favorite themes among some anti-Communist observers of China was that Mao represented the indigenous Chinese Communists while Liu represented the international faction of the party. This view disappeared after it had become known that since the mid-nineteen-forties, at the very time when the outsiders were speculating that the two were engaged in a power struggle, Mao was in fact gradually planning to put Liu into the position of successor. The fact of the matter is that since Mao gained party leadership in 1935, he has remained unchallenged. His prestige in mainland China since 1949 has been so enormous that he is unchangeable. This does not mean that he would be supported without reservation, especially when his dogmatic policy proved to be unworkable, but it means that no one in the party is in a position to challenge him as the leader; no one is qualified to engage in a power struggle with him. It is significant to note that despite all the turmoil in China in the current cultural revolution, the resistance has yet to turn directly on him. No leadership has emerged around whom the opposition could rally or pledge its allegiance. The best they could do is to wave red flag against red flag.

In December 1958, Ch'en Yi revealed that Mao wished to de-

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cline re-election as head of state. Reportedly, Mao had also intimated his intention to Khrushchev and Nehru long before he resigned. Since Liu had clearly been the heir-apparent, it made little sense for him to engage in a power struggle with Mao. If Mao were forced out of office by Liu, who took over the chairmanship of the People's Republic of China, it is difficult to explain how Mao could purge P'eng and Huang in September 1959. Perhaps we may accept the official explanation at face value: Mao stepped down as chief of state while keeping the powerful chairmanship of the party because he wanted to have more time for Marxist-Leninist theoretical work and his resignation would enable him all the better to concentrate his energies in dealing with questions of the direction and policy of the party and state.

It may have been a gracious gesture on Mao's part to admit that his program of the "three red banners" had turned out to be a failure. However, this factor alone did not exclude another possibility—that because of his age he was quite willing to delegate more responsibility to Liu Shao-ch'i and the other lieutenants so as to pave the way for smooth succession while he was still alive and to avoid the kind of struggle for succession experienced in the Kremlin. Since Mao was somewhat in seclusion and even possibly seriously ill at times, Liu naturally became the power center of the regime as heir-apparent. In politics, persons tend to go where the power is. In the light of this reasoning, Mao's reported grievances that his senior colleagues failed to consult him on important matters in the past become more intelligible. By 1965, he might have realized to his dismay that his comrades had not been faithfully following his line, but were merely paying lip-service to Mao Tse-tung's thought.

As a result, Mao initiated the cultural revolution. As the attack on those in authority grew in intensity, some of his close comrades showed increasing reluctance to go along. Reluctance became criticism. "You are going too far," so voiced the critiques against the Red Guards. Or, as indicated by party documents, "You are making an awful mess of it"; "your revolutionary spirit is all right, but the way you are doing things is wrong," and so on. This may account for the increasing number of top leaders criticized in wall posters, leaders who did not go far enough for Mao. A *Red Flag* editorial of August 21, 1966, declared with unmistakable

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clarity that anyone, regardless of how high his position, how old his standing in the party, or how prominent his reputation, who did not follow the Mao Tse-tung line would be downgraded, humiliated, or dismissed from office. But not even Mao Tse-tung is omnipotent. He is stubborn, but facts and reality are stubborn, too. Eventually, his reckless policy had to be brought to an end before it carried the country to chaos. By the end of February 1967, the momentum appeared to have slowed down.

The Red Guards from primary and secondary schools were now told to return to school. Their errors and excesses were criticized. Ultra democracy was denounced and discipline was stressed. Next to spring plowing, in which the army was ordered to participate, special attention was given to unify rebel organizations and to correct the chaotic and anarchical conditions of the mass movement by establishing the revolutionary committees as a provisional organ of power based on the "three-in-one" principle. This might be in line with Mao's guerrilla tactics of attack and withdraw, advance and retreat, striving with each push to gain a bit more ground against the adversary. It might also be a result of resistance to Red Guard outrages and the danger of economic paralysis. In any event, after a quiet month of consolidation there were signs in early April that definite steps were being taken to make a final assault on Liu Shao-ch'i.

VI

Among the top leaders who have been spared attack in the cultural revolution are premier Chou En-lai and Defense Minister Lin Piao. The manifestations of the advancement of Lin Piao's power in the summer of 1966 are too well known to require description here. Since it was the army newspaper that took the lead in the cultural revolution, and it was Lin Piao who emerged as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms," it was suggested by some observers at the beginning of the cultural revolution that Mao or the party had lost power to the army. Others have speculated on the possibility that China might move from a rigid to a more flexible foreign policy after the purge of P'eng Chen, because he had been closely identified with a hard-line policy. I still believe, as I have from the outset, that the cultural revolution was directed by Mao

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Tse-tung, that the party under Mao's leadership still commands the gun, and that the nature of the cultural revolution does not mean the changing of Mao's foreign policy. As it happened, by the middle of February 1967, China's relation with the Soviet Union nearly reached the breaking point as a result of an escalation of the war of the embassies.

The reason for the army newspapers' having taken the lead seemed to be that Mao was unable to use the *People's Daily* because the men in charge of the party paper were the very persons who had to be purged. Next to the *People's Daily*, the *Liberation Army Daily* was probably the only one that enjoyed national reputation. It also indicated the army's support for Mao. Furthermore, a top military leader standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Mao in public and in the listing of the party hierarchy does not necessarily mean that the army has taken over. This had been the case for twenty years until the cult of Mao Tse-tung developed after the Communist victory. For two decades, particularly in the nineteen-thirties, army chief Chu Teh used to pair with Mao to such an extent that many ignorant peasants mistook "Chu-Mao" as one person. Of course, since 1949 Mao's name has almost totally eclipsed that of Chu Teh.

Next to Chu Teh and P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao was the military commander who had worked most closely with Mao since the founding of the Red Army in 1928. Since Chu Teh had become inactive because of his age and P'eng Te-huai had been purged, it is logical that when Mao needed army support to undertake the nationwide purge of those persons within the party who were in authority, he turned to Lin Piao. Since he took over as minister of National Defense from P'eng Te-huai in 1959, Lin Piao had faithfully followed the Mao line. He has given Mao full support, as had Chu Teh in the past.[2]

Whether Lin Piao will be Mao's successor will depend on when the occasion for succession arises. In a sense, Mao will have no successor, because it has been more than forty-six years since he,

[2] My view that Lin Piao is an heir to Chu Teh's role was first expressed in talks to the Foreign Service Institute (Sept. 6, 1966) and the Columbia University Seminar on Modern China (Oct. 12, 1966), and coincides with the view subsequently expressed by Edgar Snow in his article, "The Man Alongside Mao," *New Republic* (Dec. 3, 1966), 16.

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along with others, founded the party, and it has taken more than forty-six years to make Mao Tse-tung what he is today. Someone will take his place as party chairman, but when this happens, things will not be the same. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen whether, after the upheaval, Mao can put his house in order again.

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On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought*

MICHAEL WALZER
Harvard University

"New philosophy calls all in doubt," wrote John Donne, and thereby suggested a theory of intellectual transformation. Because the universe was of a piece, all its parts harmoniously connected, the Copernican revolution seemed to call into question not only Ptolemaic astronomy but also a whole series of related ideas having to do with order, not in the heavens but on earth. With the sun lost and the cosmos "all in pieces," "Prince, Subject, Father, Son are things forgot."[1] Suddenly, the very categories of social and political thought seemed empty and useless. In a sense, Donne was right: later seventeenth-century writers like Hobbes and Locke were indeed compelled to work out anew the meanings of authority and subjection and to redefine political and familial obligation. But was he also right to suggest that this work was made necessary by the new philosophy?

For other writers, it was the new religious ideas which had destroyed the perceived coherence of the social world. Machiavellian "atheism" and Protestant voluntarism, thought Richard Hooker, endangered the ancient, elaborate, and lawful structure of human

* This paper was read before the American Sociological Association, Chicago, Aug. 30, 1965.

[1] John Donne, *The First Anniversary*. For some of the effects of the new science upon English thought and culture, see Marjorie Hope Nicolson, *The Breaking of the Circle* (New York, 1962).

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life, giving rise to a kind of outlaw individualism which Donne also was to describe:

> For every man alone thinkes he hath got
> To be a Phoenix, and that there can bee
> None of that kinde, of which he is, but hee.[2]

Against the new man of his own time, Hooker reiterated the traditional world view at great length and with enormous power, though not with any confidence that his heroic effort could stem the tide. For with the old religion, like the old cosmos some thirty years later, "all in pieces," the way seemed open for universal doubt and its frightening corollary, eagerness for novelty. Hooker sadly admitted the "aptness of men's minds to accept and believe" the new political doctrines.[3] But was he right to believe that these ideas followed directly from the collapse of ancient faith?

Certainly cosmology and theology were closely bound up with the politics of writers like Hooker and his predecessors. But they were bound up in a very complicated fashion. Scientific and religious thought on the one hand, and political thought on the other, were parts of a single system, but this was a system which even in the Middle Ages had frequently been subdivided, and whose various parts hung together in a way which implied no necessary logical connection. Hooker might write, for example, that it was "expedient" to understand the angelic hierarchy for the "more perfect direction" of mankind, but he did not mean that the best social order could be deduced from the structure of the angelic squadrons.[4] The connection between the two was not logical but analogical. The angels represented an order toward which human societies tended or might be directed. Similarly, the coherence of society was like the harmony of the planets; the rational, benevolent authority of the king and the father corresponded to that of God himself.[5] And so new ideas about God's government of the universe or about the orders of angels or the movements of planets

[2] *The First Anniversary;* Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of the Ecclesiastical Polity,* Bk. V, I-III.

[3] *Ecclesiastical Polity,* Bk. I, I, 1.

[4] *Ecclesiastical Polity,* Bk. I, XVI, 4.

[5] On the correspondences, see E. M. W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture* (New York, 1944).

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did not necessarily call into question the social analogues of the old ideas. They merely made those analogues less persuasive than they had previously been; they undercut what for the moment may be called the symbolic reinforcement of such political ideas as harmony and hierarchy.

Consider another example: the traditional view of the state as a "body politic" was enormously strengthened and its effectiveness in political discourse greatly enhanced by the parallel view of the church as a divine body. Of course, the church was not thought to be *like* a body; it was thought to be a body, and Christ its actual head. But this mysterious identity could not be reproduced in politics, and so the unity and integration of the church, like that of the physical body itself, only symbolized a perfection which the state might approach or in terms of which it might convincingly be described. Protestant voluntarism, and the contracts and covenants to which it gave rise, weakened the force of this symbol but did not necessarily entail its rejection. For there might well be reasons, quite apart from religion, for continuing to use it; indeed, it would never have been used at all were there not such reasons.

Even Hooker's remarkable faith in human rationality and in the possible (or rather, the presumed) identity of positive and natural law did not logically depend upon his overarching vision of universal harmony. Imagine the heavens a chaos, the angels a band of skyborne scavengers and God himself their chieftain; it would still be possible for men to elaborate laws and organize communities. They would only require a set of images and models alternative to those they had just been so rudely denied. Barely twenty years after Hooker's death, Hugo Grotius argued, in effect, that such images and models were built into the human mind; man would be sociable even if there were no God. And the political theory based upon this insight was not so very different from Hooker's.

But if the rejection of the old political ideas did not follow logically from the new cosmology and theology, it followed nonetheless (and Grotius' revised traditionalism was only a temporary expedient). In order to understand why this was so, it is necessary to say something about the function of symbolism in political thought. For the old cosmology and theology provided not a set of propositions from which a political theory might be deduced, but rather a series of images and analogues out of which a

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theory might be fashioned. And once those images and analogues had been called into question, it was not impossible, but it was increasingly difficult, to think the old thoughts.

I

Politics is an art of unification; from many, it makes one. And symbolic activity is perhaps our most important means of bringing things together, both intellectually and emotionally, thus overcoming isolation and even individuality. "Whether verbal or iconographic," writes William York Tindall, "the religious symbol, and the political too, can unite man with man and man with something greater than he, society or God."[6] In a sense, the union of men can only be symbolized; it has no palpable shape or substance. The state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived. An image like the body politic, then, is not simply a decorative metaphor, applied by a writer who has already grasped the nature of political association and now wishes felicitously to convey his understanding. Rather, the image is prior to understanding or, at any rate, to theoretic understanding, as it is to articulation, and necessary to both.[7] When the state is imagined as a body politic, *then* a particular set of insights as to its nature are made available. The image does not so much reinforce existing political ideas (though it may later be used for that purpose) as underlie them. It provides an elementary sense of what the political community is like, of how physically distinct and solitary individuals are joined together. Or rather, in this case, it suggests that individuals are neither solitary nor distinct, but exist only as members of a body. Thus the image provides a starting point for political thinking, and so long as it is effective, no other starting point is possible. If symbolization does not by itself create unity (that is the function of

[6] *The Literary Symbol* (Bloomington, 1955), 16.

[7] See Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 41: ". . . if the material of thought is symbolism, then the thinking organism must be forever furnishing symbolic versions of its experience, in order to let thinking proceed. As a matter of fact, it is not the essential act of thought that is symbolization, but an act *essential to thought*, and prior to it." But Langer is using the word symbolization in a rather broader sense than is intended above.

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political practice as well as of symbolic activity), it does create *units*—units of discourse which are fundamental to all thinking and doing, units of feeling around which emotions of loyalty and assurance can cluster.[8] But when the image becomes merely decorative, when it is "better left to the muses," as Milton wrote of the once vital symbol of the political father, then it has lost its unitive potency. It becomes a "conceit," still used by writers but no longer capable of engaging the intellect or the emotions.

Symbolic activity does more than provide the units of thought and feeling; it also connects those units with other structures: religious systems, planetary orders, physical bodies, man-made machines. It unifies the universe, provides politics with a series of references, links it closely with other realms of human experience. Thus the state, when seen as a body politic, is brought into close relation with the whole organic world. A single vocabulary describes animal bodies and political communities and makes the second appear almost as familiar, as natural, as well organized as the first. So kings become heads and soldiers arms; change is understood in terms of growth; disorder is described as a disease; decline as senility:

> States have degrees, as human bodies have,
> Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter and the grave.[9]

If this is art, it is not merely artful; that is, it is not the creation of some crafty politician or hireling intellectual. It is rather a per-

[8] Ernst Cassirer distinguishes mythical symbols which represent, he argues, an "objectification of feeling" from linguistic symbols which represent an "objectification of sense-impression." This is part of a more general distinction between mythical and rational thought which he defends in *The Myth of the State* (New York, 1955), 55. But it is the very essence of the symbol, as the term is used in this essay, that it simultaneously provokes thought and evokes feeling. Words alone may not do this, but words which have become part of the special vocabulary of politics—king, subject, citizen, duty, rights, father of his country, checks and balances, and so on—obviously do.

[9] Fulke Greville, *Treatie of Warres*. This search for references has, perhaps, a special cause in the history of political thought. Since antiquity, politics has been regarded as a realm about which only probabilistic statements could be made. So thinkers have been driven to escape this realm, to find some sort of certainty in religion, cosmology, science, and so on, and carry it back into politics. But this is not necessarily a self-conscious escape. It may be that certain sorts of statements about the state—vivid descriptions of or bold assertions about its essential qualities—such as human beings are prone to make, simply cannot be made, cannot even be thought, except metaphorically.

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vasive world-view, which cannot in its time be denied, though its parts can certainly be manipulated. Thus symbolic systems set (rough) limits to thought, supporting certain ideas, making others almost inconceivable.

Unit and reference symbols belong to a kind of public intellectual domain, like language itself. They cannot be ascribed to individual writers, though certain characteristic uses of them undoubtedly can be. The creative genius in political thought is not a man who invents new symbols, for that is an artificial and idiosyncratic business at best. He is rather a man like Hooker who elaborates old symbols with a new fullness and eloquence, or like Hobbes who explores the meaning of symbols just emerging in the thought and activity of his immediate predecessors and his contemporaries. But the symbols themselves seem to be a collective product, worked out by numberless men at many different levels of artistic and intellectual excellence over a long period of time.[10] Similarly, the decline of one or another set of symbols seems to be a gradual process involving the thought and activity of many men and imposing on all of them a certain strain and uneasiness. For this, in a minor way, is like losing a language, a loss which surely would be terrifying if we could properly imagine it.

If symbolization were a matter of logic only, "new philosophy" would quickly call all the old references into doubt. But images and analogues are matters of feeling as well; they shape our whole sensibility; they guarantee a sure place in a known world; they tell us more than we can easily repeat. And so their transformation encounters a resistance which logical demonstration does not or ought not to meet. This is a resistance especially strong in the realm of politics, for when all is said and done, the polity is more important (for most men) than the cosmos. Francis Bacon understood this well when he pleaded for scientific freedom and argued that the new discoveries would not affect political life:

> But surely there is a great distinction between matters of state and the arts; for the danger from new motion and from new light is not the same. In matters of state a change even for the better is distrusted,

[10] The argument here is based in part on Clifford Geertz' brilliant essay "Ideology as a Cultural System" in David Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe, 1964), 60.

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> because it unsettles what is established; these things resting on authority, consent, fame and opinion, not on demonstration. But arts and sciences should be like mines, where the noise of new works and further advances is heard on every side.[11]

The contrast is a true one, though it is certainly over-exact. Nevertheless, changes in the way men conceived the cosmological reference-world did undermine conceptions of the polity. Whatever the intentions of the scientists, whatever the evasions of political writers, the new science had its subversive effects, for it called into question the very vocabulary with which fame and opinion work and the crucial symbols through which authority inspires consent.

At the same time, the evasions of publicists and philosophers like Bacon have their function in intellectual life; they slow down the process of transformation and make possible the development of alternative symbolic systems. If the earth was no longer at the center of the universe, if the planets did not move in perfect circles, then indeed it became easier to explore the parallel disharmonies of human life. And that exploration, carried on by dramatists, poets, preachers, and pamphleteers of all sorts, was simply the working out of images and analogues with which the new disharmony could be understood and even ordered—which is to say, theorized about.[12]

In a similiar fashion, the net impact of the new religion on political thought was significantly blunted, and time gained, by the genuine reluctance and (sometimes) the deliberate evasiveness of Puritan ministers. Most of them were undoubtedly sincere when they denied King James' dictum: No bishop, no king. They did not intend their defense of ministerial parity to be a defense of secular equality and they continued to employ the symbols of hierarchy in their occasional discussions of political and social life. Yet one can watch in their work the decay of those symbols, as a consequence of their reconstruction of the religious reference-world.[13] A direct attack upon the ancient authority of the king, however, did not occur until a new symbolic system had been fully developed. As Clifford

[11] Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*. Bk. I, XC.

[12] It should be said that in any complex civilization there exist what might be called symbols-in-reserve, or symbols alternative to the dominant ones, to which men freed for one or another reason from the dominant ones can turn.

[13] M. Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), Chap. V.

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Geertz has suggested with reference to the French Revolution, the principle of kingly authority "was destroyed long before the king: it was to the successor principle that he was, in fact, a ritual sacrifice."[14]

The process of destruction is very complex. What occurs is a slow erosion of the old symbols, a wasting away of the feelings they once evoked, an increasingly disjointed and inconsistent expression of political ideas, a nervous insistence upon the old units and references—all this accompanied, willy nilly, by a more and more arbitrary and extravagant manipulation of them—until finally the units cease to be accepted as intellectual givens and the references cease to be meaningful. But since men cannot orient themselves in the political world without unit and reference symbols, the systems are replaced even as they are called into question. And the more profound the questioning, the more adventurous is the search for replacements. The precise nature of the new symbols is by no means determined; it depends on the availability of new reference-worlds and on the artistic and intellectual success with which these are appropriated and the new references worked out.

Symbolic activity is thus not only a mediative, but also a creative process. It must be said again, however, that there is nothing *logically* necessary about this activity. The arbitrary reassertion of the old symbolism can offer intellectual and emotional sustenance for at least some time. Indeed, the official political theory during periods when symbolic forms are being questioned and replaced is likely to consist entirely of dogmatic reiterations and amazing elaborations of the old images and analogues. Experimental and innovative activity, which can often take place openly so far as the reference-worlds are concerned, takes place secretly, or at any rate beneath the public surface of intellectual life, so far as politics is concerned. And this is why systematic theorists like Hobbes claim such absolute originality; they have few if any public predecessors and may be quite unaware of their actual indebtedness.

But there is another reason for the extraordinary claims of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century innovators which must briefly be considered. Whatever their hesitancy about politics, these men intended to call into doubt not merely the old images and analogues, but the very process of symbolization itself. This is how

[14] Geertz, 75, n. 43.

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they viewed their attack upon the medieval system of "correspondences." They did not intend to replace that system with something more modern and so they had no eye to the tortuous processes by which they were enabled to do so—and by which, in some measure, the precise character of their own achievement was determined. Thus Martin Luther, announcing in one of his earliest pamphlets a recurrent Protestant theme, attacked the medieval writer Dionysius who had elaborated the symbols of hierarchy: "He plays with his allegories, but this does not make them realities. . . . This business of allegorizing is only for men who have nothing else to do."[15] Luther, presumably, had no time for such play. Similarly, Francis Bacon a hundred years later in his famous attack on intellectual Idols: "And though there be many things in nature which are singular and unmatched, yet [the human understanding] devises for them parallels and conjugates and relatives which do not exist."[16] In political thought, Hobbes waged a similar war against symbolism, defending a narrow conception of language and promising a science freed from the absurdities of metaphor. And yet Hobbes' thought, for all his careful definitions, is surely as symbolic as Hooker's. Despite the pretension of the opening chapters of *Leviathan*, the new science, like the old cosmology, did not provide a set of propositions, but a series of striking and suggestive images. So the body politic was replaced by the body-in-motion, harmonious integration by an anarchy of movement, authority by power, growth by construction. All this was profoundly important; it involved a major shift in sensibility and a fundamentally new political orientation. But it did not establish the absolute autonomy of politics, nor cut it off from all reference-worlds, nor terminate the human search for unity. Finally, it represented not linguistic clarification or scientific advance, but rather a transformation in symbolic expression. After all, what is Leviathan—"that mortal god" and perfect machine—but a new Idol?

II

The new symbols with which Hobbes worked have a history. In part this is the history of the modern science of physical and me-

[15] Luther, *The Pagan Servitude of the Church* in John Dillenberger (ed.), *Martin Luther, Selections from His Writings* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961), 343.

[16] Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Bk. I, XLV.

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chanical motion. But it remains a question why the world of motion became a reference-world for political thought, a new source of images and analogues. The answer lies not only in the success of the science, but also and more importantly in political and social transformations which literally set men moving and so made the new symbols appropriate. Indeed, the symbolism of clashing movement seems to have sources in political experience quite independent of its scientific sources. And the decline of the old symbols of harmony and hierarchy seems to have causes quite apart from and prior to the "new philosophy." Political images and analogues have, in fact, a double source and a double susceptibility: their rise and fall are related first to cultural change in the broadest sense, to new philosophies, theologies, and technologies; and secondly to political change, to new social problems and new methods of organizing and controlling human activity.

If this is true of the symbols as units of thought, it is equally true of them as units of feeling. Just as religious symbols need to be ritually acted out if they are fully to be felt, and just as the symbols change when the rituals do, so in the world of politics there is a continuous interaction between symbolic formation and enactment (and similarly, between theory and practice). The king will not long be acknowledged as head or father, for example, if he fails convincingly to act out the parts, or if other actions become more significant in communal life than the rituals of headship or fatherhood.[17]

What happened in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England was that transformations in political experience directly paralleled transformations in the reference-worlds which had previously provided the terms of symbolic expression. The result was that new political practices were translated into new images and analogues, not quickly, but with relatively greater speed than anywhere else in Europe. And new theories were developed and systematically elaborated earlier there than anywhere else. In Italy, where changes in experience had preceded both "new philosophy" and religious reform, the new politics gave rise to no stable pattern of symbolic expression. Machiavelli had no Italian successors. But England's double transformation, complex and tortuous though

[17] See Geertz' discussion of Javanese kingship in "Ideology," 66-67.

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it was, culminated in Hobbes' brilliant exploration of a symbolism which no later thinker—until the Romantics developed new images and analogues—could possibly avoid. For two hundred years there is hardly an English writer, hardly a coffee-house conversationalist, who is not a successor to Hobbes. Almost for that long, the new symbols seemed equally resonant with the religious and scientific worlds from which they had been drawn and with the political world to which they referred.

This double transformation probably cannot be precisely analyzed, but it can be illustrated—and with an example central to Hobbes' work. The body-in-motion upon which he builds his system is a symbolic figure. It represents the individual human being, but in a very special way: no longer is he a member of the body politic; no longer does he have a place in a hierarchical system of deference and authority; no longer do his movements conduce to universal harmony. Instead, the individual is alone, separated from his fellows, without a master or a secure social place; his movements, determined by no one but himself, clash with the movements of other, identical individuals; he acts out chaos. Now this extraordinary view of human activity was not invented by Hobbes. His creative achievement was to conceive the body-in-motion as the basis of a theoretical system and to offer his own map, so to speak, of the internal logic of the idea. But before the body-in-motion could be conceived, it had to be imagined, and before it could be imagined, it had to be experienced. The decay of the old cosmology and theology opened men to this experience, for if in some sense it had always been available, the pervasive symbolism of harmony had made discordant motion difficult to accept. But at the same time, the experience itself had to become vastly more significant in communal life than it had been in previous ages before the collective imagination could center upon it. Center upon it that imagination surely did, as the sixteenth-century literature of vagabondage and ambition suggests. Here were the two sorts of motion—physical and social mobility, wandering and climbing—which Hobbes' single figure embodies. Indeed, the picaresque hero of the early novelists and the conquerors and usurpers of the dramatists would surely have called into question the old symbolic system even if its reference-worlds had never been transformed. Once again it must be said, however, that this would have been,

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as in any case it was, a very slow process. It was perfectly possible for a writer like Shakespeare to reaffirm the old cosmology and all its political references, while simultaneously exploring with extraordinary intensity the new man in motion. Harmony was his intention; disharmony his preoccupation: "Love cools, friendship falls off, brothers divide. In cities, mutinies; in countries, discord; in palaces, treason; and the bond cracked between son and father."[18]

And as in Shakespeare's plays, so in the political world itself the new man was first seen from within the loosening frame of the old symbolic system—that is, as a deviant and a threat. But the defense mounted against this threat—legislation, police, cruel punishments—was so massive as to call into question the harmony and naturalness of the order presumably being defended. Increasingly, political thinkers groped toward a vision of masterless men and sovereign power such as Hobbes was finally to describe.

But that vision could, literally, not be seen until the old symbols had been discarded. The villains of the dramas and the vagabonds, criminals, conspirators, and social climbers of the real world could be symbolically transformed into prototypes of man himself only with the assistance of new referential systems. Here social change and cultural innovation interconnect and the fallen Adam of Protestant theology and the moving bodies of the new physics both play their crucial part in the history of political ideas. They serve as universalizing images. They provide the basis for new theoretical analyses of the separated members and rebels against hierarchy who had previously been treated only as deviant figures. Donne's universalism—"*every man*. . . hath got to be a Phoenix"—has Protestant sources:

> For that first marriage was our funerall:
> One woman at one blow, that kill'd us all. . . .[19]

Hobbes, though he too drew upon the Calvinist tradition, owes far more to the scientists. His theory is presented to a large extent in the imagery of Galilean physics: "There be in animals two sorts of motions. . . ."[20] The availability of this imagery was of crucial importance not because it enabled him to express new ideas, but

[18] *King Lear*, I, ii.
[19] Donne, *The First Anniversary*.
[20] *Leviathan*, Part I, VI.

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because it enabled him to treat theoretically a view of human behavior imminent, so to speak, in the minds of his predecessors, but concealed or distorted by an inadequate symbolic frame.

Once again, the comparison with Italy is useful. Sheldon Wolin has described how Machiavelli, who surely possessed a keen sense of men in motion, struggled to express himself through the old imagery: "The result was not a sharply defined picture, but a series of palimpsests."[21] This is true, but it does not go far enough. Machiavelli did not simply write his new ideas over the old symbols; rather his ideas were never fully developed because he had as yet no alternative symbols through which to work them out. Of course, he did possess new symbolic references—the images and analogues of warfare, for example, which he employed so brilliantly and which lie behind much that is original in his writings—but these did not include systems so complete, so alluring, so available for imitation, as the new theology and science of Hobbes' time. And this perhaps explains why Machiavelli's view of human nature was never systematically worked out. He himself seems uncertain whether he is talking about some or all men; his enemies all too easily pretended that he had justified occasional and desperate villainy rather than provided a serious psychology. It was Hobbes who first turned the *Prince* into *everyman* and explored the Machiavellianism of everyday life, and he was able to do so only with the help of a new symbolism. "Each individual appeared as an atom," writes Wolin, "somewhat different in composition, but having the same general appearance, hurtling across a flat social plane."[22]

III

The new political theories of the seventeenth century thus have two sources: cultural innovation and social change. But the ideas themselves are not in any direct sense a reflection of or even a response to innovation or change. Complex processes of symbolic transformation mediate the distance between cultural or social upheavals on the one hand and theoretical developments on the other —or, which is very nearly the same thing, between old and new

[21] Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston, 1960), 214.
[22] *Ibid.*, 282.

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theories. When new reference-systems and new experiences coincide, as in seventeenth-century England, the mediative process may be shorter than in other cases and new theoretical work more quickly produced. But in any case that intervening moment of painful doubt and intellectual disarray—and of clandestine creativity—is enormously significant. It helps explain why theorists like Hobbes cannot carry on any meaningful debate with their predecessors. Their ideas have not been developed through any simple process of intellectual disagreement or rational response to changing conditions. Rather, they begin work with new unit and reference symbols; they see a different world; their reason has new tools at its disposal. Finally, they stand on the other side of a chasm like that which opens between men who no longer speak the same language.

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The Foreign Policy Conflict in American Labor

JOHN P. WINDMULLER
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations

In 1966 foreign policy issues and overseas operations overshadowed almost all others that came before the governing bodies of the AFL-CIO. On three separate occasions the Executive Council gave considerably more than routine attention to foreign affairs. In June, an extraordinary meeting approved the American worker delegate's boycott of the International Labor Conference in Geneva. In August, the regular session rejected criticism of labor's Latin American operations and voted a strong endorsement of American policy in Vietnam. In November, the Council reaffirmed all major foreign policy positions taken since the merger in 1955. All three gatherings evoked well publicized internal disagreements. The first two concluded with split votes, though rather lopsided ones. The third one faintly portended the possibility of a break in labor unity when UAW President Walter Reuther decided at almost the last minute not to attend a comprehensive foreign policy review held at his own request.

These events reveal a side of American labor's activities which does not often receive notice. There can certainly be no doubt that over the past two decades labor's commitment to a variety of international activities and causes has become substantial, controversial, and probably irreversible. It is equally clear that the emotions which international issues arouse among the small group of

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active participants are extremely strong. They can be repressed for a time, but eventually they burst out, as they did again in 1966.

This paper will review only the controversies which arose in 1966, especially those involving the boycott of the ILO Conference, the activities of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, and labor's stand on the war in Vietnam. The analysis which then follows will attempt to explain the source and nature of the differences, the apparently excessive importance of individual personalities in labor's foreign policy, and the likely impact of the current conflict on the cohesiveness of the federation.

The Walkout at the ILO

It was American labor's boycott of the ILO Conference in June which stirred up the greatest amount of publicity and led to the first confrontation in 1966 between Reuther and AFL-CIO President George M. Meany. To understand why Rudy Faupl, for many years the American worker delegate at ILO conferences, walked out on the first day of a scheduled three-week meeting requires a brief account of the relevant background.

Alone among all the specialized UN agencies, the ILO is a survivor of the League of Nations era. Under the terms of its constitution, originally an integral part of the Versailles Peace Treaty (Articles 387 to 427), the ILO holds an annual conference—the International Labor Conference—at which may be represented as voting delegates not only two government representatives of each member state but also one worker and one employer delegate. This form of representation constitutes the basis of the ILO's well known "tripartism."

The presiding officer of the conference, invariably a distinguished government delegate, is chosen *de novo* each year. The office is coveted more for the honor which it confers than for the power that flows from it. In recent years, however, the chairmanship has on several occasions required more than routine gifts, usually because of efforts by delegates from Communist or underdeveloped countries to employ the conference as a forum for raising highly controversial political questions.

Normally, the chairmanship rotates among the several continents. In 1966 it was by general agreement Europe's turn. Ordi-

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narily the countries of the area concerned would have tried beforehand, through conventional diplomatic channels and through their representatives on the ILO Governing Body, to come to an understanding on an appropriate candidate. His election would then have been a mere formality. However, 1966 was to be a different year.

Already by November 1965 Poland had made it known that it would advance the candidacy of Leon Chajn, a former deputy minister of labor and for years a regular Polish government delegate. The prospect of his election greatly disturbed a number of Americans whose task it is to be concerned with ILO affairs.[1] Fearing that Chajn's occupancy of the chair would not only afford free rein to political speeches from the rostrum but also enhance Communist chances of increasing their representation on the Governing Body, they decided to look for a suitable candidate from a Western European country. Eventually, the search narrowed down to the person of Dr. G.M.J. Veldkamp, the Netherlands minister of social affairs.[2]

Veldkamp's willingness to have his name go forward rested in part on extensive inquiries by Dutch embassies throughout the world. These showed that Veldkamp appeared certain of election.[3] Two days before the 50th International Labor Conference opened, the entire U.S. delegation—government, workers, and employers—caucused in Geneva. The government members reported that "the election of Mr. Veldkamp appeared to be assured and that the U.S. Delegation therefore might 'play it in low key.' "[4] But on June 1, Chajn won the election by 184 to 183 votes.

A full explanation of the reasons for the surprising result would lead too far afield. Contrary to expectations, the Africans voted as

[1] They were Assistant Secretary of Labor George Weaver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator of International Labor Affairs George Philip Delaney, employer delegate Richard Wagner (recently succeeded by Edwin P. Neilan), and worker delegate Rudy Faupl.

[2] According to the account of a high Dutch civil servant, Veldkamp's candidacy was due to pressure by Western employer delegates. See T. M. Pellinkhof, "De 50ste Internationale Arbeidsconferentie," *Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid*, XXI (1966), 647. By contrast, in his report to the AFL-CIO Executive Council, Rudy Faupl wrote that it was "largely through the efforts of the U.S. Government" that Veldkamp entered the contest. See Rudy Faupl, "American Labor and the Issues Confronting the ILO," *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, XXI, No. 7 (July 1966), 4.

[3] Pellinkhof, 647.

[4] Faupl, "American Labor," 4.

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a body for Chajn. This was intended as a protest against recent Dutch support in the UN Security Council—with the Netherlands delegate in the chair—for Britain's stand on the Rhodesian question. The Scandinavian and French governments also supported Chajn, as did Iran, the Arab delegations, Spain and Portugal, and of course the entire Eastern European bloc.[5] In a report to his Parliament Dr. Veldkamp explained that on the eve of the conference the Eastern European countries had offered in return for support of Chajn's candidacy that they would exercise greater moderation in their speeches.[6]

However that may have been, the American worker delegate and his advisers walked out of the conference when the vote was announced. Faupl explained subsequently:

> After the election, I called President Meany and reported what had happened. I advised him that I could not, in good conscience, sit in the Conference presided over by a representative of a totalitarian country and that "I am withdrawing the delegation." President Meany told me, "You are the Delegate, you are in a position to weigh the situation. If I were in your position I would do the same thing, but don't do anything that could commit the AFL-CIO to withdrawing from the Organization—which is a decision that neither you nor I can make but only the Executive Council."[7]

Faupl then drafted a statement but did not release it at the request of the leader of the Workers' Group, Jean Möri of Switzerland.[8] It was, therefore, not until June 4 that the New York *Times* carried its first story of Faupl's boycott.[9]

The delay apparently had the effect of conveying the impression to President Reuther that the leadership at AFL-CIO headquarters had deliberately concealed the walkout. In fact, Reuther later seems to have become convinced that AFL-CIO headquarters had con-

[5] See, for example, "The International Labor Conference of 1966," *Monthly Labor Review*, LXXXIX (1966), 841-46.

[6] Staaten Generaal, *Rijksbegroting voor het Dienstjaar 1967*, "Hoofdstuk XV, Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid," "Memorie van Toelichting," Zitting 1966-67 (Identification No. 8800), No. 2, p. 46.

[7] Faupl, "American Labor," 4.

[8] Möri feared that adverse reaction to Faupl's protest might enhance Communist chances of winning for the first time a worker seat on the ILO's Governing Body in the upcoming triennial elections. *Ibid.*, 4-5.

[9] "U.S. Labor Shuns I.L.O. Conference," New York *Times*, June 4, 1966.

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trived in advance to stage a walkout if Veldkamp lost the election. In a statement released on June 16, Reuther expressed this charge very sharply:

> In the last twenty-four hours, the UAW has learned from authoritative sources that the boycott of the ILO by the AFL-CIO had been under consideration by the AFL-CIO headquarters for approximately a week prior to the walkout and it is, therefore, evident that there was ample time for consultation and discussion with the leadership of the AFL-CIO before any final decision was taken.[10]

Reuther's indignation over the lack of consultation was justified, but his accusation of chicanery lacked proof and very probably missed the mark.[11]

Meany's immediate reaction to Faupl's call was to put himself in touch not with fellow labor leaders but rather with the highest official in the U.S. government. The government was bound to be concerned about the walkout since it affected the position of the entire U.S. delegation in Geneva. If strong pressure to reverse the walkout materialized, it would most likely come first from that side rather than from AFL-CIO vice-presidents. No tradition of collegial decision-making had established itself in the AFL-CIO, certainly not in the sense that news of Faupl's walkout would automatically have led to extensive internal consultations. Day-to-day decisions were customarily made at headquarters. Quarterly Executive Council meetings reviewed and approved past actions and passed appropriate resolutions. If any council member strongly disagreed with a given policy, he could ask for a special meeting—and he would certainly get one.

Meany never disguised the fact that this was his view of proper procedure. In commenting on Reuther's charges, he said:

> Now I felt that if he was disturbed by this action and he knew I had some part in it he should have called me up and told me what he said in the letter, that this was unauthorized, that this should have been

[10] "Statement by UAW President Walter P. Reuther on behalf of the International Executive Board of the UAW—Presented to the AFL-CIO Executive Council, Washington, D.C., June 16, 1966," *UAW Administrative Letter*, XVIII, No. 11 (June 17, 1966), 6.

[11] Meany's reply to Reuther's allegation was: "I told him that was a damnable lie, an absolute damnable lie, made out of whole cloth." *John Herling's Labor Letter*, June 18, 1966, p. 4. Compare New York *Times*, June 17, 1966.

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brought before the Executive Council. Now if he had done that on the 5th [of June] I can assure you I would have called the Executive Council into session. Certainly I had no desire to impose my will as against the Council's.[12]

No evidence has been brought forward to show that Faupl acted on prior instructions.[13] His act, instead, seemed to have been a personal reaction to an adverse turn in the life of an organization—the ILO—whose course had increasingly become a matter of concern to him. In the early nineteen-sixties Faupl had still been optimistic about the ILO's ability to remain a genuine tripartite organization.[14] But rising Communist influence in 1964 and 1965, sometimes with the aid of delegates from the many new member countries, had increasingly discouraged him.

In the spring of 1965, Faupl and Meany had met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk "to convey the concern of the AFL-CIO Executive Council over the deterioration of the tripartite structure within the ILO and lack of consultation with the [entire] delegation by our Government delegates."[15] In the course of this conversation Meany had even expressed the view that if the ILO turned farther away from its original purposes and structure and became largely an intergovernmental institution, "there would be no more place within it for the American labor movement."[16] Yet, already the

[12] *John Herling's Labor Letter*, June 18, 1966, p. 3. It does not appear necessary to deal with Meany's disingenuous assertion, made at the same time, that he did not look on the walkout as a policy matter. If it had really been a routine action, he would hardly have thought it necessary to get in touch with the White House.

[13] One of Meany's closest advisers on foreign policy and the director of the AFL-CIO International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone, whom Reuther probably suspected as a key member of the alleged plan to stage the boycott is reported to have expressed his opposition to it. Lovestone, according to the very plausible report, felt that Faupl should not have walked out at all but should instead have issued a "vigorous statement denouncing the election of the Pole, while asserting that it is now important for all democratic forces to push forward ever more vigorously because of the setbacks." *John Herling's Labor Letter*, June 11, 1966, p. 2.

[14] See Faupl's testimony on the "International Labor Organization" in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the International Labor Organization*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, pp. 115-18, and R. Faupl, "International Labor Organization," *Labor Law Journal*, XIII (1962), 515-19.

[15] Faupl, "American Labor," 4.

[16] *Ibid.*

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1965 conference had shown that Rusk's promise of closer coordination among all members of the U.S. delegation—a promise which according to Faupl was at least in part kept—had not sufficed to stop the drift.[17]

As far as Faupl was concerned, Chajn's election only confirmed the trend. The delegate from Burundi, the first to make a seconding speech on behalf of Chajn, came from a country whose government had only a short time ago executed the leaders of the Christian trade union movement. Deals seemed to have been made between the Communist bloc and the Iberian dictatorships which threw Spain's and Portugal's votes to Chajn. Chajn himself represented a country without genuine freedom of association. Faupl may safely be taken at his word when, while justifying his walkout to the AFL-CIO Executive Council, he stated: "I have acted in accordance with my own conscience, without instructions from anyone and in accordance with the policy of this Council as I have understood it, and in accordance with the will of the overwhelming majority of the American workers."[18]

The lack of plan also shows through Meany's first reaction to Faupl's call from Geneva: "When I finished talking to Faupl I called President Johnson and told him what had happened and then went to see him the next day and went into great detail on the deterioration of the ILO. . . ."[19] President Johnson asked Meany to take the matter up with Rusk. Meany reports:

> Secretary Rusk asked me whether Faupl was going to stand for election as a member of the governing body [of the ILO] and I said that when I talked to him he had not made up his mind, that he was pretty well disgusted with the whole ILO picture, being that this organization that meant so much to him was going down the drain, as he looked at it. Rusk said to me that he thought it would be wise if he could hold a seat on the governing body. So I told Secretary Rusk that I would

[17] After the 1965 conference, one of Faupl's closest associates wrote in his review of the proceedings that what "was most disturbing was the apparent indifference of most delegates except those from the U.S. to the Communists' use of the conference as a vehicle for promoting Soviet foreign policy objectives." Bert Seidman, "ILO at the Crossroads," *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, XX, No. 8 (Aug. 1965), 1.

[18] Faupl, "American Labor," 5.

[19] From a Meany news conference, as quoted in *John Herling's Labor Letter*, June 18, 1966, p. 1.

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> convey that to Faupl and I did and I advised Faupl that I thought that he should try to hold his seat, and, of course, as you know he was elected to that seat.[20]

Whether Rusk and others who spoke with Meany urged him to have Faupl abandon his boycott before the end of the conference is not clear. Meany has denied that such a request was made.[21]

On June 8, and therefore in all likelihood after the completion of Meany's consultations with government officials, the UAW Executive Board met in Detroit for an already scheduled meeting. Afterwards, Reuther sent a letter to Meany in which he expressed "the strongest objections to and sharp disagreement with the action of the AFL-CIO delegates in walking out of the current ILO Conference in Geneva" and to the undemocratic procedures which preceded that step.[22] He challenged the right of any AFL-CIO officer or delegate to commit the organization in such a grave matter without a thorough review and a prior vote at the highest policy level of the AFL-CIO. He also characterized the walkout as "unwise, undemocratic, contrary to established AFL-CIO policy, and unauthorized by any AFL-CIO body with authority to change that policy." The letter concluded with a demand that Meany "direct the AFL-CIO delegates . . . forthwith to resume their seats and to continue their participation in the work of the ILO Conference." Meany's response was to call a special meeting of the AFL-CIO Executive Council for June 16.

By calling the meeting, Meany in effect turned the issue into one of confidence in his leadership and thereby into a personal contest with Reuther. Reports on the council session indicate that it was one of the most agitated in the eleven-year history of the merged

[20] *Ibid.* Faupl was re-elected to the Governing Body on June 9. He interrupted his boycott just long enough to participate in the vote. In this election Pyotr T. Pimenov, a secretary of the Soviet Union's Central Council of Trade Unions, was also elected to a three-year term on the Governing Body. It was the first time that the worker delegates at an ILO conference chose a member of a Communist labor organization for one of their twelve seats. Whether Faupl's boycott contributed to Pimenov's election is uncertain. More likely, disunity between adherents of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions was chiefly responsible.

[21] *John Herling's Labor Letter*, June 25, 1966, pp. 1-2.

[22] The complete text of the letter appears in *John Herling's Labor Letter*, June 11, 1966, pp. 3-4. See New York *Times*, June 11, 1966.

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federation.[23] At the close of a four-hour debate, the council took a decision by the rare device of a vote. By a vote of eighteen to six it adopted a resolution which "fully supports and endorses the position of the President of the AFL-CIO and the recent action of the U.S. workers' delegate to the International Labor Conference." The brief resolution also asserted that the walkout had been "the most effective means to indicate the reaction of the free workers of America to the election as President of the Conference of a representative of a totalitarian regime. . . ."[24]

The most interesting aspect of the vote was not its foreordained outcome but the division of council members.[25] All members associated with former AFL unions voted for the resolution. Six out of nine presidents of former CIO unions voted against it, including Reuther. The other three took Meany's side.[26] The solidarity of the AFL bloc therefore proved superior to that of the CIO. This was to become even clearer in the ensuing months. Reuther did, however, win one concession. The council agreed to his request to hold a special review of all foreign policy positions during the fall.

In retrospect, the boycott must be termed a futile gesture, at best. Quite unnecessarily, and no doubt quite unintentionally, it raised a question whether American labor was prepared to respect the adverse outcome of a properly conducted vote in international gatherings. But initially—that is, before the walkout turned into a boycott—it had been no more than the indignant reaction of a single person. Although Faupl was technically a free agent and

[23] The reporter for the Washington *Post* wrote: "After Faupl and Meany had their say, Reuther spoke for about 45 minutes. Then more than a dozen of the 24 members present spoke, during which there was heated name-calling according to one informant." Washington *Post*, June 17, 1966.

[24] For the full text see *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, XXI, No. 6 (June 1966), 1.

[25] Five council members were absent: A. Philip Randolph of the Sleeping Car Porters, Paul Phillips of the Papermakers, Herman Kenin of the Musicians, I. W. Abel of the Steelworkers, and David Sullivan of the Building Service Employees. If speculation about their likely vote is permissible, the guess may be hazarded that Phillips, Kenin, and Sullivan would have voted for the resolution, and Randolph against it. The absence of a substantial record on foreign policy in the case of Abel prohibits a guess about his position.

[26] They were Joe Beirne of the Communications Workers, John Grogan of the Shipbuilding Workers, and Paul Jennings of the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE).

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therefore not under Meany's orders, Meany could have prevailed upon him to reconsider. He chose not to do so. Thereby he assumed a share of the responsibility himself, perhaps the larger share since he was not on the scene and was thus not under the direct influence of the infighting and the intrigues that have beset ILO meetings in ever greater measure in the last twelve years.[27]

Latin America

In August, the AFL-CIO Executive Council met in Chicago in regular conference. Two foreign policy issues—Latin America and Vietnam—dominated the meeting. For the past two decades, U.S. labor has made a steadily greater effort to cultivate its ties with Latin American labor organizations. The main thrust has been to support the development of a form of trade unionism which corresponds to American labor's own conception of the proper role of trade unions in a free society. That this undertaking reflects a good deal of apprehensiveness about the spread of radical ideologies cannot be seriously doubted, but that it also stems from a genuine sense of mission to help weak organizations acquire the means for self-sustained growth, nurtured by activities centering on services and bargaining, is in my view equally indisputable.

In early 1962, a group of AFL-CIO leaders took the initiative of establishing an administratively independent organization to expand some already ongoing activities concerned with aid to Latin American labor: the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Among the principal sponsors of this venture were George Meany and President Joe Beirne of the Communications Workers. Initially, the major task of the Institute was conceived to be the education and training of Latin American labor leaders.[28]

[27] In a gently admonishing comment on the reasons for Faupl's boycott the Swiss Trade Union Federation held that "the best way and the only truly effective way of protesting was under those circumstances to walk up to the podium." See *Special Bulletin of Swiss Trade Union Federation*, June 20, 1966, mimeographed, p. 2. For a similar comment by a West German trade union delegate see Hermann Beermann, "Die Kommunisten und die Arbeitskonferenz," *Die Quelle*, No. 8 (Aug. 1966), 338-39.

[28] American Institute for Free Labor Development, "Aims, Objectives, and Programs," May 1962, mimeographed. More recently, a series of so-called "impact projects" has been added; these are low-cost ventures combining local self-help with foreign assistance.

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To these was soon added a series of "social projects" involving principally low-cost housing construction, credit unions, and cooperatives.

As an independent organization the AIFLD could tap two sources of funds which the AFL-CIO proper could not have drawn upon: contributions from U.S. business firms and contracts from government foreign aid agencies. In 1965, the Agency for International Development contributed about three million dollars to the AIFLD's budget, while the AFL-CIO itself gave about $200 thousand and private business between $150 thousand and $160 thousand.[29] The current operating budget probably amounts to about four million dollars, substantial but far less than the much larger estimates recently advanced.[30]

AIFLD has attracted a considerable amount of favorable publicity.[31] Nevertheless, from its very inception some trade union leaders have expressed strong misgivings, first of all about the mixed composition of the AIFLD Board of Trustees. Despite a trade union contingent large enough to exercise effective control over policy in the most unlikely event that that should ever become necessary, the inclusion of American businessmen with important holdings in Latin America has disturbed several critics who believe that a mixed board needlessly offends socially progressive groups in the area. For example, Victor Reuther, director of the UAW's International Affairs Department, has objected that the presence of businessmen

> on AIFLD's Board seriously compromises its trade-union training and educational role. Its structure exposes it to the charge of conflict of interest and is a propaganda gift to the enemies of free trade unions who effectively characterize these businessmen as symbols of Yankee imperialism and enemies of social progress in Latin America.[32]

[29] This information comes from AIFLD Secretary-Treasurer Joseph A. Beirne, as cited in "CIA ties denied by AFL-CIO," *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 24, 1966.

[30] One estimate has given the improbable figure of $110 million as the total U.S. government contribution to AFL-CIO overseas activities. Henry W. Berger, "American Labor Overseas," *The Nation*, Jan. 16, 1967, p. 83. However, see note 56 below.

[31] George C. Lodge, "Revolution in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIV (1966), 196; David Bell, "The Quality of Aid," *ibid.*, 605.

[32] Victor Reuther, "The International Activities of American Trade Unions," in William Haber (ed.), *Labor in a Changing America* (New York, 1966), 304-05.

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That view did not deter Walter Reuther from becoming and until February 1967 remaining a charter member of the AIFLD board, though perhaps an inactive one,[33] but it helped to bring about one change. During AIFLD's first months, J. Peter Grace of W. R. Grace and Company had been president and chairman of the board, while George Meany was listed as vice-chairman. In September 1962, Meany assumed the presidency himself.

The majority view, as expressed by AIFLD Administrator William C. Doherty Jr., strongly favors presenting AIFLD as a joint North American labor and business venture. Doherty maintained in a recent article that the presence of businessmen serves to set a good example to Latin American employers and workers by demonstrating the feasibility of labor-management cooperation, that it helps to dispel hostility toward U.S. business firms in Latin America and thereby toward the United States in general, and that it encourages U.S. firms abroad to adopt labor policies favoring the growth of free trade unions.[34]

A second criticism alleges that AIFLD's educational program is pervaded by an exaggerated anti-Communist tone which repels rather than attracts those whose support it seeks to win. The program does pay attention to the study of communism and the most effective means of combatting Communist penetration of labor organizations, political parties, cooperatives, and similar groups. But it is doubtful that this aspect has been considered fatal even by those who are unhappy about it. At bottom this particular disagreement reflects, I believe, mostly a difference over the style or tactics best designed to win the loyalty of working-class organizations in underdeveloped countries generally and Latin America in particular.

The third and probably the most serious criticism has asserted

[33] Charter board members from the CIO side of the merged federation included, besides Reuther, James Carey of the International Union of Electrical Workers, O. A. Knight of the Oil Workers, Joseph Beirne of the Communications Workers, and Michael Ross, at that time director of the AFL-CIO's Department of International Affairs.

[34] William C. Doherty Jr., "AIFLD and Latin Labor Building a Modern Society," *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, XXI, No. 7 (July 1966), 3. An additional reason may be the expectation, for which there is a good deal of pragmatic justification, that Congress and AID will more readily favor grants to a joint labor-business effort than to one under exclusive labor sponsorship.

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that AIFLD has been cooperating with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in combatting communism and subversion in Latin America. It is, of course, in the very nature of such charges that they cannot be documented. That fact neither makes them true nor necessarily proves them false. An instance of such cooperation is said to have been American labor's contribution to the unseating of Cheddi Jagan's left-wing government in British Guiana (now Guyana) in 1964. Against the background of these events, an article in *The Nation* in February 1964 reported the Reuthers as feeling that the AFL-CIO had "no business engaging in Central Intelligence Agency-type activities."[35] Two years later these feelings had obviously remained unchanged, for in one of a series of four articles about AFL-CIO foreign affairs appearing in the Washington *Post* a reporter wrote that "people close to the AIFLD say that its announced program is suffering from a preoccupation with its unannounced activity—intelligence gathering."[36]

Initially, these allegations had come only from "outsiders." As such, they could still be brushed off. It was not until May 1966 that, in the course of the UAW convention in Los Angeles, Victor Reuther himself stated in a published interview that the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department, and by implication AIFLD as well, were involved with the Central Intelligence Agency. In a related personal criticism Reuther commented further that Jay Lovestone, the director of the AFL-CIO International Affairs Department, "seems to have brought into the labor movement the working habits and undercover techniques which he learned when he was in the highest echelons of the Communist Party."[37]

This unexpected attack, coming from high inside the labor movement and therefore likely to be far more damaging to AIFLD operations than previous external criticism—and far more resented by those at whom it was directed—could obviously not be disregarded. At the behest of AIFLD Secretary-Treasurer Joe Beirne, an explicit review of the organization's activities was put on the

[35] Stanley Meisler, "Dubious Role of AFL-CIO: Meddling in Latin America," *The Nation*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 137.

[36] Dan Kurzman, "Lovestone's Aid Program Bolsters U.S. Foreign Policy," Washington *Post*, Jan. 2, 1966.

[37] Harry Bernstein, "AFL-CIO Unit Accused of 'Snooping' Abroad," Los Angeles *Times*, May 22, 1966.

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agenda of the AFL-CIO Executive Council for the regular August 1966 session in Chicago. This explosive item thus set the stage for a second confrontation within less than three months between Meany's and Reuther's foreign policy views.

In Chicago, Beirne first presented a verbal report on AIFLD activities. A resolution was then introduced which commended that organization for its work in carrying out the policies of the AFL-CIO and which rejected "out of hand the vilification that has been conducted against the AIFLD."[38] According to the *Christian Science Monitor*, which carried the most complete account of the meeting, Walter Reuther "expressed personal high regard for AIFLD's work." The account even quoted members of the Executive Council as having said after the meeting that " 'Walter admitted Victor went too far' in criticizing the AIFLD. But, they added, Walter believed the AFL-CIO statement [also] went too far in its condemnation of honest criticism and serious doubts of the AIFLD."[39] In the ensuing count, the statement passed by twenty-three votes to two, with one abstention.[40] The two minority votes came from Reuther and Joe Curran of the National Maritime Union. Jacob Potofsky of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers asked to be recorded as abstaining.

Thus, twice within a few months Reuther had suffered defeat on a foreign policy issue. The first time, one-fourth of the council members had still backed him, all leaders of former CIO unions. The second time, even they for the most part deserted him to join Meany's side.

Vietnam

One other foreign policy issue occupied the council at Chicago—the war in Vietnam. For some time Vietnam had been a matter of contention within labor, most recently at the December 1965 AFL-CIO convention in San Francisco, but there the difference had

[38] For the text of the resolution see *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, XXI, No. 9 (Sept. 1966), 1.

[39] *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 24, 1966.

[40] There were three absentees: Maurice Hutcheson of the Carpenters, Paul Jennings of the IUE, and George Burdon of the Rubber Workers. On the basis of past positions it is highly likely that Hutcheson and Jennings would have voted with the majority, and it is conceivable but uncertain that Burdon would have voted with the minority.

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seemed subtle and elusive. The San Francisco resolution, whose draft language was modified at Reuther's request to strengthen its support of negotiations,[41] had placed the labor movement behind President Johnson's policy, including "all measures the Administration might deem necessary to halt Communist aggression and secure a just and lasting peace."[42]

It was only in the debate on the resolution that the nuances separating Meany's views from Reuther's seemed to come to light, although no more than a very hazy light. Both rejected a withdrawal by the United States, both wanted Hanoi and Peking to understand clearly that they would obtain no military victory, and both expressed themselves in favor of a solution to the conflict at the conference table. But Reuther made the greater effort to put his views at "midpoint between two extreme positions," which he identified as those of the appeasers and those of the advocates of unlimited escalation.[43]

In Chicago eight months later, the council adopted a new statement on Vietnam whose tone was several degrees more militant than the San Francisco resolution. The matter came up two days after the debate on AIFLD activities. By this time Reuther had already left the meeting for another engagement, but not before a draft of the statement had been scrutinized by the council's International Affairs Committee. Reports differ about the transaction in that committee. According to Reuther, he protested the draft statement. According to others, he voted for the statement after certain changes he proposed had been inserted. Paradoxical as it may seem, both versions may well be correct. In any event, Reuther later characterized the statement as "intemperate, hysterical, jingoistic and unworthy of a policy statement of a free labor movement."[44]

The statement, adopted unanimously by those present, again supported President Johnson's political and military policy in the Vietnam conflict. But it went further than earlier policy stands in

[41] *John Herling's Labor Letter*, Dec. 25, 1965, p. 1.

[42] *Temporary Proceedings of the Sixth Constitutional Convention*, Fourth Day—Morning Session, p. 72.

[43] *Ibid.*, Fifth Day—Morning Session, pp. 5-11.

[44] See especially Damon Stetson's report in the New York *Times*, Aug. 27, 1966.

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backing the build-up of American forces, attacking the Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese governments for blocking a settlement, and—for the first time—turning harshly on the domestic opponents of U.S. policy:

> In our democracy, the right to dissent is sacred. It must be neither abrogated nor abused. While a minority has the right to dissent from the majority, disruption by even a well-meaning minority can only pollute and poison the bloodstream of our democracy. . . . Those who would deny our military forces unstinting support are, in effect, aiding the Communist enemy of our country—at the very moment when it is bearing the heaviest burdens in the defense of world peace and freedom.[45]

The precise reason for Reuther's strong objection has never been made known, but in view of his support of the San Francisco resolution—and his militantly anti-Communist speech there—it is probable that he considered the Chicago statement a gratuitous insult to Americans opposing the administration's policy, an unbalanced assessment of an extremely complex situation, and an unwarranted call for military escalation instead of a more intense search for peaceful negotiations.

The Policy Review

The meeting for a full-fledged review of all AFL-CIO foreign policy positions, which Reuther had requested earlier in the year, was set for November 14 in Washington. A few unions had been holding conventions during the intervening months and in some cases, such as the Steelworkers and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, had passed resolutions on Vietnam which were interpreted as favoring Reuther's views. Another development conceivably aiding Reuther was President Johnson's effort during the summer and fall months of 1966 to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Virtually on the eve of the meeting, Reuther announced that he would be kept in Detroit by a meeting of his own union's executive board. Joe Curran, who alone had supported him in Chicago when the AIFLD issue came up, at once urged him to change his mind

[45] For the complete text see *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, XXI, No. 9 (Sept. 1966), 1.

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since otherwise there would be "reason to doubt your sincerity." Curran apparently received no reply to his telegram.

In Reuther's absence, the policy review became a tame affair indeed. The council took up, one by one, nineteen different policy areas on which it had expressed itself during the past eleven years.[46] With one exception, it unanimously reaffirmed its previous views. The exception was the council's long-standing opposition to U.S. recognition of Communist China and China's admission to the United Nations. On this issue, Jacob Potofsky of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers dissented.[47] He could hardly have done otherwise since just a few weeks earlier he had co-signed the report of a panel of the United Nations Association, a private organization, that had urged the United States to adopt the so-called two-Chinas policy.

It is, of course, impossible to divine what the outcome would have been in Reuther's presence. Many issues had never been keenly controversial. These included all the old resolutions on colonialism, economic assistance and development programs, the United Nations, NATO and national defense, German reunification, Israel and the Middle East situation, international trade, and perhaps several others. Other resolutions covered more controversial matters, but even these, when originally adopted, had commanded unanimous support once the draftsmen had exercised their skills. Most resolutions would, therefore, have been reaffirmed as originally written. Only very few items, such as the Chicago statement on Vietnam, could have led to vigorous debate. In such cases, Meany would have won with ease on any showdown vote. But even here the possibility of compromise should not be excluded. Reuther would not have stood alone on Vietnam and China. His cause was hopeless only if he wanted to win on his own terms. And that he surely could not have expected after years of struggling to gain modest concessions. By absenting himself without furnishing a convincing reason, Reuther abandoned the field to the majority and offended those who had in the past given him their support.[48]

[46] See David R. Jones' account in the New York *Times*, Nov. 15, 1966.

[47] See the *AFL-CIO News*, Nov. 19, 1966, for a list of the issues.

[48] A variety of unsupported reasons have been advanced to account for Reuther's decision to remain in Detroit. They include his unwillingness to suffer still another defeat so shortly after the August meeting in Chicago, his

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Controversial Policy Issues

The foreign policy conflict in the merged federation began, of course, well before the merger was sealed. While AFL and CIO were still two separate federations, they sometimes though by no means always stood for different substantive policies. After the CIO expelled its Communist-dominated unions in 1949, but in fact as early as 1947, after the CIO majority threw its support to the Marshall Plan, the differences narrowed considerably but did not disappear entirely.

There is no need for drawing tiresome comparisons between past AFL and CIO resolutions on bygone issues.[49] Nor would it be particularly useful to search out the specific areas of contemporary disagreement (and the far from negligible areas of agreement) beyond those covered already in the preceding account of developments in 1966. Eventually, almost all the substantive differences, whether pre-merger or post-merger, resolve themselves into a single fundamental disagreement over the proper way for American society in particular, and democratic societies in general, to treat with communism.

If this is the nub of the controversy, as I think it is, the depth of disagreement depends on the presence and the weight of a Communist aspect in a given policy question. For example, a resolution on international trade and fair labor standards should occasion no bitter haggling over formulation or substance because there is no significant Communist aspect in this kind of issue; but a resolu-

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reluctance to expose himself to criticism over the poor showing of the Democratic party in Michigan in the November elections, his determination to abandon a long-standing policy of seeking a compromise on all secondary issues, such as foreign policy, so as not to endanger labor unity, his calculation that the AFL-CIO presidency would never be his anyway and therefore required no further distasteful accommodations, and his need to reckon with the views of powerful UAW board leaders who opposed any further concessions to the AFL-CIO leadership. Reuther's stated reason was that forthcoming negotiations in the automobile industry required his presence in Detroit. I am unable to decide which reason, or combination of reasons, is the "real" one, but I deem his own explanation to be irrelevant.

[49] See John P. Windmuller, "Foreign Affairs in the AFL-CIO," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, IX (1956), 419-32; Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1960), 160-63; George C. Lodge, *Spearheads of Democracy* (New York, 1962), 90-98.

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tion on trade with Eastern Europe would have to be drafted with extreme circumspection if the wide range of viewpoints prevailing in labor's top ranks is to be accommodated. The three issues which fed the controversy in 1966—the walkout from the ILO Conference, AIFLD operations in Latin America, and the Vietnam war—were "loaded" with Communist aspects, or, more precisely, offered a range of choices about how best to deal with the Communist side.

Just where the roots of disagreement over strategy and approach to communism are to be found is difficult to say. The question is germane, but in the last analysis probably answerable only in terms of the environment in which the main protagonists grew up and rose to power, the beliefs that early influenced their outlook on world and national affairs, and the ideals that impressed themselves on them as worth striving for. Most likely it is a significantly different assessment of the nature of communism itself, as an ideology and as a social system, which is basic to the divergence. That would help to account for the respective designations of "rigid" and "soft" which each side has sought to pin on the other.

One can readily infer from speeches and other documents that Meany's assessment of communism is one of an utterly evil, expansionist, enslaving, and still basically monolithic force without redeeming qualities of any kind and inherently incapable of transformation or salvation. Communism is epitomized for him by Stalin's terrors and is bound to remain so more or less. Reuther seems to view it in less Dantean terms. To him it apparently presents itself as a totalitarian, unjust, and even reactionary system which does not shy away from violence but which thrives best on poverty, misery, and degradation. It is neither immutable, indivisible, nor totally and irredeemably evil. These two disparate conceptions have coexisted in American society for several decades, in many different shadings of course. It is obvious that quite different conclusions follow from them with regard to the most effective way of dealing with Communist initiatives, proposals, and threats.

It is ultimately in the prescription of the appropriate response to communism, as the most important and perhaps still the most dangerous challenge to the democratic world, that the widest area of disagreement in labor, as in society at large, persists. While both sides agree on the need for maintaining a strong military establishment to deter Communist aggression—and agree also on the use of

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force to defend free institutions wherever attacked—they hold entirely different ideas about the long-term prospects of peaceful dealings with Communist states and movements and about the mutations of communism as an ideology.

These differences affect their attitudes on short-term relations, too. Since Meany sees in communism a conspiratorial force girding for world conquest, he abhors dialogues, visits, and exchange programs. At the level of international labor affairs, where his influence on public policy is manifestly strongest, he has unrelentingly opposed any initiatives by government and individual unions to invite Communist labor groups to the United States. Such contacts would serve only to confer a false legitimacy on the other side's organizations, thereby disguising their true purposes all the better, these being the exploitation of workers, the subversion of legitimate organizations, and ultimate world domination.

Because Communist states employ commercial relations as part of their overall political and economic strategy, Meany holds that the West ought to be chary about them. Any expectation that trade and cultural relations can ever lead to a genuine liberalization of Communist regimes or to long-term improvements in East-West relations is really a delusion. Communist leaders, especially those in the Soviet Union, have no intention of abandoning their long-term objectives. What the United States must always keep in mind, therefore, is that any step toward a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union—in fact anything that helps to shore up a Communist regime anywhere—is probably immoral and certainly fraught with great peril to the free world.

Inherent in Meany's view is the notion that communism cannot change except in superficial, tactical, and deceptive ways. Reuther, however, sees at least the possibility of a basic long-term change and finds support for it in the new polycentrism and the liberalizing trends in post-Stalin Russia and Eastern Europe. As circumstances change, so may dogma, practice, and the nature of the regime. If the United States can help to accelerate a change in circumstances, through increased trade and contacts, it should by all means search out the opportunities. Reuther's side, therefore, favors U.S.-Russian trade liberalization, labor exchange visits with unions in Communist countries, Communist China's admission to the United Nations, eventual U.S. recognition of Communist China,

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and a general widening of opportunities for a direct demonstration of the values and operation of democracy. With appropriate modifications, the contrasting views of the protagonists extend also to the policies the United States ought to adopt toward left-wing regimes and radical social movements in the new states.

As long as AFL and CIO were separate federations, these differences could find expression in the nuances of their separate foreign policy resolutions. But after the merger, the prescriptions of the dominant AFL wing, represented most forcefully by Meany, tended to pre-empt the field. Whenever Reuther failed to persuade a majority of his colleagues in the adversely weighted Executive Council —which turned out to be pretty much all of the time—he faced the unpleasant choice of keeping his own counsel or speaking out on behalf of a relatively small number of dissenters. It is true that on some important domestic issues he tried, very cautiously, to mold the Industrial Union Department into an autonomous force within the federation, but that department was not a suitable vehicle for the conduct of foreign policy.

Moreover, Reuther's aim to preserve at least outwardly a peaceful relationship with the top leaders of the federation made it inadvisable to branch out too frequently on his own course. One should not forget that most labor organizations tolerate recurring dissent and minority factions only with difficulty, if at all. Perhaps the prospect of succeeding some day to the federation presidency imposed its own constraining influence. Since Meany, too, preferred unanimous resolutions over publicized discords, he consented often enough to Reuther's suggestions for changes in foreign policy statements so that appearances could be kept up. To be sure, the accommodations were usually uneasy ones for both sides. Instead of representing a genuine reconciliation of antagonistic viewpoints, they only constituted verbal compromises, as was certainly the case with the 1965 Vietnam resolution in San Francisco. If Reuther had not become unaccountably upset over Faupl's walkout from the ILO Conference—and then even more upset when he was told, falsely and perhaps mischievously, that it was a deliberate, planned maneuver—the truce might well have lasted longer.

It ought to be noted in passing that after the end of the Dulles era in American foreign policy, Reuther's position on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (but not with Communist

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China) was usually closer to the administration's own views than was Meany's. Yet, this circumstance did not strengthen Reuther's standing in the House of Labor. The reasons are obvious. In the first place, any administration desires to have a neat and orderly relationship with labor. This wish leads logically to a preference for dealing, as far as possible, with the most representative and authoritative leaders at the very top, in other words, at federation headquarters. In the second place, both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations always knew perfectly well that they could pursue their evolving relations with Communist countries without deference to any contrary views of organized labor's principal spokesmen, though whenever possible, of course, with their welcome support and endorsement. When the thrust of administration policy in Eastern Europe began to aim at an easing of tensions, an increasing volume of trade, and the general objective of "building bridges," there was no danger that Meany would create difficulties unless deliberately provoked. Under these circumstances the very marginal advantage which might have accrued to the administration by openly encouraging a wider hearing in the labor movement for Reuther's more congenial views was hardly worth the certain cost of incurring Meany's profound hostility.

The Importance of Personalities

In the area of foreign policy probably more than in any other area of concern to labor, personalities have always played a dominant role. The reasons do not lie far afield. Whatever it is that union members expect from their organizations, the leadership's foreign policy views play virtually no role. With only few exceptions, concentrated at regional and local leadership levels, there is no articulate "public opinion" in labor's ranks on foreign policy.[50] Foreign competition aside, ordinary members simply do not

[50] Some union leaders at local and regional levels who favor Reuther's position on Vietnam and on foreign policy in general have tried to mobilize sentiment for the purpose of obtaining reconsideration and modification of official AFL-CIO views. One group, composed of leaders in New York and New Jersey, has issued a critical statement on Vietnam under the name of the Trade Union Division of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). See Peter Millones' report in the New York *Times*, Nov. 18, 1966. Similar groups are said to have been formed in the Middle West and the Far West. Not only does past experience

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consider their organizations to have a vital stake in such issues in comparison with bargaining, grievances, and other more mundane services.

The chances are therefore very great that the representative union member, whatever he may think as a citizen about foreign affairs, does not associate his union with a particular foreign policy stance, is willing to leave the matter to the men at the top of his organization if it pleases them to be concerned, and if put to the test is likely to prefer seemingly straightforward aims, like victory, to more tenuous, ambiguous, and complex ones.[51] He is also likely, if pressed, to be more attuned to Meany's general views about foreign affairs and relations with Communist countries than to Reuther's. Thus, when Faupl declared that his walkout from the ILO Conference had been "in accordance with the will of the overwhelming majority of the American workers," he was undoubtedly correct. There was no need to hold a referendum.

The absence in most unions of an alert and informed constituency on foreign policy questions has enabled those few labor leaders who hold strong views about foreign policy to follow their own preferences to a far greater degree than in collective bargaining or even political action, and certainly with less need to be concerned about rank-and-file sentiments. Moreover, since only a small pro-

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show that such groups are invariably unsuccessful in achieving their objectives (and therefore sooner or later dissolve themselves), but their leaders are often placed under great pressure to abandon the group by the national heads of their own unions who fear that their own ambitions, say a seat on the AFL-CIO Executive Council, may be thwarted by the injudicious acts of their local and regional officials. In labor's house, foreign affairs, like jurisdictional disputes, are not matters to be trifled with.

[51] The most comprehensive survey of union member attitudes about foreign policy is Alfred O. Hero, *The UAW and World Affairs: A Report for the UAW and the Foreign Policy Association*, July 1965 (unpublished). The data in this report together with other data will be the basis of a publication to be issued sometime in 1968. They generally indicate that manual workers tend to have a low tolerance for ambiguity and complexity in foreign policy issues, just as in domestic affairs. For confirmation see Lewis Lipsitz, "Work Life and Political Attitudes: A Study of Manual Workers," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (1964), 957, and Almond, who indicates that lower income groups are not only less well informed about, and less interested in, international problems than higher income groups, but that they also have more than a proportionate share of fatalists, pessimists, isolationists, and nationalists (pp. 122-30).

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portion of the country's top labor leaders maintain an abiding interest in foreign policy, most labor leaders themselves are willing to follow the initiative of a few men who, like Meany and Reuther, have an exceptional interest in such problems. Personal loyalties —and personal ambitions and rivalries—will therefore often influence their decisions as to whom, or what, they will support. The fact that in the dispute over the ILO boycott all council members from former AFL unions took Meany's side and all but three from former CIO unions took Reuther's side was surely not attributable to foreign policy differences arising out of the traditions of craft and industrial unionism per se.

On the other hand, there are also limits to personal loyalties, and one of these limits was evidently crossed when the Reuther camp linked AIFLD activities in Latin America with the CIA. This clearly went too far for all but one of Reuther's past supporters. Most labor leaders, as the Reuthers surely knew, are anxious to avoid embroilment in any issue that might conceivably create an adverse impression about their concern for national security.

When Reuther and Meany negotiated the terms of merger, both appreciated these general considerations perfectly well. That explains why their most tortuous negotiations, yet also those which received at the time the least amount of publicity, involved the future administration of foreign affairs.[52] Because the AFL was bound to become the senior partner on the strength of its superior numbers, it was the CIO's manifest objective to secure in advance as much influence over policy-making and administration in foreign affairs as could be wrested from the bargaining.

At the policy level, Reuther first of all sought to obtain for the CIO the chairmanship of the International Affairs Committee of the Executive Council. He did so in the belief, erroneous as it later turned out, that this committee would play a strong role in shaping

[52] By almost entirely omitting this area from his account of the negotiations preceding the AFL-CIO merger, Arthur J. Goldberg's book is not as candid as it could have been. See *AFL-CIO: Labor United* (New York, 1956), 209-11, 225-26. Goldberg, probably the chief architect of unity, wrote: ". . . although there have been peripheral differences of emphasis in the foreign policy positions of the AFL and the CIO, it seems probable that the new federation will have no great difficulty in establishing a unified and integrated outlook on world affairs" (p. 225). The prophecy was wide of the mark.

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AFL-CIO foreign policy. When Meany refused to concede the point, perhaps because he was himself not yet sure whether possession of the chairmanship could later be converted into the hard cash of foreign policy, they compromised on installing two co-chairmen. The strength of their mutual suspicions is indicated by the fact that no other standing committee started out with two helmsmen. Actually, that awkward arrangement only lasted for two years. The CIO co-chairman, Potofsky, resigned over a quarrel with Meany involving a matter of no political consequence. Since the AFL co-chairman, Matthew Woll, died at about this time, Meany took the chairmanship himself for a while, thereby undoubtedly confirming Reuther's worst expectations. Subsequently, Meany relinquished the position to George Harrison, whose views in any event coincided closely with his own, but by that time he was already confident that the committee would only help rather than hinder him in steering AFL-CIO foreign policy.

Even more intricate were the negotiations on the staffing of the federation's Department for International Affairs. As both sides realized, it was here that the vital detail work—preparation of draft policy statements, liaison with foreign and domestic government agencies, relations with foreign and international labor organizations, and much more—would be handled in the first and often most important instance. The involuted details need not detain us. When the timetable for the merger was threatened by repeated lack of agreement on a mutually acceptable director, the prize finally went to a complete novice in foreign affairs. Since that amiable stand-in, George T. Brown, had neither the interest nor the talent to grope his way through the maze of issues and personal feuds, effective policy direction became the responsibility of Jay Lovestone, who already had been serving as Meany's foremost foreign affairs adviser for several years. Lovestone's pre-eminent role subsequently received formal recognition, first, through an associate directorship, and in 1963 with his appointment as director.

Reuther's failure to prevent Meany from taking possession of the federation's International Affairs Department resulted soon after the merger in the establishment of the UAW's own International Affairs Department under Victor Reuther. At the point where differences in policy and philosophy no longer suffice to explain

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rationally the conflict in the AFL-CIO, the explanation is forced to shift to the personality conflict between Victor Reuther and Jay Lovestone, and, of course, between their aides and the principals behind them.[53]

Much has already been written of Lovestone's foremost role in the American Communist party during the nineteen-twenties, of his leadership of a Communist splinter group during the nineteen-thirties, and of his achievements as head of the AFL's Free Trade Union Committee from 1942 to the time of merger. One aspect, however, of the relationship between Meany and Lovestone deserves special notice. Most critics of AFL-CIO foreign policy maintain that Lovestone's indomitable anti-communism, comprehensible, they say, only in a former Communist, has taken complete possession of Meany. One widely syndicated Washington commentator wrote after the June 1966 Executive Council meeting:

> Jay Lovestone is a figure as remote and mysterious as the great khan and on the issue of foreign policy almost as absolute in the labor movement. Once a Communist, he became, as have so many others, a professional anti-Communist. His hold on the 72-year-old AFL-CIO president and the hierarchy of aging moguls around him is so strong that no interference or even criticism is tolerated.[54]

The precise nature of the relationship between a powerful leader and his adviser(s) is almost always difficult to assess. One cannot, therefore, reject out of hand the possibility that Lovestone has all along been the *eminence grise* behind the AFL-CIO majority's stand on communism and other issues. But in this case, as undoubtedly in many others, considerable influence based on expertise and skill appears to have become confused with omnipotence. In all probability Meany's views about communism took shape long before Lovestone became his adviser. On questions of tactics Meany's implacability probably pushes him further, at times, than Lovestone's counsel favoring greater suppleness would suggest. Thus, the notion that Meany is merely the voice

[53] See David R. Jones' account of this conflict in the New York *Times*, June 19, 1966.

[54] Marquis Childs, "Labor's Hard Line on Foreign Policy," Washington *Post*, June 17, 1966.

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and Lovestone the real force behind the federation's foreign policy is very likely no more than an attractive myth.

The personal conflict between Lovestone and the Reuthers has its origins in the UAW's organizing period. In the late nineteen-thirties, a group of Lovestone's followers, including especially Irving Brown, became involved in one of the factional struggles for control of the young union. They backed Homer Martin, clearly the wrong man, who subsequently led a portion of the members into a dual AFL union, while the much larger contingent, containing also Walter Reuther's caucus, remained faithful to the CIO. A decade later, when the separate AFL and CIO backed rival anti-Communist labor federations in postwar France and Italy, Victor Reuther was the CIO's principal European representative, while Lovestone and the AFL's chief European envoy, Irving Brown, pursued divergent AFL policy objectives abroad.[55] During this time, too, the CIO was still affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions, an organization comprising all important national labor federations from Communist and non-Communist countries, except only the AFL which refused any association with Communist labor groups and with the rival CIO. The breakup of the WFTU in 1949 brought the foreign policies of the two American federations much closer together, but had no parallel effect on personal relations. Many occasions have arisen since the merger to keep old animosities alive.

The Prospect

On February 3, 1967, Reuther resigned from the AFL-CIO Executive Council and from all his other positions in the federation except the presidency of the Industrial Union Department. The announcement of the resignations indicated that the UAW convention scheduled for April 1967 would be asked to empower the

[55] In Italy the AFL backed the Christians and the CIO the right-wing (Saragat) Socialists, known respectively as CISL and UIL. In France, however, the AFL supported the CGT-FO which had fairly close ties to the Socialist party (SFIO), whereas the CIO aided the Christian CFTC (whose majority now constitutes the CFDT). To some extent these ties still survive. The UAW recently printed with evident approval an English translation of a long interview which the CFDT's general secretary had given to a German trade union paper. See "Free and Independent-French Christian Union Adopts New Secular Policy," Occasional Publication No. 3 of the UAW International Affairs Department, Dec. 1966.

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officers to decide whether the union should sever its remaining links with the AFL-CIO. If a break occurs, foreign policy differences will have made some contribution to it, but their significance should not be overestimated.

It is indeed the case that international affairs have become an important and still expanding part of labor's overall activities. To labor's own considerable funds spent on international affairs of various kinds one must now add the even more sizable government resources put into labor's Latin American and recent African undertakings, the latter under Irving Brown's direction.[56] Inevitably, there has been talk about setting up a similar operation for Asia. It is true, also, that the personal commitment of the chief antagonists to foreign policy issues is exceedingly strong, with corresponding effects on their emotional involvement.

Nevertheless, for the labor movement as a whole and for any individual union in particular, even for the UAW, international affairs are still a secondary field of work and controversy. In recent years, the only real debate in a UAW convention over an international affairs issue occurred in 1962 when the union's officers proposed to allocate the interest income from the general strike fund to the union's international work. The proposal was eventually adopted, but only after a considerable number of speakers expressed their dissatisfaction with what they considered to be an unjustified diversion of the union's resources. Many active members and subordinate leaders would neither understand nor welcome a disaffiliation of their union from the AFL-CIO arising out of foreign policy differences at the top levels of the two organizations,

[56] Among the positions from which Reuther resigned was his board membership of the African-American Labor Center, labor's counterpart of the AIFLD for work in Africa. The UAW's relations with the AALC had been better than with the AIFLD, in part perhaps because there are no businessmen on the AALC board. After this article was completed, information came to light which showed that several national unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO had conducted programs abroad with financial support from foundations which, in turn, had been recipients of funds provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. At the February 1967 Executive Council meeting of the AFL-CIO, Meany denied that the AFL-CIO itself had received such monies for its own operations. Speaking for the AIFLD and the African-American Labor Center, respectively, Joseph Beirne and Irving Brown also denied that their organizations had received funds from foundations subsidized by the CIA. See New York *Times*, Feb. 21, 1967.

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especially since very likely more of them share Meany's general foreign policy views than Reuther's.

Thus, should the UAW's leadership decide in favor of disaffiliation, after overcoming what must surely be a substantial amount of resistance in its own top ranks, it will have to justify it far more strongly on grounds of differences over domestic than over foreign issues. To Reuther and his closest personal associates the two categories are no doubt inseparable and perhaps even of equal importance. In both instances, their utter frustration stems from an accumulation of grievances over not having been consulted on matters they deem important, over having been consistently disregarded even if they were consulted, and ultimately over the hopelessness of a perpetual, and most recently a declining, minority position. But in facing their constituents in the union they must give pre-eminence to the seriousness of domestic differences as justification for a split, for most union members are psychologically not prepared to recognize foreign policy disagreements as adequate cause for disunity in labor's ranks.

Whether or not a split occurs, the UAW will in the future pursue an even more independent foreign policy course than it has heretofore. The size of its international affairs staff now approaches that of federation headquarters. The UAW Free World Labor Defense Fund takes in more than the union has been able to spend so far. From this income, the UAW can finance all manner of activities designed to assure it of an independent standing in world affairs: assistance to unions in underdeveloped countries, directly or through the International Metalworkers Federation of which the UAW is a key affiliate; joint bargaining or pre-bargaining consultations with foreign unions in automotive industries; publicity on behalf of the foreign policy views and philosophy of the UAW leadership; training of a UAW cadre for temporary overseas service; and conceivably even the establishment of independent contacts with labor organizations in Communist countries. In addition, the UAW chartered in 1966 its own nonprofit corporation for overseas activities. Known as STEP (Social, Technical, and Education Programs), this organization intends to provide assistance to workers and their organizations abroad in vocational training and other fields requiring outside help. It is to be financed by the union itself and under appropriate circumstances also through

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contracts with the U.S. government. One may regard STEP as the UAW's answer to the AIFLD.

Over the next few years, one should therefore expect not only a continuation of two separate foreign policy lines but also the emergence of two separate operations, the major one representing the federation as a whole and the smaller one representing either an autonomous affiliate or an independent union, depending on what the UAW officers decide to do. It is highly unlikely that the UAW will receive support from other AFL-CIO unions, although on specific issues individual leaders will continue to speak out, as Potofsky did on Communist China's admission to the United Nations. On the whole, however, American trade union leaders will still take their foreign policy cues from the federation's leadership. For the foreseeable future, then, in the critical area of relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, U.S. foreign policy is moving ever farther away from the presently dominant views in the labor movement.

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Money and Party in Jacksonian America: A Quantitative Look at New York City's Men of Quality*

FRANK OTTO GATELL
University of California, Los Angeles

In olden times, that is, a generation or more ago, American historians proceeded upon a basic assumption when discussing the Jacksonian period: the Democratic party was the party of the people, and the Whig party was the party of economic privilege. The Democrats included in their ranks the common man, the farmers, the artisans, and the mechanics, the poor but honest sinew of Jacksonian Democracy. Conversely, the Whigs were the rich merchants and the wealthy planters who made up a self-styled "better sort." They were thinly disguised Federalists, vainly striving to stem the populistic tide.[1]

This economic class interpretation of political divisions came under severe attack during the two decades following the Second World War. First the entrepreneurial or "Columbia" school argued that Jacksonians shared the capitalistic ethos of their Whig antagonists, and that they were merely demanding equal time at the

* Grateful acknowledgment is made to the American Philosophical Society, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Academic Senate Committee on Research, University of California, for grants-in-aid which made possible the research for this article.

[1] See, for example, E. Malcolm Carroll, *Origins of the Whig Party* (Durham, No. Carolina, 1925), 189-220; George Rawlings Poage, *Henry Clay and the Whig Party* (Chapel Hill, 1936), 11-12; and, for New York, Dixon Ryan Fox, *The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York 1801-1840* (New York, 1919), 409-49.

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feeding trough.[2] A short time later, the writers of the complementary consensus school went beyond the identity of outlook that supposedly existed between established Whig capitalists and nascent Jacksonian capitalists, and argued that agreement on fundamental issues has been the hallmark of American politics at all levels. They insisted that meaningful correlations between voting behavior and economic status were hard to come by, if not nonexistent.

In the latter category, the work of Lee Benson stands as an influential example. His study of voting behavior in New York State in 1844, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*,[3] has in the few years since its publication in 1961 gone through several printings, including two paperback editions, and has become one of the most widely discussed volumes on Jacksonianism, even gaining the rare accolade of a session at a historical convention devoted entirely to its appraisal. Benson's book has not swept all before it—the conservatism of the historical profession is guarantee against such sweeping triumphs whatever the new viewpoint may be—but even critics have conceded that it made a breakthrough in methodology, a departure which afforded a fresh approach to the Age of Jackson, and perhaps to American politics in general.

Benson's methodology breathed academic modernity from every pore. He employed the rhetorical and structural paraphernalia of the social sciences. And particularly in those passages which demolished historiographical shibboleths, Benson ardently championed a marriage of historical dilletantism with the virile social sciences—an alliance meant to rescue history from old-maid antiquarianism.[4] Such a union will be solemnized before long, and the historical discipline will profit by it; so say most of the younger practitioners of the historian's craft. Thus Benson placed himself

[2] Charles Grier Sellers Jr., "Andrew Jackson versus the Historians," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLIV (1958), 627-30.

[3] Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case* (Princeton, 1961). Benson does not write of an America without social conflicts, but he gives primacy to ethnic and religious factors as determinants for group behavior, discarding the haves-versus-the-have-nots basis of liberal historiography.

[4] See, for example, Lee Benson, "Research Problems in American Political Historiography," in Mirra Komarovsky (ed.), *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, 1957), 113-83.

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in the vanguard, and his methodological *tour de force* gave almost irresistible impetus to his thesis.

Benson was especially assiduous in attacking the older view that in the Jacksonian era parties divided along class lines. In a section on party leadership, he attempted to establish a sociological identity among New York State Democrats and Whigs at the top rank, and his analysis extended with similar results into "Middle-Grade Leaders."[5] But in the process, to borrow a figure from the politics of New York in the eighteen-forties, Benson may have turned Barnburner to get rid of a few rats. A closer inspection of a small but important part of the smoldering ashes than has previously been attempted is called for. The comments which follow are not offered as an assessment of Benson's book as a whole. His theory of voting cycles and his call for a multivariate analytical approach to voting behavior are stimulating, and they will doubtless receive careful appraisal and criticism as his hypotheses are tested.[6]

I

"Partial answers," Benson declared at the beginning of his section on party leadership, "frequently give rise to misleading or erroneous conclusions."[7] No one can fault that observation, but in practice Benson himself emerged with answers that were partial, misleading, and erroneous. The questions he posed in that section went beyond the stated initial problem of the social composition of middle grade political leadership. In addition, and much more significantly, he asked: "Did men of wealth strongly tend to give their resources, talents, and prestige to the Whigs rather than to the Democrats? Did a large proportion of the business community—however defined—adhere to the Whig faith?"[8] In arguing for the negative, Benson cited an unnamed Whig orator to the effect that New York's rich men were divided politically and that many Democrats were in fact wealthy. The orator did not contend, however,

[5] Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, 64-85.

[6] Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-Party Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIX (1965), 25, note; 32.

[7] Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, 79.

[8] *Ibid.*, 80. Two questions (composition of middle-grade political leadership and voting behavior of wealthy citizens) run through the discussion on pages 79-85. I am concerned with the second.

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that the wealthy men were divided *evenly* between the parties. But, according to Benson, "by exploiting the clue" provided by the orator's imprecise claim, "historians may be able to clear away the rhetorical rubbish and reveal the social structure of party leadership during the Age of Egalitarianism."[9] Rhetorical rubbish, or the injection of something resembling class conflict into the Democratic-Whig struggle of the late eighteen-thirties, thus became the impediment. "Who from 1834 to 1844 took the [Democratic] campaign claptrap literally?" Benson asked derisively.[10] A fairer question might be: Who took the campaigning seriously? and the answer would be: A great many people. For, as is the case of twentieth-century advertising, which is also not to be taken literally, the effectiveness of rhetorical claptrap cannot be dismissed.

So much for rhetoric. What about verifiable data? Benson quoted from an editorial in Greeley's *Tribune* which tried to distribute part of the odium attached to the possession of wealth to the Democrats: "The Whigs are by no means all wealthy, nor are the wealthy all Whigs," etc., etc.[11] Some of Greeley's statements were themselves rhetorical claptrap. For example, Greeley "charged" that Democrats chartered most of New York City's banks. Since the Democratic Albany regency had controlled the legislature almost continuously for a generation, the statement was a truism. But Greeley also specified that many New York City Democrats were worth $100,000 or more. Benson explained that "the design of this study does not permit the research necessary to test all the claims" Greeley made, but one assertion (the presence of $100,000-or-over Democrats) could be tested precisely to learn about "party division among economic groups in New York."[12]

Eventually, all discussions of New York City wealth in the eighteen-forties depend upon those exasperating, fascinating, incomplete, and indispensable compendia of the city's economic elite, *Wealth and Biography of the Wealthy Citizens of New York City* . . . , published annually during most of the eighteen-forties and fifties by Moses Y. Beach, editor of the New York *Sun*.[13] Many

[9] Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, 80.
[10] *Ibid.*, 81.
[11] *Ibid.*, 81-82.
[12] *Ibid.*, 82.
[13] [Moses Y. Beach,] *Wealth and Biography of the Wealthy Citizens of New*

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historians have used them, Robert G. Albion wrote an article about them,[14] and Benson took samples from the sixth edition of 1845.

Beach's list of wealthy citizens for that year included about one thousand names. Benson chose not to analyze the list *in toto*, despite his stated intention to evaluate this specific Greeley claim. Therefore, "some sampling procedure must be devised."[15] He first matched the names of men who were officers of "ratification meetings" held in New York City in 1844 by both major parties with the names on the Wealthy Citizens list, and found that twelve Whig officers (or thirty-four per cent) qualified, as did thirteen (or twenty-six per cent) of the Democratic officers. Although Benson dismissed the percentage differential of eight per cent as "not large enough to be significant in any case," he nevertheless took the trouble to explain it away by the claim of "rank order position."[16] In other words, the importance of Middle Grade Leaders decreased as one read down from the top of the list. Thus if one took the first ten names, both parties supplied six (or sixty per cent) Wealthy Citizens. If one took only the first thirty-five names, the Democrats supplied thirty-four per cent Wealthy Citizens to the Whigs' thirty-five per cent. This reduction procedure, although ingenious, was questionable to say the least. Benson nowhere established that the men were listed in order of social or political prominence. The Democrats may have been listed that way (although that is doubtful); the Whigs certainly were not. They appeared arranged not in "rank order," but by city wards. The eighth name among the many Whig vice-presidents, for example, was not that of the eighth most important New York City Whig, but that of the Whig sent to the city-wide party convention to represent the Eighth Ward.[17] And it should also be remembered that Benson's

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York City, Comprising an Alphabetical Arrangement of Persons Estimated to be Worth $100,000, and Upwards. With the Sums Appended to Each Name: Being Useful to Banks, Merchants, and Others (6th ed.; New York, 1845).

[14] Robert Greenhalgh Albion, "Commercial Fortunes in New York: A Study in the History of the Port of New York About 1850," *New York History*, XVI (1935), 158-68.

[15] Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, 82.

[16] *Ibid.*, 83.

[17] New York *Tribune*, May 7, 1844.

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"ratification meeting sample" involved but twenty-five men out of the thousand Wealthy Citizens.

Benson's second sampling procedure was simpler but equally unsatisfactory. Taking the list at face value, he scanned Beach's biographical vignettes for political identifications and found information concerning the party affiliations of another twenty-five men, thirteen Democrats (fifty-two per cent) and twelve Whigs (forty-eight per cent).[18] Again, a consensus historian's dream. But the stumbling block here was the inaccuracy of the identifications. Beach, or his compilers, called two of the alleged Jacksonian Democrats, Jonathan Thompson and William W. Todd, "democrats."[19] Both men were in fact National Republicans who supported John Quincy Adams in 1828 and Whig candidates thereafter. Thompson was Adams' collector of the port, whom Jackson removed in 1829.[20] Corrected, the second sample then becomes fourteen Whigs (fifty-six per cent) and eleven Democrats (forty-four per cent). But the "sample" is not useful in any case. Beach's political identification of his Wealthy Citizens was arbitrary. Some men of political prominence were not identified by party (Benjamin F. Butler, for example), and some were identified incorrectly.

So, on the basis of these forty-five individuals (five were repeaters) out of one thousand (or 4.5 per cent of the total), Benson asked us to believe that his "hypotheses appear potentially verifiable."[21] This is a very tall order for such scanty research to accomplish, however tentative the claims. Obviously, the only constructive way to resolve the problem is to direct attention to the remaining ninety-five per cent and examine the Wealthy Citizens list in its entirety.

II

As already noted, the principal recommendation for the use of Beach's list is its availability. It contained no explanation of the

[18] Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, 84.

[19] [Beach,] *Wealthy Citizens*, 29.

[20] For Thompson see Henry Wysham Lanier, *A Century of Banking in New York 1822-1922* (New York, 1922), 136; James Grant Wilson and John Fiske (eds.), *Appletons' Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (New York, 1888-89), VI, 92-93; New York *Courier and Enquirer*, Nov. 2, 1832; New York *Tribune*, Sept. 27, 1844. For Todd see [Joseph A. Scoville,] *The Old Merchants of New York City* (New York, 1863-66), IV, 310-12; New York *National Advocate*, July 10, 1828; New York *Tribune*, Oct. 28, 1844.

[21] Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, 84.

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selection procedure employed, but merely implied that *every* New Yorker of 1845 worth $100,000 or more could be found on the list. Nor was there any assurance of accuracy concerning the estimates of wealth (usually rounded off to the "nearest" $50,000).[22]

Striking omissions were plentiful. Take, for example, William E. Dodge of the important metals firm, Phelps, Dodge & Company. Dodge, aptly termed a "merchant prince" by his biographer, was already a very wealthy citizen[23] at the time of the Beach compilation. Even more perplexing is the fact that Dodge was omitted although the company's senior partner, Anson G. Phelps, was listed at one million dollars, and junior partners Anson G. Phelps Jr., and Daniel James (worth $400,000 each), were both included.[24] Similarly, Edwin D. Morgan, merchant and politician, did not receive a listing; nor did Marshall O. Roberts, a young capitalist worth $250,000 by 1847.[25] Dodge, Morgan, and Roberts were all Whigs, but one can probably produce names of some prominent Democrats of means who did not gain inclusion. Obviously, Moses Beach was as capricious a practitioner of the art of "elite listing" as any of his predecessors or successors.

Theoretically, one might spurn Beach's offering and try to draw up a comprehensive and accurate list of New York City wealth in the eighteen-forties or any other decade of the period. But the task would involve a lifetime of research in the city directories and tax lists, among other sources. The scope of *this* inquiry does not permit such a luxuriance of preliminary investigation. I propose to limit myself to the one thousand individuals found in the Beach list of 1845.

[22] Albion, "Commercial Fortunes," 163, questions several estimates as too low; for a similar objection see Harry E. Resseguie, "A. T. Stewart's Marble Palace—the Cradle of the Department Store," *New-York Historical Society Quarterly*, XLVIII (1964), 136. On the other hand, Samuel B. Ruggles' biographer thinks the estimate of his subject is high; D. G. Brinton Thompson, *Ruggles of New York* (New York, 1946), 31, note.

[23] Richard Lowitt, *A Merchant Prince of the Nineteenth Century: William E. Dodge* (New York, 1954), 20-22, 201-02.

[24] [Beach,] *Wealthy Citizens*, 15, 23.

[25] For Morgan see James A. Rawley, *Edwin D. Morgan, 1811-1883: Merchant in Politics* (New York, 1955), 7-8, 21; for Roberts see Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), *Dictionary of American Biography*, 21 Vols. (New York, 1928-37), XVI, 11-12. Dodge and Roberts are listed in Beach's thirteenth edition of 1855.

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The figure "one thousand" has cropped up several times. It is an approximation, since the precise number of "workable" names is actually 909. The elimination of some names was advisable for several reasons. Female wealthy citizens could not vote or participate politically, whatever their views. Men who died before 1828 (the first year of a meaningful pro- or anti-Jackson alignment) have been eliminated, as have those identified by a last name only. There were also a dozen names repeated on the list.

Among the remaining 909 names, problems of identification arose. In some cases, men shared the same name, sometimes with another man on the list and far more often with another citizen who was not listed. There are two wealthy citizens named David Banks, and two men named George Douglass. In these instances, separate identifications were possible, and each pair split politically. But significantly, perhaps, at least as far as this study is concerned, the two Whigs were wealthier than their namesakes. There was also the problem of identifying the politics of men with common given and family names. For example, many John Wards lived in New York City at the time, but businessmen (who made up the vast majority of those on the list) often signed their firms' names to political pronouncements, such as calls for ratification meetings, or patronage petitions. Thus the presence of "Prime, Ward & King" on a Whig call or petition provided the political stand of John Ward, as well as that of Edward Prime, Samuel Ward, and James G. King, his partners in that well known brokerage firm. Of course, not all the names were that "common." Happily for the investigator, there was only one Aquilla G. Stout in New York City in 1845, and, of course, only one Preserved Fish.

Whatever the deficiencies and difficulties, the list still beckons. An intensive search in both primary and secondary sources, Whig and Democratic, produced the political identification of 642 men, or (70.6 per cent). The extent of political involvement varied widely. Thus, among the Whigs, the men ranged from Moses H. Grinnell, a Whig congressman, and Jonathan Goodhue, president of many an anti-Jacksonian New York City rally, to merchants such as George T. Trimble and Oliver T. Hewlett, who apparently were not lured into participating in political meetings but who publicly opposed Democratic policies, such as the removal of the deposits and the refusal to charter a new national bank. The Dem-

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ocratic minority showed a similar spread, from ex-cabinet member Benjamin F. Butler to Democratic merchants such as Reuel Smith, who voiced general approval of the Van Buren administration in 1840. In any case, of the 642 men identified politically, the overwhelming majority (541 or 84.3 per cent) were of the Whig persuasion. New York City money in 1845 was decidedly Whig.

Not only was New York City wealth Whiggish to the general extent of 84.3 per cent but big money showed an even more pronounced affinity for the party of "sound principles." If we divide the Wealthy Citizens into groups according to the size of their estates, at the highest levels the incidence of Democratic affiliation shrinks well below the already miniscule overall average of 15.7 per cent. All four men worth five million dollars or more were anti-Jacksonians. And at the next three levels, the Democrats averaged only 8.4 per cent of those identified. Thus among those worth $400,000 or more (with one hundred identified out of a total of 129), ninety-two men (ninety-two per cent) were Whigs. Democrats fared better in the categories $300,000 to $399,000 and $250,000 to $299,000, dropping off again sharply in the $200,000 to $249,000 class. But to revert to America's common yardstick for measuring great wealth, of the seventeen millionaires identified out of a total of twenty-two, sixteen (94.1 per cent) were Whigs.[26]

TABLE 1
Party Affiliation by Amount of Wealth

	Total	*Identified*		*Whig*		*Dem.*	
	No.	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
$5,000,000 or more	4	4	(100%)	4	(100%)	0	(0%)
$1,000,000 to $4,999,000	18	13	(72.2%)	12	(92.3%)	1	(7.7%)
$500,000 to $999,000	80	59	(73.8%)	54	(91.5%)	5	(8.5%)
$400,000 to $499,000	27	25	(92.6%)	23	(92.0%)	2	(8.0%)
$300,000 to $399,000	101	67	(66.3%)	50	(74.6%)	17	(25.4%)
$250,000 to $299,000	63	47	(74.6%)	37	(78.7%)	10	(21.3%)
$200,000 to $249,000	162	110	(67.9%)	98	(89.1%)	12	(10.9%)
	455	325	(71.4%)	278	(85.5%)	47	(14.5%)

[26] The only millionaire identified as a Democrat, Jacob Lorillard, died in 1838. Had he lived on into the forties he may well have become one of the many wealthy Democratic defectors to Whiggery.

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III

Benson could not have chosen a less suitable point in time than 1844-45 to seek validation for his thesis. In fact, his study of Jacksonian Democracy is curiously unhistorical in its neglect of chronology. True, he provided a summary of New York political history from 1815 to 1844 which set the Fox-Schlesinger accounts topsy-turvy, and he specifically chided political historians for their unhistorical use of isolated election returns,[27] but in essence his study concentrated upon voting behavior in 1844. With regard to a negative correlation between upper-class membership and party, 1828 would have served far better.

In 1828, a New York City businessman or professional might as easily have supported Jackson as Adams. Or with equal probability, he might have ignored the organized aspects of politics and done no more than cast his vote. This was no longer the case in 1844. In the intervening sixteen years, businessmen had soured on Jacksonism-Loco Focoism in a series of revolts which culminated in opposition to Van Buren's subtreasury proposal during the late eighteen-thirties and in the feverish enthusiasm of the election of 1840.[28] The defection process began in New York City as early as 1827, when several Tammany sachems supported Adams instead of Jackson.[29] Then during the Bank Veto campaign of 1832 several Democratic leaders bolted (among them Gulian Verplanck and Moses Grinnell),[30] and a year later the crisis brought on by the removal of federal deposits from the Bank of the United States caused further defections. The Panic of 1837 and the subtreasury proposal, which ostensibly would have cut the ties between the national government and the bank credit system, produced the major party split known as the conservative revolt, and created more recruits for the Whig column. Most conservatives found their way back to the Democratic party in time, but not all.

[27] Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, Chaps. 1-3, p. 124.

[28] For a general account of these movements, see William Trimble, "Diverging Tendencies in the New York Democracy in the Period of the Locofocos," *American Historical Review*, XXIV (1919), 396-421. See also William G. Carleton, "Political Aspects of the Van Buren Era," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, L (1951), 167-85.

[29] Gustavus Myers, *The History of Tammany Hall* (New York, 1901), 86.

[30] Robert W. July, *The Essential New Yorker: Gulian Crommelin Verplanck* (Durham, No. Carolina, 1951), 172-79.

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Among the Wealthy Citizens of 1845, many such defectors from the Democracy can be found. Of the men identified as Whigs by the eighteen-forties, fifty-two (or almost ten per cent) were former Democrats. The total of men identified as having been Democrats at one time or other was 153 (101 in good standing by 1845, and fifty-two defectors). Thus fully one-third of the wealthy who had originally been Democrats reacted violently to their party's policies in the eighteen-thirties and joined the enemy. One simply cannot dismiss the "Loco Focoizing" of the Democratic party in the middle and late eighteen-thirties as rhetorical claptrap; *something* caused a third of the wealthy Democrats to bolt. And there was no corresponding reversal of the process. Not a single individual among the 101 Democrats of 1845 had previously been an anti-Jacksonian.

As important as were the defections, perhaps even more significant was the fact that the Democratic response to the Bank War and Panic of 1837 temporarily solidified the New York City business community into an anti-Democratic force. It may be difficult now to comprehend what terrors the subtreasury scheme would have imposed on the merchants, or to tremble at the Loco Foco oratory, but the businessmen of that day did not have the balm of historical perspective to soothe them. Many believed that they were standing on the "ragged edge of anarchy," to employ a conservative pronouncement of the latter part of the nineteenth century. In the late eighteen-thirties, New York City businessmen displayed their colors, many of them for the first time. A contemporary observer described a leading merchant financier's reaction:

> With very clear and decided notions on public subjects, Mr. Ward had yet kept himself—as was, indeed, until 1834, the case with very many of the leading and active commercial men in New York—free from party strife. . . . When, however, in 1834, that series of disastrous measures commenced, which, under the auspices of General Jackson and his successor, have caused such accumulated ruin and misery, Mr. Ward . . . entered the political arena.[31]

Merchants supporting the Whig ticket convened a meeting in September 1840 in front of the Merchants Exchange. Over two thou-

[31] Charles King, "The Late Samuel Ward," *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, VIII (1843), 553.

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sand firms signed the call for the meeting, a list which took up the entire front page of the Whig newspapers.[32] The Whig diarist Philip Hone was both exultant and accurate when he wrote:

> The great meeting of Whig merchants took place to-day. . . . The appearance of the mass of people was perfectly sublime. It was a field of heads, occupying a space about six times as large as the area of Washington hall, from which I calculated the number at fifteen thousand; all respectable and orderly merchants and traders. . . .[33]

The Democratic merchants also held a meeting. Its call, again in the form of company names tabulated in small print, consumed one-tenth the space in newspaper columns that the Whig call had used.[34] As Democrat Joseph A. Scoville (the "Old Merchant") put it, colorfully but not exultantly: "Very few merchants of the first class have been Democrats. . . . The Democratic merchants could have easily been stowed in a large Eighth avenue railroad car."[35]

Table 2 illuminates the intensification of political activity on the part of New York City businessmen following the initiation of the Bank War. In the period 1828-31 slightly less than ten per cent of the Wealthy Citizens could be identified politically and, of them, nearly half were Democrats. But in the next four-year period, 1832-35, a span which coincided with the Bank Veto and the Removal of Deposits, the number of Wealthy Citizens taking a political stand more than quadrupled, and the proportion of Democrats fell to 23.2 per cent. The Democratic percentages continued to dip in the late eighteen-thirties and early forties. By the mid-forties the incidence of political identification declined as the fires of the Bank and currency questions died down, but by then the bond between the business community and the Whig party had been established. Of course, these figures are not a mirror of the political loyalties of all the Wealthy Citizens from 1828 to 1851, but they do reflect the willingness of the elite economic groups to make public their political preferences at certain times. We can reasonably assume that nearly all of the Wealthy Citizens voted in 1828, but the fact

[32] New York *Times and Evening Star*, Sept. 26, 1840.

[33] Bayard Tuckerman (ed.), *The Diary of Philip Hone 1828-1851* (New York, 1889), II, 44.

[34] New York *Evening Post*, Sept. 16, 1840.

[35] [Scoville,] *Old Merchants*, I, 81.

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that only ten per cent were part of the visible political superstructure indicates a lack of mercantile hostility toward the Jacksonians before the coming of the Bank Wars.

TABLE 2
Party Affiliation by Time Period

	Total	*Identified*		*Whig*		*Dem.*	
	*No.**	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
1828-31	909	90	(9.9%)	48	(53.4%)	42	(46.6%)
1832-35	909	379	(41.9%)	291	(76.8%)	88	(23.2%)
1836-39	905	298	(32.9%)	244	(81.9%)	54	(18.1%)
1840-43	900	324	(36.0%)	270	(83.4%)	54	(16.6%)
1844-47	892	190	(21.3%)	156	(82.2%)	34	(17.8%)
1848-51	880	134	(15.2%)	106	(79.2%)	28	(20.8%)

* Twenty-nine Wealthy Citizens died between 1828 and 1847.

IV

It is abundantly clear that by 1845 New York City wealth was allied to Whiggery, and that the process had taken place progressively during the preceding fifteen years. Were there other factors which might have produced this pattern of political allegiance? Religious and ethno-cultural variables as determinants of political behavior are being investigated more and more, and I shall follow the trend.

Not surprisingly, the denomination with by far the largest representation among the Wealthy Citizens was the Episcopalian. Presbyterians followed next, and then Quakers and Dutch Reformed. The striking thing about the political breakdown for these four dominant denominations is that the percentages of Whig affiliation ran close to the overall Whig average of eighty-four per cent. Thus eighty-four per cent of the Episcopalians were Whig; eighty-eight per cent of the Presbyterians; eighty-four per cent of the Dutch Reformed; and ninety-two per cent of the Quakers. Benson observed that Protestant denominationalism was of little use in pinpointing political alignment, and this seems to be true for the wealthy. What we can observe is such a well known phenomenon as denominational social climbing. Of twenty-three men who switched religions, twelve became Episcopalians and joined, if not the established church, then the church of the establishment.

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The number of Wealthy Citizens in the remaining denominations was too small for generalizations. Unitarians were Democratic by sixty-six per cent, but only two men were involved. Congregationalists and Jews were one hundred per cent Whig—all four Congregationalists and all seven Jews. There were only eight Catholics, including a mathematician from Columbia College who converted as an adult, and the Delmonico brothers, the Italian-Swiss restaurateurs, but only one man from Ireland (a Democrat).

TABLE 3
Religious Affiliation

	No.	*Politics Known*	*Whigs*	*Democrats*
Baptists	8	7 (87.5)	5 [1]* (71.4)	2 (28.6)
Catholics	8	4 (50.0)	2 (50.0)	2 (50.0)
Congregationalists	6	4 (66.7)	4 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Dutch Reformed	33	25 (75.8)	21 [2] (84.0)	4 (16.0)
Episcopalians	204	157 (78.0)	132 [13] (84.0)	25 (16.0)
Jews	8	7 (87.5)	7 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Methodists	9	8 (89.0)	7 (87.5)	1 (12.5)
Moravians	2	2 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
Presbyterians	118	99 (83.9)	87 [4] (87.8)	12 (12.2)
Quakers	45	36 (80.0)	33 [1] (91.7)	3 (8.3)
Unitarians	3	3 (100.0)	1 (33.3)	2 (66.7)
Fundamentalists	1	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
No Religion	2	1 (50.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)
	447	353 (79.0)	302 [21] (85.5)	51 (14.5)

* Numbers in brackets indicate Democrats who defected.

On the ethnocultural front, I have followed the native-immigrant division (and sub-categorization) employed by Benson. He also provided rough estimates of political affiliation among the groups[36]—native Dutch, for example, he estimated to have been sixty per cent Democratic. Although the estimates are expressed in percentages, Benson requested that the figures not be taken "literally." Their precision cannot be verified, but precise or not, there is a pronounced dissimilarity between Benson's ethnocultural estimates for the New York electorate as a whole, and the ethnocultural breakdown of wealthy New Yorkers.

[36] Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, 185, 342-43.

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Among the natives, Benson estimated that the Old British and Dutch were both sixty per cent Democratic; but among the wealthy, the Old British were eighty per cent Whig, and the Dutch were eighty-three per cent Whig. These two categories were large, but the largest single native category was the "Yankees," or as Albion put it "the swarm of New Englanders who were seeking their fortunes in New York City, just as it was clinching its leadership over the rival American ports."[37] Benson estimated that New York Yankees as a whole voted Whig by fifty-five per cent; wealthy New Englanders in New York City voted Whig by ninety-two per cent. Two other native groups identified as Democratic by Benson, Germans (sixty per cent) and Penn-Jerseyites (fifty-five per cent), were also Whig by seventy-five per cent and seventy-two per cent respectively. There were a dozen native Southerners. Though they came from Jackson's banner region, they were eighty-three per cent Whig.

The immigrant categories reveal the same patterns. All but one group represented among the wealthy were Whig. There was only one Irish Catholic, no French Canadians, no Welsh, and no Negroes on the Wealthy Citizens list. Immigrant French, supposedly ninety per cent Democratic, were eighty-six per cent Whig (but that includes only seven men). The immigrant English, estimated at seventy-five per cent Whig, were one hundred per cent Whig (fourteen of fourteen). The Scots, estimated at ninety per cent Whig, were ninety-three per cent Whig. The lowest Whig percentage among immigrant groups (excluding the one Irish Catholic), was the German (fifty-four per cent), a group estimated at eighty per cent Democratic. Although the German percentage involves but a dozen men, it seems to demonstrate the tug of various factors operating on a man's political decision-making process. One can accept, almost axiomatically, the proposition that religious and ethnocultural background will influence his response to politics, but surely one need not have to argue excessively for considering the possession of great wealth as an important factor, perhaps the preponderant factor, in analyzing the American wealthy as political men.

[37] Robert G. Albion, "Thomas Tileston," *DAB*, XVIII, 541.

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TABLE 4
Ethnocultural Background

Natives	*No.*	*Politics Identified*	*Whigs*		*Benson's Estimates for Whigs*	*Democrats*
British	146	106 (72.6%)	85 [10]*	(80.2%)	40%	21 (19.8%)
Dutch	102	77 (75.5%)	64 [7]	(83.1%)	40%	13 (16.9%)
German	11	8 (72.8%)	6	(75.0%)	40%	2 (25.0%)
Huguenot	7	3 (42.8%)	2	(66.7%)	75%	1 (33.3%)
Penn.-Jersey	26	21 (80.8%)	15 [3]	(71.5%)	45%	6 (28.5%)
Southern	13	12 (92.3%)	10	(83.3%)	—	2 (16.7%)
Yankee	147	122 (83.0%)	112 [3]	(91.8%)	55%	10 (8.2%)
Sub-totals	452	349 (78.0%)	294 [23]	(84.2%)		55 (15.8%)
Immigrants						
Dutch	4	4 (100.0%)	4 [1]	(100.0%)	—	0 (0.0%)
English	32	14 (43.7%)	14	(100.0%)	75%	0 (0.0%)
French	12	7 (58.4%)	6 [1]	(85.7%)	10%	1 (14.3%)
German	15	13 (86.6%)	7 [1]	(53.8%)	20%	6 (46.2%)
Cath.-Irish	1	1 (100.0%)	0	(0.0%)	5%	1 (100.0%)
Prot.-Irish	17	14 (82.4%)	10 [3]	(71.4%)	90%	4 (28.6%)
Scottish	31	29 (93.6%)	27 [2]	(93.1%)	90%	2 (6.9%)
Swiss	5	0 (0.0%)	0	(0.0%)	—	0 (0.0%)
West Indian	1	1 (100.0%)	1	(100.0%)	—	0 (0.0%)
Polish	1	0 (0.0%)	0	(0.0%)	—	0 (0.0%)
Sub-totals	119	83 (69.7%)	69 [8]	(83.2%)		14 (16.8%)
Totals	571	432 (75.7%)	363 [31]	(84.0%)		69 (16.0%)

* Numbers in brackets indicate Democrats who defected.

V

What do these data prove about the political alignment of America's wealthy classes in cities other than New York? Nothing. To what extent New York, City or State, represents the country at large, or to what extent it can usefully be called a "test case," remains to be determined, especially among non-commercial, rural elites. Several additional studies using other "Wealthy Citizens" lists (they exist for Boston and Philadelphia, for example) would be feasible and profitable. Even the absence of such lists does not close the door to counting the heads of the elite. There are directories for all major cities in the Jackson period, and in some cases they go beyond a mere alphabetical listing of heads of households to include classified business and professional directories. From

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these one might "do" the politics of, say, the importing merchants of Providence, or the lawyers of Pittsburgh, or the physicians of Charleston.

But it is important to begin with men of a non-political grouping and then proceed to their political identification. To start with vice-presidents of ratification meetings or with members of Congress from Tennessee in the antebellum period is to beg the question, since a sociological identity, or near-identity, is almost predictable in those instances. In the case of ratification-meeting vice-presidents we can expect that both parties, whatever their rhetoric, produced lists of solid men—that is, men of material substance—even though one party might have had a much smaller reservoir of "vice-presidential types" to draw upon.[38] It was not likely that the New York City Democracy, whatever its Loco Foco professions, would put a score of illiterate and inarticulate hod carriers on the Tammany Hall platform. In the second case cited, it was no surprise that the Tennessee congressmen were usually middle-aged lawyers of similar social background. The nature of the group chosen for investigation predetermined that result.[39] But what of the Tennessee professional and commercial classes, the upper crust of the state (and other states as well), taken as solid blocs? Only after such groups have been isolated and examined can we begin to speak with certainty about upper class and party in Jacksonian America.

Much of the previous debate has floundered upon the semantic difficulty of whether Whigs were wealthy. Once again, the terms are in reverse order; the question should read: Were wealthy Americans Whigs? If by "Whigs" we mean all who voted for that party, or even the party functionaries at all levels, it is obvious that the possession of great wealth was not a prerequisite to association with Whiggery. The party had to appeal to a mass electorate in an

[38] Yet even among the vice-presidents of ratification meetings who were Wealthy Citizens there was considerably more Whig money than Democratic. The thirteen Democrats were worth, collectively, 2.5 million dollars; the twelve Whigs were worth 13.4 million.

[39] Milton Henry, "Summary of Tennessee Representation in Congress from 1845 to 1861," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, X (1951), 140-48. The similarities between congressmen of both parties emerge clearly in the table on page 141, although the author concludes, contrary to the evidence he submits, that "Tennessee Democrats were dynamic and radical, while the Tennessee Whigs were generally conservative" (p. 148).

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age of ballot-box egalitarianism. By definition, a man of wealth was one who owned more than the majority of his neighbors, and there were simply not enough of the "wealthy" available to achieve election-day victories without the creation of an exclusive, high-level electorate. One Democratic editor described the situation in 1840 in simple terms: "There was a meeting of Whig merchants in Wall Street, and a meeting of the people in the Park, both of which were very large, but the latter much the larger, for the very simple reason that there are more people,—more mechanics and laborers,—than there are merchants."[40] If we begin with the parties, and especially with the entire electorate, it is indeed difficult to find "any evidence that the party situation reflected basic economic or social cleavages in the population," as has recently been remarked of New Jersey.[41] But perhaps the judgment would be altered if one plotted the location of economic status groups in the New Jersey political spectrum, especially for the eighteen-forties.

In a viable two-party system, operating within the context of universal white manhood suffrage, the class nature of political alignment must be sought in areas other than a pristine partisan division of rich versus poor. The validity of projecting the New York City experience to points beyond has yet to be established, but I suspect that the monied men of New York City in the eighteen-forties were not out of step with their peers elsewhere in thinking that the Whig party of that decade better served their interests and better calmed their fears than did the Democracy.

[40] New York *Evening Post*, Sept. 29, 1840.

[41] Richard P. McCormick, "Party Formation in New Jersey in the Jackson Era," *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society*, LXXXIII (1965), 173. McCormick was referring, however, to the decade 1824-34.

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The President and His Helpers: A Review-Article

REXFORD G. TUGWELL
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

In all probability the books considered here are only the first three of perhaps seven or eight likely to be written about the Kennedy presidency by his co-workers.[1] Even without others his brief regime can be said to have had a thorough apologia remarkably soon after its ending; when Galbraith, Bundy, Goodwin, Rostow, Bell, and others have had their say, the administration will have had a really formidable defense.

The word "formidable" is justified; these are all long and detailed books, written by competent expositors with the help of carefully kept notes and files. So is the word "defense"; the authors are all fierce Kennedy partisans.

Sorensen had worked for Kennedy since 1953 when he simply asked for and was given a job in the office of the new Senator from Massachusetts. Schlesinger's case was different. He was not an unknown young man but already a distinguished professor of history at Harvard, who had worked for liberal causes, was interested in politics, and had even been one of Stevenson's helpers in his contests with Eisenhower. For some reason not clear-

[1] *Kennedy* by Theodore C. Sorensen, New York, Harper and Row, 1965.—viii, 783 pp. $10.00; *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Boston, Houghton Mifflin and Cambridge, Mass., The Riverside Press, 1965.—xiv, 1087 pp. $9.00; *With Kennedy* by Pierre Salinger, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1966.—xvi, 391 pp. $5.95.

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ly explained, he had attached himself to the Kennedy cause and had been asked to join the White House staff.

Salinger came to Kennedy by way of the Senator's brother Robert. He was a San Francisco reporter who had graduated to writing special articles and was assigned (by *Colliers*) to write an exposé of the Teamsters Union about the time Robert was starting his work as counsel for Senator McClellan's Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field. He offered to cooperate and, when *Colliers* suspended publication, was hired as an investigator. This was late in 1956; the committee's work went on for three years. At the end of that time the Kennedy candidacy had reached the organization stage, and Salinger began to work for the Senator in an office over a garage with Stephen E. Smith's name on the door. Smith was Kennedy's brother-in-law, and Salinger had been told "to set up a press operation."

The three, along with several others whose accounts are yet to come, worked through the campaign and were carried on into the White House to become members of the presidential staff. Salinger became press secretary and so had specified duties. Sorensen was special counsel, meaning that he was available for various assignments but was always in charge of the last draft of speeches. Schlesinger was given a watching brief and an office in the remote East Wing. He was occasionally assigned to some problem in the foreign field, but obviously was meant to be the administration's historian, something Kennedy anticipated with mixed feelings as the going got rough and mistakes were made.

All have written as might be expected of professionals, lucidly but with obvious reserve. There are some natural evidences of haste; Schlesinger, the historian, does not always distinguish what is important from what interested himself; Sorensen manages to be dull over long stretches, something unexpected for the author of so much luminous writing for the Kennedy signature; and Salinger's book suffers from lack of careful editing.

Still it is obvious that these three and their colleagues made up a wonderfully integrated presidential family; they were as much seized with the office as Kennedy himself, and all seem to have shared his dedication. It is no wonder that since his service was so tragically ended there has remained a widely felt sense of loss. Kennedy himself was a deeply engaged man who was able to look

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at himself with detached candor. He judged others in much the same way; he was cool and wry; and he learned his presidential lessons in a much shorter time than most of his predecessors. If he had lived he might well have been one of the most distinguished and honored of the line.

But he was not given time. And because he made terrible early mistakes, it cannot be claimed for him that he belongs among the select few—with Jefferson, whom he so much admired, with Lincoln, with Wilson, and with the Roosevelts. What can be said is that he was a most admirable individual. He was touched with grace; he never allowed himself the usual appeals to cheap sentiment; he worked unremittingly in spite of almost continuous pain from an old injury; his courage never failed; and he accepted fully his responsibility.

These qualities were part of a whole make-up that allowed him, nevertheless, to be ruthless, single-minded, and self-centered in his drive for power; and when he had that power, to dispose it according to his judgment, without sentiment, and always with first regard for its protection and its increase.

This, of course, was necessary. He was acutely aware that his support had been only a fraction of one per cent higher than that of his opponent. This is a crippling beginning for any president, and Kennedy did not even have the customary honeymoon. He could not bear down on the Congress as a popular leader; most of his proposals were rejected and during his time in office only one really major piece of legislation was accepted (it was not actually passed until after his death). It was as barren a time as that of Eisenhower who, in contrast, had not wanted very much of anything done; but anyone who says that now is attacked furiously by his partisans.

His chroniclers make a good deal of the better times that followed his election. He had promised to get the country moving again; and, they say, he did. What they have in mind is that a budget deficit was accepted as the means to this end. But his critics do not allow that any tremendous effort was needed to reduce taxes, congressmen being what they are.

Economics was not Kennedy's best subject and it took him some time—as it did many of those around him—to accept reduced taxes and increased public expenditure as a way to increase activ-

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ity, especially when it might involve deficits. The idea had been similarly resisted by Roosevelt until slow recovery was interrupted by a sinking spell in 1937. Until that time such spending had been justified only as an effort to relieve the distress of the unemployed. But around Kennedy there were several economists who called themselves Keynesians—Walter Heller, for instance—and they convinced him that the release of purchasing power from reduced taxes would not only enlarge economic activity but would have the result of increasing employment. Eventually, also, revenue would be just as much or more from reduced rates on larger incomes as higher rates on smaller ones.

It was true that since the war the country had been in a sort of coma, afraid of more inflation such as had followed the Korean involvement, devoted to "sound" policies, and convinced that a high rate of unemployment together with unused industrial capacity was "normal." For all the nation's pride in past progress there was lacking the imagination to adapt to a high-energy economy. Kennedy had made much of this as a Republican characteristic when campaigning, but when elected he had no program for effecting a change and still had to be convinced that management was possible.

He confessed at one time that he could distinguish between monetary and fiscal policies only by recalling the initial of Chairman Martin of the Federal Reserve. But eventually he understood that orthodox monetary policy was effected by manipulating the interest rate, the supply of money, and market operations by the Federal Reserve. Business was kept from expanding by restricting loans or making them expensive; and these policies were supplemented by prudent management of public expenditures so that the budget balanced. There was something wrong about this; but what was it?

I

The newer economists pointed out that actually the budget had not been balanced during the Eisenhower years and that in spite of orthodox monetary policies the dollar had declined in purchasing power. The country, they said, was producing at much less than capacity and there was an intolerable rate of unemployment. This stagnation was unnecessary. The remedy was easier mone-

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tary policy, a release of purchasing power by reducing taxes, and increased public spending.

There were other reasons for a change and these appealed to Kennedy. Unemployment was not only a hardship for the unemployed but a social burden; restricted public expenditures for the last two decades had left the nation short of all sorts of facilities from schools to hospitals; the cities were rotting at the core—an enlargement of water supplies was needed, health statistics were frightening, and everyone was talking about the shortage of housing, school rooms, hospital beds, and utilities.

Schlesinger argues that Kennedy as a senator was "an incipient Keynesian."[2] And certainly as a representative of Massachusetts he had to be aware of declining industries, poverty-stricken cities, and distressed workers. But he had been more inclined to look for ways to improve New England's position than to consider the condition of the whole economy; and when he became president by so slim a margin, he began by being very cautious about criticism from the financial community. Walter Lippmann, in 1961, accused him of merely carrying on the Eisenhower policies.

He was, it is true, very much afraid of being called a "big spender," thinking that, if he was, he would have trouble getting anything at all out of a conservative congress. This problem was associated both with his lack of popular support and with an opposition from business that continued to grow. Sorensen refers to this in a chapter called "The Fight Against Recession": ". . . the sanctity of balanced budgets, moreover, made it politically impossible to convert overnight either the voters or Congress to the merits of budget deficits."

It was only in 1962 that he promised "tax reform" for the next year. But these chroniclers are right in saying that when it came, his fight for the use of fiscal measures was the boldest move of his presidency. For in that year another of the familiar Eisenhower recessions was obviously imminent. During the year before, all the indexes had turned downward, and his promise to get the country going again had begun to seem an empty one.

[2] The argument here goes back to 1952 when Kennedy was a newly elected congressman. It will be found in Chapter XXIII and cites a statement on "Meet the Press" in favor of enlarged purchasing power and, if necessary, an unbalanced budget.

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Galbraith, for one, thought the tax reduction a mistake. He called it a Keynesian reaction. The same effect, with a better result, he said, could be got by an increase of public spending for all those facilities so badly needed. The difference among Kennedy's associates was a heated one, especially since he felt it necessary to quiet what Paul Samuelson called "irrational opposition" by posing as an economical manager. It was widely publicized that he uniformly reduced the requests of agency heads, cutting away many billions before submitting his budget to the Congress. By various devices such as raising postal rates, reducing the cost of the farm program and putting the Interstate Highway project back on a self-financing basis by raising direct taxes, he was able to show that his own annual increases in domestic expenditures were smaller than those of the Eisenhower years. This Galbraith thought was nothing to be proud of; but in fact expenditures for welfare measures were increased—not nearly enough, but still by an appreciable amount.

It was a hard struggle, involving many devious recourses, and the dramatic vindication in the immediate response of the economy came too late for his political purposes. The argument for fiscal management was won. But the government lacked any means for actual control. The word management in this connection is deceptive. Government can increase or decrease its own taxing and spending and in this sense it does manage; but what goes on in the board rooms of corporations it has no way of reaching. And the decisions made there drastically affect the economy. Even prices, these days, are, most of them, "administered" privately and are quite unaffected by demand. It is unheard of to set prices calculated to tempt more consumers. If they do not buy, production schedules are reduced. This, unfortunately, causes unemployment and a further reduction in production. But the corporation is likely, in such circumstances, to *raise* prices. It is no great matter to it whether profits come from selling many goods or few, but it is a great matter to the economy.

Nevertheless it is Kennedy's contribution to domestic policy that monetary and fiscal management was made acceptable by him. It is already being made into a flexible and powerful defense against the recurrence of the hard times that for so long were a torment that seemed inevitable.

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Presidents, as things are, sit in the center of the economic complex. They are expected to maintain prosperity (and are criticized if it declines), but what they can do about it is hardly more than peripheral. It is more correctly called influence than power, and influence has different sources than power, more uncertain, more easily eroded. Even the monetary controls are in independent hands. The Federal Reserve Board is not responsible to the chief executive.

Kennedy obviously had not assessed his situation realistically when he promised to "get things moving again." And he learned, when he did, that what he must do would gain him a reputation for recklessness. On the other hand, when he opposed price increases, he was "hostile to business." There was one period of stock-market decline when acidulous jokes circulated after an exchange with Roger Blough of U.S. Steel about an increase in steel prices. He was heard to repeat in the aftermath something his father had told him. All steel men, he had said, were S.O.B.'s; and now, the son said, he believed it. This was enlarged by some who overheard it to include *all* businessmen. He tried for correction in a press conference; Sorensen tells what happened: "His correction was ignored and his hope was unfulfilled. Buttons appeared bearing the caption 'S.O.B. Club.' Bumper stickers appeared reading 'Help Kennedy Stamp out Free Enterprise' or 'I miss Ike—Hell, I even miss Harry.' "

These exchanges in 1962 worried Kennedy the politician; but in spite of efforts at conciliation, involving some humiliation, he concluded that there was little he could do. A British cartoon at the time of his row with business about inflationary price increases pictured one furious executive saying to another, "This guy Kennedy thinks he's running the country!" Sorensen, commenting on this, says, "That caption was correct!" But, of course, Sorensen was wrong. He had not the means, if what was meant was the economy rather than the country.

II

Nor did Kennedy have a constitutional directive for doing so. Such a thing never entered any framer's mind. It was something come to informally in the twentieth century after bitter battles. And the

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mixed expectation and resentment accompanying such efforts had never been cleared away—as it should—by forthright amendment.

True, the president was given "the executive power" in the first words of Article II; but what was meant by this has to be understood in late eighteenth-century—and that means pre-industrial—terms. He is spoken of in modern commentaries as the *chief* executive, but this is not the language of the constitution. There is even doubt from a close reading of that document that he was meant to have more than a generally supervisory role in government. If it is recalled that there were in the beginning only three departments, each with a few clerks, and that government had very few responsibilities, the present position—without any constitutional recognition—is a startling transformation.

The curious fact is, however, that what the framers meant him to be, the president has become; he supervises but he does not manage the immense departments. What he does do is to manipulate the levers of central power, such of them as he controls, as best he can. Until recently these were largely conciliatory and negative except when he was acting as commander-in-chief. Cleveland was the first president to be confronted with the savage conflict of labor and management in an industrial system grown up without constitutional recognition. He unhesitatingly put down what seemed to him a simple rebellion. He was not expected to do more. That the conditions creating virtual civil war ought to be brought under control, with agreed rules, was still not something generally thought necessary. But the problems did not settle themselves; they rapidly grew worse. More and more often public intervention was necessary. There was a dangerous polarization, and presidents from Theodore Roosevelt on had to struggle with complicated issues they had no mandate for and no effective means to use. Kennedy had to confront all of them, and he was even without that ultimate recourse of presidents—public support.

The gradual reaching back and reinterpreting of the constitution in such matters had all the uncertainty of legislative and administrative law and none of the certainty of constitutional agreement. When there were emergencies the president, with a national constituency, acted according to his judgment. The Congress was slow and contrary and the Supreme Court was bound by its procedures; the whole responsibility devolved on the president.

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What this impossible duty had become by Kennedy's time is detailed in these books. All the authors agree that he struggled manfully, and all too often they incline to picture defeats as victories. He lost his domestic battles because it was not clear what he might do, and even more because he was met by a resistance he had no weapons for overcoming. He was always conscious that he had to tread a narrow path between the expectation that he would be the nation's protector and the castigation that exploded when he used the means available to him. He learned to be cautious about offending. He was a man of courage, but a president's courage is not personal. He sometimes spoke of "putting the presidency on the line," meaning that he risked diminishing his freedom to act. When he did this once or twice with business or labor, he lost far more than he gained. When he went on the journey to Texas that ended so fatally, it was because he knew he had lost too much. He foresaw probable defeat in 1964 and was beginning a campaign of recoupment.

III

In view of their sympathetic understanding of Kennedy's trials and of his unremitting efforts to act as the people's surrogate, it seems strange that none of his helpers gained perspective enough to unearth causes or suggest remedies. There is no recognition that the presidency itself had become impossible and that some sort of drastic overhauling had become imperative. It is forgotten now, in the belated flowering of a Kennedy cult, that he was a discouraged, not a triumphant, man in 1963. It was not because he failed in devotion or bravery; it was because he was overwhelmed.

Sorensen does not admit this; everything, he says, was moving in Kennedy's direction in November 1963: "... abroad after the Cuban missile crisis and Test Ban Treaty, at home with the tax and civil rights bills, in office with more complete mastery of the Executive Branch. He was ... neither wearied nor disillusioned by his burdens, more respected and beloved than before, still growing, still striving. ..."

Schlesinger is similarly affirmative: "He had so little time ... yet he had accomplished so much. ... He gave his country back to its best self, wiping away the world's impression of an old nation, of old men, played out, fearful of ideas, change and the future. ..."

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It is hard to take these dithyrambs seriously. He was no doubt an inspired leader for those who were close to him; but the rest of the country did not see it so and, if they read these encomiums now, will not find them believable.

He was a president who had little power because he had so small a majority and because he had so little influence as a legislative leader. He will be remembered, after some years, it may be guessed, for having participated in the disaster of the Bay of Pigs and for having faced down Khrushchev when the Russians attempted to establish a direct threat to American security in Cuba: one disaster and one triumph.

These last have to do with quite another phase of the presidency, one that presidents have really come to dominate as they have not the domestic scene. In one he failed; in the other he succeeded.

Actually both the Schlesinger and the Sorensen books have much more to say about Kennedy the world statesman than about Kennedy the chief executive. It was in foreign affairs that his talents —and his courage—could best be displayed. He, like other presidents, was allowed in such matters the most undisputed power—a power, again, that is not at all clearly conferred in the constitution but has been taken for granted since Washington's administration with, along the way, some embarrassing conflicts with a recalcitrant Senate. But one of the strangest—and longest—discussions in Schlesinger's account concerns the President's frustrations with the department in charge of foreign relations. In desperation he created a small duplicate State Department in his own office. This seems a feeble device to have been adopted by so inventive and intrepid a person. Actually it was an avoidance of trouble. Somewhat the same course was followed with Defense. In neither case was any attempt made to reduce these unruly bureaucracies—as they are pictured—to proper discipline. They were simply accepted as existing evils and left to function emptily in their own preferred ways, outside the presidential orbit.

Something is wrong here, very much wrong; but what it is we do not learn from these chronicles. The truth is that Kennedy did not function as an executive. He had only the most meager contacts with the secretaries of the domestic departments, largely because he had no interest in their operations. He had no cabinet, really, seeing no sense in discussing foreign policy with secretaries

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of Agriculture or Interior. This, of course, has been the habit of other presidents, but they were not executives either. Concerning this Sorensen admits that Freeman in Agriculture and Udall in Interior were "vigorous and progressive. . . . But they were handicapped by the President's inability to give their departments and problems the same time and attention he gave to national security affairs."

This is putting first things first for a chief of state, but not for a chief executive. The neglect of domestic affairs is unfortunately not merely occasional; since the nation is continually in crisis now, made so by its position of overwhelming strength and by the challenge of newly risen nations with a missionary determination to humble the giant, the need for drastic change is underlined almost daily. No president, so long as this condition exists, will be able to act as chief executive.

What is needed is becoming obvious. National security is not, for instance, separable from the operations of at least three departments—Defense, State, and Treasury; and the president must certainly put together the budget and report on the state of the union. But why should he be called on to pretend that he is the administrator of the other departments (growing almost yearly more numerous) and agencies that so large, so complex, and so rich a nation needs to meet modern demands? There is agitation rising almost to furor about several issues—city deterioration, crime, pollution of air and water, transportation, and recreation, for instance—that, if they are mentioned at all in these memoirs, are mentioned only in passing. We are in danger of becoming a monstrous slum concentrated on our position in the world, concerned with the welfare of people in every nation but our own.

Of course the economy must be attended to. However much presidents regard themselves as world-strategists, they are forced to think of domestic management when hard times—or inflationary ones—threaten. Their attention is then jerked back from their main preoccupation somewhere abroad, but soon they are again diverted. Udall and Freeman did not often see Kennedy. No secretary of these vast conglomerations has for many years often seen his nominal chief.

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IV

Kennedy's constant preoccupation was the one with which all modern presidents are forced to concern themselves. This, of course, is political leadership. It is properly the duty of the sole representative of all the people in a democratic state. Much of interest about it will be found in these books. All were involved with it and all understood its demands. Sorensen was most influential in this and Salinger was, as press secretary, its forward operative. Schlesinger often offered advice. But none of these was a real professional. The operative helpers were "the Irish Mafia"—O'Donnell, O'Brien, and the others, including Robert Kennedy.

This presidential responsibility, because it was not anticipated in the constitution, also has special difficulties that sometime and somehow must be remedied. A partisan nominee, an advocate, who suddenly on election becomes president, not only of his party, but of a whole people, but who, from time to time, must resume his partisan role, cannot be completely or satisfactorily chief of state. He may have a narrow majority, or he may not even have had a plurality of all the votes—something not only true of Kennedy but of his Democratic predecessors Cleveland and Wilson. He must always be conscious of having to earn the approval of something like half the electorate who preferred another candidate, or, at least, must be wary of their watchful skepticism. This was Kennedy's special cross, and it constricted his freedom of action. He was always, for instance, looking for Republicans, preferably realistic ones, to man his agencies—men like Dillon, McCone, McCloy, and Clay. This contributed to his safety from criticism; but it did not please members of his own party and enable him to influence the Congress and it did not give him intimates. The impression of him that lingers is that he was a very lonely man.

His calculations, however frustrated, were his alone to work out. They were intended to enhance his own powers and those of his office. But these are peculiar in nature and have become more peculiar with time. The theoretical ability to superintend the administrative establishment, when any novel initiations are undertaken, encounters the resistance of a huge bureaucracy; and if not resistance, then inertia. Orders from a president are smothered by

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interpretation as they pass down from desk to desk. There is delay, and, often, outright and organized opposition. Instructions affecting a private interest will, within hours, or certainly days, provoke a call from a senator or a congressman with protests. And mere changes in procedure or policy will simply be found not to happen. By pursuing the matter he can, of course, prevail, but he cannot pursue a hundred matters over a hundred days and with a hundred people.

The result of this is that the machine tends to run in its own way and at its own pace, more influenced by some interested legislator or a group of them, who make trouble if they are not listened to, than by the nominal chief executive.

This inability of a president—who must be political leader and chief legislator and who is sole custodian of the national security—to direct the domestic establishment has become almost total. Kennedy was reluctant to accept this disability and his helpers are reluctant to acknowledge it, but in his last year—1963—he was reduced to following up persistently no more than a few issues, and three particularly—civil rights for Negroes, the prevention or ending of serious strikes, and activating the economy.

These involved his duty as chief legislator; and at this he labored earnestly with the help of a formidable presidential lobby—that Irish Mafia—to extend federal investment in education, public housing, and other measures to expand purchasing power. He recognized his responsibility for leadership. But the struggles with a recalcitrant Congress were wearing and often only half-successful. He must have come to realize what seems never to have occurred to him in his years as a legislator, that congressional reforms were long overdue. Nor does it seem to have occurred to these chroniclers; either that, or reform seemed so remote as to be impractical.

These books dwell with pride on Kennedy's valiant bearing throughout his ordeals, but there is almost no suggestion that either he or they considered his frustrations to be institutional. In the sense that these are accounts only of the brief Kennedy years, there is, perhaps, no reason why there should have been such a questioning. Yet this was Kennedy's real trouble as it had been that of his predecessors. The Congress had fallen into the control of committee chairmen from safe districts, and nothing could dis-

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turb their immovability. They were reactionary and mostly Southern, and they treated presidential proddings with silent contempt. In these circumstances Kennedy got done only what this small cabal felt it must concede to prevent serious attempts to displace them.

As to this it is probable that congressional reform will never originate with a president. He must always try to get along as best he can because there are immediate things to be done. But the Congress will never itself initiate reform. It was given the advantage in the constitution of controlling the gateway to amendment. As a consequence, so far as congressional prerogative is concerned, there has never been any. As the original House of thirty-nine members, and Senate of twenty-four, grew to its present size, and debate gave way to committee operations, usually secret, the original notion of a legislature that made laws for the chief executive to carry out was reversed. The initiative passed to the president, with legislators holding back, bargaining for advantage and consenting only for extraneous reasons. The national interest gets a poor showing on Capitol Hill.

These rules do not apply to matters of foreign policy. Since the Congress has less interest, and lately because being commander-in-chief has become more important, the president's reputation is apt to be determined by his conduct of foreign affairs. Occasionally a treaty is not confirmed by the Senate, or the House attempts to interfere with military or diplomatic management as it does with domestic matters; but the president is indisputably chief of state, and interference with his assumed prerogatives has usually been extremely unpopular.

This is an unsatisfactory situation, too, in a democracy. A president cannot be king today, prime minister tomorrow, and permanent head of the civil service all the time. Yet even those caught up in constitutional obsolescences, as Kennedy was, struggle in the web without complaint. Not only he but these three extraordinarily competent helpers accepted things as they were, quite willing to lose tremendous battles without questioning the set conditions.

We are asked to agree that Kennedy was a great president. His accomplishments suffer by comparison with those of his successor, but this is somehow not accepted as the criterion. He was a man of

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grace, wit, courage, and devotion. His successor is notably less endowed with these qualities. It is submitted that these are the characteristics of a chief of state, not of a chief legislator or chief executive.

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Book Reviews

Memoirs, *1945-1953 by Konrad Adenauer, translated by Beate Ruhm von Oppen. Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1966.—478 pp. $10.00.*

Konrad Adenauer has often been compared with Otto von Bismarck—(this used, in fact, to be standard practice in the *Rheinischer Merkur* on the anniversary of his birthday)—and there are indeed marked similarities between the two great statesmen, particularly in the way in which they assessed complicated situations, in their negotiating techniques, and in the high valuation which they placed upon patience in diplomacy. The similarity breaks down, however, on the point of literary style, and it is unlikely that anyone will seriously consider placing Adenauer's memoirs alongside the *Erinnerungen und Gedanken* of the founder of the German Reich of 1871. Bismarck's memoirs have a grace and color that make them a delight to read; Adenauer's are characterized by a flat, often repetitious, and generally humorless style which is not helped by the fact that the narrative is frequently interrupted by the insertion of long quotations from official memoranda, diplomatic notes, and after-dinner speeches that are often even less spirited than the *Bundeskanzler*'s own prose. Beate Ruhm von Oppen's translation is excellent, but she could not be expected to improve upon the original, and it is to her credit that she did not try to do so.

Leaving the literary aspect aside, however, this first volume of Adenauer's memoirs is a work of great interest and undeniable historical importance, for in it the Old Man gives the world the story of his part in Germany's recovery from military defeat and moral collapse, from the moment when he came back to politics in 1945 until that happy day in

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1953 when he initialed the provisional agreement for the European Defense Community. His account embraces the whole question of the revival of political life in Germany, the relations with the occupying powers in the days when their own unity on German questions was breaking down, the complicated story of the revision of allied dismantling policy and the even more tangled question of the origins of German rearmament, and the beginnings of the movement toward European federation and the related progress of Germany toward regained sovereignty. During all of this, Adenauer, as head of government, was the directing intelligence of German policy (relatively little is said of his collaborators and their contributions), and the focus of his narrative is upon his negotiations, disputes, and/or agreements with allied statesmen like Sir Brian Robertson, André François-Poncet, and John McCloy, and domestic antagonists like Kurt Schumacher of the Social Democratic party.

Although the account is generally written with a sovereign detachment, emotion intrudes on occasion. This is particularly true when the author discusses British policy in Germany, which he believes—doubtless in part because the British occupation authorities dismissed him as *Oberbürgermeister* of Cologne for incompetence in October 1945—was doctrinaire and unrealistic, when he touches on the patent incompatibility of the objectives of the Marshall Plan and the policy of dismantling German industry, when he discusses allied failure to discern Soviet motives in the first years after the war, and when he describes the tactics of his great domestic rival Schumacher and their profound differences on the direction to be taken by German foreign policy. It is notable also that the usually colorless style assumes something resembling eloquence whenever Adenauer talks about his faith in a united Europe that could eliminate the evils of national rivalry and lay the basis for a new era of international collaboration. "How many difficulties the world would have been spared," he writes wistfully, "if the European Defense Community had become a reality."

GORDON A. CRAIG
Stanford University

Germany and the Atlantic Alliance *by James L. Richardson. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—vii, 403 pp. $8.95.*

Mr. Richardson has written an important book. Really, it is three books: a description of Germany's postwar political relation to the West; an

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analysis of the contemporary military situation in Europe; and a perceptive discussion of the implications of reunification. Interspersed in the narrative is a careful treatment of the reciprocal relation between strategy and politics. It is an ambitious project, and Richardson has brought it off amazingly well.

Concerning the Federal Republic's alignment with the West, Richardson—who is now with the Arms Control Unit of the British Foreign Office—rightly credits Konrad Adenauer for moving Germany in this direction. Richardson's treatment of the Adenauer era is refreshing. And he correctly pinpoints the cause of subsequent friction between Bonn and Washington as arising from the Kennedy administration's handling of Berlin. Mr. Richardson emphasizes the significance of the various Berlin crises for analyzing Soviet behavior. And he carefully differentiates Soviet purposes at the time of the blockade (imperialist), from Soviet motivations in 1961 (*status quo*).

Richardson also discusses Soviet strategy. This has three aspects: consolidation of Communist control in East Germany; isolation of the Federal Republic from the West; and gambits on reunification. But in essence, all boil down to the fact that the concrete advantage accruing to the Soviets from control of East Germany outweighs all others. This is a useful reminder. And until its implications are fully grasped in the West, the policy of "building bridges" can proceed only so far.

Less satisfactory is Mr. Richardson's treatment of the German Democratic Republic. It pains this reviewer to find fault with what otherwise is so splendid a book. But Richardson assumes as a datum that Communist control of East Germany is an anomaly. In view of the changes which have occurred in the GDR since 1961, this seems dubious. Thus Richardson is on firm ground when he says that reunification is unlikely in the immediate future.

This is a good book. It is well written, copiously documented, and of appeal both to the general reader and the scholar. Richardson's conclusions reflect the evidence he has marshaled. He reminds us of genuine West German concerns (arms control and Berlin), and cautions against their possible divisive effect. A timely contribution.

JEAN EDWARD SMITH
University of Toronto

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Organization and Revolution: Working-Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848-1849 *by P. H. Noyes. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xii, 434 pp. $10.00*

A rethinking of the terms of German mid-nineteenth-century political history has been under way at least since the late Rudolf Stadelmann's centennial *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Revolution von 1848,* followed in the United States in 1958 by Theodore S. Hamerow's *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction.* The rethinking is affected by renewed and revised interest in formal social history, and maybe also by the contemporary concerns of liberal intellectuals, concerns where (in contrast with a generation past) injustice and inertia often seem less the work of a few powerful economic and political corporations than of many petty social ones. It is clear that a political sociology which assumed that the grass roots would naturally be aligned with progress and democracy has never been reliable; the question arises whether those who discover it now will end up, as scholars or indeed citizens, in the inferno history has devised for the German liberal intellectuals who discovered it in 1848. Since Engels' and Marx's doctrinal rage of 1851-52 at the behavior of the German artisanry and peasants (*Germany: Revolution and Counter-revolution*), our grasp of 1848 has been enfeebled by a set of political categories and terms deriving from West European and North American doctrines; indeed, that is an accusation German conservatives have long directed against their contemporaries on the Left. The story of Germany in 1848 is rarely told without emotional expression of moral disillusion, recrimination, or cynicism, and this surely bears some relation to the scholarly equipment available to the tellers.

The way to avoid a querulous rigidity on the one hand (that of some East German historians, for example), and a sterile inversion of political sympathies on the other (certain "realistic" conservative revisionists) presumably is to investigate the matter thoroughly. Professor Noyes, who died young and promising a month before his book was published, endeavored to do this with the workers' organizations of 1848-49, bodies whose roles in the revolution have hung in a kind of categorical limbo; they have not sorted out properly, for historians or for German liberal politicians at the time—a fact, again, which should tell us something about the preconceptions of both. The book is a very fine and constructive piece of work. Noyes' comprehension of the enormous published literature on the subject is imposing, and to this he added a scrutiny of the archives of the Economic Committee of the Frankfurt Parliament, notably the thousands of petitions and memoranda it received and processed on

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matters of labor organization. In his conclusions the men of the Parliament do not come out with credit; but he observes that disunity among the organizations and among the aims of the German workers did more to reduce their revolutionary effectiveness than did timidity or betrayal by a middle class precariously enthroned at the Paulskirche. It may be indeed that his effort to draw contrasts within the working class, between the aims of trade-guild masters and those of journeymen, leads him to underemphasize the conflict between the social aims of the workers' organizations and those of the Paulskirche. And perhaps he does less than justice to Marx's scepticism about the reliability of even the more radical German 1848 workers' organizations and leaders, with their strong guild orientation, as instruments of social revolution. To the revolutionary class-consciousness Noyes concludes was lacking would belong revolutionary purpose as well as class unity. To decide what it meant to be revolutionary, and who was, would require examination of all the other important political groupings of the Germany of that time. Noyes' book is an excellent internal description of labor politics in Germany 1848-49, the best I know in any language. He quite properly refrained from proposing a general political sociology of the revolution, for which much spade-work remains to be done.

MACK WALKER
Cornell University

Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth-Century England *by W. G. Runciman. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.—xiv, 338 pp. $6.50.*

In this book, Mr. Runciman distinguishes three dimensions of social inequality, namely, an economic or class hierarchy, a status hierarchy, and a hierarchy of power. He then proceeds to ask how far the deprivation felt by the lower ranks of the British people in the period since the end of the First World War has in each of these contexts corresponded, first, with the objective facts of the situation and, second, with the requirements of social justice. During these years, it appears, the British manual worker had every reason to feel considerably more deprived than in fact he did. Indeed, it seems that he only accepted his inferiority so meekly because of the modesty of his choice of reference groups with which to compare his own position. This modesty, according to Mr. Runciman, has been particularly conspicuous in respect of economic differences.

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Status differences, on the other hand, appear to have been somewhat narrowed in the past half-century, in spite of which consciousness of deprivation has become noticeably more lively. About the hierarchy of power the author has less to say. Power in the sense of workers' control in industry was certainly no nearer realization at the end than at the beginning of the period; but the rise of the Labour party in politics, and the fervor with which its leaders embraced, and were embraced by, the establishment, certainly discouraged militancy and mollified feelings of deprivation.

The data on which these conclusions are based are drawn, first, from a historical review of social change in Britain from 1918 to 1962; and secondly from an *ad hoc* survey on attitudes to inequality conducted in the latter years. Having myself been in close touch with Labour politics throughout the greater part of the whole period I can give first-hand confirmation of the accuracy of Mr. Runciman's historical interpretations; and his own survey was clearly designed with commendable care.

In the final section of the book, the author attempts to apply the criterion of "social justice" to the threefold hierarchy of British society. His concept of social justice is derived from an imaginary contractual model (borrowed from Professor Rawls) in which only those social inequalities are justified which are based on a principle to which persons "in a state of nature" would subscribe even if they did not know whether they would personally gain or lose from its implementation. To my mind this piece of academic fantasy seems rather silly and quite unnecessary. Heaven only knows what "persons in a state of nature" might or might not do. All that really emerges from Mr. Runciman's parable is, of course, his own personal conception of justice, the subjective nature of which he would have done better frankly to acknowledge.

This is not an easy book to read. The argument is close-knit and the analysis subtle; and the author's habit of meeting every objection in advance sometimes makes the thread of his own reasoning difficult to follow. It would, moreover, have been a kind concession to the reader's frailty if, in the innumerable comparisons drawn between manual and non-manual groups, some more distinctive name (for example, "white-collar") had been given to the latter category. But whatever the effort involved, this is unquestionably a book that deserves to be read.

BARBARA WOOTTON
House of Lords, London

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The Triumphant Empire: The British Empire Before the American Revolution *by Lawrence Henry Gipson. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1965; Vol. XI: lxvi, 579, xxxv pp.; Vol. XII: lvii, 372, xxx pp. $10.00 each volume.*

The superlatives with which reviewers have greeted successive volumes of Professor Lawrence Gipson's history since the appearance of Volume I in 1936 tend to intimidate, no matter how resolute the determination to judge with fresh impartiality. Volumes XI and XII, covering the period from the Declaratory Act to the Declaration of Independence, complete the story of estrangement between Britain and her most treasured American colonies, although the complete study of the Old Empire will be brought to a conclusion in a final volume devoted to those colonies which chose to remain within the orbit of crown and parliamentary rule. Those readers whose prime interest lies in Gipson's explanation of the Revolution's causes need not wait upon the publication of Volume XIII, however, for the study of causation is completed with this section or book, entitled *The Triumphant Empire.*

Gipson finds no reason to change the viewpoint at which he had arrived when he wrote his first volume thirty years ago—the American colonies had grown to political and economic maturity under a system of permissiveness and freedom while British leaders continued to view them as still in their infancy. The quarrel was basically a constitutional one, however significant were the economic forces that tugged at this group or that. While adhering to his scheme of discussing developments in Britain and America separately, Gipson displays the skill of a virtuoso in juxtaposing them so as to create the impression of wholeness. His finest passages, perhaps, are those dealing with the complexities of political relationships and their bearing upon the overriding constitutional issue, and if it is not his gift to paint portraiture—for none of the central figures are fixed in bold relief—his landscapes are superb. By and large, Gipson is more sympathetic toward those who would have moderated the quarrel—Chatham, Burke, Harley, Pownall, Galloway, Duane—than with radicals of the stamp of Otis or the Adamses or with rigid policy-makers like North or George III.

On balance, Professor Gipson concludes that given "the deeply rooted social and political mores of the period" it is simply asking too much to have expected acceptance of bold reorganization schemes such as Burke and Galloway proposed on the eve of separation. The Old Empire he finds liberal and fair in the great majority of cases. Devoted and sensible crown officials like Pownall, Gage, and Hutchinson (in few accounts of the Revolution has Hutchinson fared so well) simply could not govern

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or carry out the terms of their commissions while at the same time acceding to the demands of the more aggressive colonial assemblies, particularly Massachusetts Bay. Further, the limitations imposed by the natural rights position taken by Warren, Otis, and the Adamses were such, as Gipson sees it, that it "is difficult to see how the Parliament or the King was expected to exercise any real power over the inhabitants of the colonies" (Vol. XII, p. 49).

Sections of Volume XI dealing with land schemes and colonial boundary disputes seem needlessly detailed and lengthy, however well they may illustrate the fairness of occasional imperial mediation efforts or the fact that land sales proved a barren source of revenue and only added to the sense of desperation felt in London. One might also wish that periodicals were cited by date and not simply by volume numbers, but the virtues of Gipson's scholarship and judgments are so many that such adverse comments scarcely weigh in the balance. One hopes that Professor Gipson will add to his concluding volume a broad, summary essay distilling for us his final appraisal of an empire which he shows us to have been built upon foundations of freedom and out of which almost inevitably grew strong and independent branches.

STEPHEN G. KURTZ
Institute of Early American History and Culture

Charles Townshend *by Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964.—vii, 198 pp. $7.00.*

This slender and fragmentary biography, begun by the late Sir Lewis Namier and completed by John Brooke, has, despite shortcomings, two points to commend it. It poses a psychoanalytic interpretation of its subject, and thus adds, if even in a minor way, to the growing literature applying insights from psychoanalysis to biography; and, as might be expected from so prodigious a researcher as Namier, it does come up with a few choice morsels of new information about Townshend drawn from the family papers.

Since "Champagne Charlie" Townshend has always been regarded as a leading architect of the new imperial policy which led directly to the American Revolution, there has been a singular need for a portrait of him in depth, something perhaps more balanced than the classic depiction by Sir George Otto Trevelyan of that "master of the revels in the

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House of Commons." Son of a formidable father and a mother equally famed for her wit and promiscuity, Charles, as his biographers show, had a loveless childhood, probably was subject to epileptic seizures, and definitely suffered traumatic effects from the perpetual war waged between his parents. In painstaking detail the authors show how Townshend suffered as the oppressed son, and find in the roots of this filial submissiveness on Townshend's part an explanation of why he became for the colonies the heavy father. They show him to be a prevaricator and quite indifferent to modern notions of conflict of interest. At a time when, as chancellor of the exchequer and member of the cabinet, Townshend was still politically concerned with the affairs of the East India Company, he speculated in the company's stock, doubtless purchasing shares in the names of other men and selling out at a neat profit made possible in large part by his inside information and public remarks.

As in their encyclopedic *History of Parliament*, Namier and Brooke in this biography have added another figure to that composite portrait of little men scurrying around to subserve themselves, their families, and their retainers. This additional evidence should provide small comfort to the imperial school of historians who would depict the British government on the eve of the American Revolution as both beneficent and farsighted.

While Sir Lewis Namier never could be accused of having either much sympathy toward or understanding of the forces behind the American Revolution, he does in this book contribute powerfully to destroying the myth that the breach between England and her colonies can be put down to a conspiracy of New England radicals. The authors disclose that it was Townshend who, as a junior minister back in August 1753, drafted instructions for Sir Danvers Osborn, governor of New York, instructions which Horace Walpole caustically described as "better calculated for the latitude of Mexico and for a Spanish tribunal, than for a free, rich British settlement." These instructions charged the New York Assembly with trampling upon the royal authority and prerogative by assuming "to themselves the disposal of public money"; directed it to make permanent provision for the salaries of the governor, judges, and other officials and for the security of the province and any foreseeable charges. The money was to be applied by warrants from the governor advised by the Council, the Assembly being merely permitted "from time to time to view and examine . . . accounts." If Townshend's instructions had been carried out, they would have rendered the royal executive financially independent of the colonial assembly. As Namier and Brooke point out, Townshend aimed at a reshaping of colonial government, to which the raising of a revenue by act of the British Parliament became a necessary corollary.

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Aside from some new fragments and the psychoanalytical insights, the biography is drab and disjointed, with long quotations loosely strung together by meager commentary which takes no account of social and political forces and movements. The authors put down Townshend's failure as a public man to defects of character, but to others his lack of wisdom would seem perhaps to be an even more grievous shortcoming in a statesman.

RICHARD B. MORRIS
Columbia University

Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, 2 Vols. *by John Stuart Mill, introduction by V. W. Bladen; textual editor, J. M. Robson. Toronto, University of Toronto Press and London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.—xciv, 1166 pp. $25.00.*

The monumental project of the *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* got under way in 1963 with two volumes of his letters; now, with the appearance of his *Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy*, we have the first of his treatises. Some students of Mill might doubt the claim of the jacket that the *Principles* is "the most important single work" of Mill, and might give equality of rank if not priority to the *System of Logic* or the immortal *Autobiography*. There is little doubt, however, that the *Principles of Political Economy* is one of the handful of powerful works in the history of economic thought that continue to exercise a deep influence not only on the development of the science of economics but also on the development of Western civilization. Like most such works, it has had its ups and downs. Thus, one of its basic ideas, the distinction between the physical character of the laws of the production of wealth and the social or institutional character of the laws of distribution, was long held in orthodox circles to betray a woeful lack of rigorous thinking; yet today in the same circles it is hailed as providing guidance for even the most technical analysis of the distribution of wealth and income. To use the words of the editor of the famous one-volume edition, Sir W. J. Ashley, what has given the work its enduring, wide appeal is that it was "a great treatise, conceived and executed on a lofty plane, and breathing a noble spirit."

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The present edition naturally invites comparison with Ashley's edition of 1906. He attempted with a good deal of success to collate the important changes in the various regular or Library editions of the treatise, which were published during Mill's lifetime from the first in 1848 to the seventh in 1871. His introduction evidenced a sympathetic understanding of Mill and his work, all the more remarkable since Ashley was a leading member of the historical school of economics and looked askance at considering David Ricardo the fountain of "pure theory" as did Mill. Both Dean V. W. Bladen and Professor J. M. Robson, editors of the present edition, highly praise Ashley's work as "having justifiably become *the* text for students of Mill." The introduction is described as "illuminating and forceful," and his work of collation is considered to have noted "almost all of those [variants] which would be admitted to be of major importance by everyone."

The new edition has made substantial improvements. Using, as did Ashley, the seventh edition as the text, it contains a full collation of all the editions with it. And what is more, it includes in the collation process the manuscript of the press-copy of volume one of the first edition of 1848, which is in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City. The manuscript copy is especially useful in showing the gradual softening of the rigidities of Mill's early training. Mill was always careful to point out that while governments or nations could decide what institutions should be established, they could not arbitrarily determine how those institutions should work. But the phrasing certainly of the conclusion was softened in successive revisions. Thus, the manuscript reads,

> the conditions of the power which they [mankind] can exercise on the distribution [of wealth] & the manner in which it is affected by the various modes of conduct which society may think fit to adopt, are determined by laws as rigid, & as independent of human control as those of Production itself.

But beginning with the third edition, the latter part of the passage became "are as much a subject for scientific enquiry as any of the physical laws of nature."

Students of Mill will welcome the placing of all the substantial variants in a form that makes it easy to reconstruct the successive earlier editions. Probably the most important of the valuable appendices is the one containing extracts from the correspondence between Mill and the greatest of his disciples in economics, John E. Cairnes. Cairnes' comments on the *Principles,* requested by Mill while preparing the sixth edition, are especially notable in connection with monetary doctrine.

All in all, this edition of the *Principles of Political Economy with*

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Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy is likely to be the standard one for many years to come.

JOSEPH DORFMAN
Columbia University

The Future of the Dollar as an International Currency *by Robert Z. Aliber. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.—169 pp. $6.00.*

This book deals with a number of the most important international monetary problems of today. It is a series of essays, however, not a systematic treatment. Moreover, although the author's own preferences can sometimes be guessed at, he deliberately refrains (p. 11) from reaching affirmative conclusions on most issues, and tries only to set out the principal conclusions involved on each side of the debates. This is certainly the safer course, since probably no two competent students would be in complete agreement on all major points. But it leaves the non-specialist reader without much in the way of guidelines, and perhaps with some sense of frustration. What policies *should* he hope to see adopted, and under what circumstances?

The first two chapters are concerned, somewhat unsystematically, with the general course of international financial events since 1913. Then comes a series of chapters, from which I expected more than I found, on the U.S. role as a reserve currency country, Current Issues, "the" International Financial Problem, and International Adjustment; and then an excellent chapter on Alternative International Financial Arrangements. In this chapter Aliber looks at the thee main alternatives to the present situation (increasing the credit component of international reserves, raising the price of gold, and installing a system of flexible exchange rates). He examines each not so much with respect to their important but tedious technical and operational aspects, but rather with respect to their prospective costs in terms of the limitations that might result in the achievement of various national goals at home and abroad. This seemed to me the most valuable and novel part of the book. I liked especially the discussion of flexible exchange rates.

Except under a regime of flexible exchange rates, however, it will continue to be necessary to induce or even compel countries whose international payments are seriously unbalanced over substantial periods to mend their ways, if the stability of the whole system is not to be endan-

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gered. How to achieve this result is the sixty-four-dollar question, but Aliber does not really attack it head-on. One wishes that he had.

JAMES W. ANGELL
Columbia University

Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform: A Comparative Analysis *by Elias H. Tuma. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1965.—xi, 309 pp. $6.95.*

The title is misleading. Agrarian reforms are analyzed from only four centuries: the sixth and the second, B.C., and the modern period since the French Revolution.

After some introductory remarks, the book is organized into two main parts: case studies (of ancient Athens and Rome, England, France, Russia, Mexico, Japan, and Egypt) and a comparative analysis based on these case studies. The concluding part is headlined "toward a general theory of agrarian reform." The conclusions are rather pessimistic with regard to the usefulness and feasibility of land reform. In the author's opinion, the history of land reform is one of failures, with the exception of the Soviet land policy of collectivization.

The case material is not well chosen. The experience with land reform in Athens and Rome in antiquity is, of course, irrelevant to the modern scene. The English enclosures are presented as "a case in contrast"; many other cases of evolutionary change could have been shown to support entirely different generalizations. Omitted are most of the modern success stories in land reform, such as those of Denmark, Ireland, modern Greece, Finland, and the Baltic republics. Even an occasional outright failure such as Turkey's would have been more illuminating than most of the cases chosen.

The chapters on England and France are typical of the non-historian's innocence of the complexity of the research problems and the width of disagreement among scholars even on basic facts, let alone interpretations. The same lack of probing pervades the subsequent chapters, too. For instance, the widespread myth about Mexican land reform having caused a fall in output and productivity is accepted (p. 123), although a footnote admits (p. 270, n. 60) that there are other opinions; but the "general attitude" is taken as proof—as if questions of fact could be settled by majority vote. Lenin's expertise is (incorrectly) called in question on a major factual point (p. 70), while his qualitative judgment is accepted without question (also incorrectly). Farm statistics from Mexico

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(pp. 121 *et seq.*) and Egypt (pp. 148 *et seq.*) are quoted second-hand, causing statistical errors, and so on.

These and many similar errors indicate that the enormous literature was too much for a Ph.D. candidate to handle. The author's nearly complete dependence on the opinions of others seriously impairs the whole study, as is perhaps most readily apparent in his remarks on Soviet land policy. The comparative analysis could, of course, be no better than the case material. Still, the absence of rigorous economic analysis is striking. The classical, long outdated assumption about "returns to scale" in agriculture is repeated as monotonously as among orthodox Marxians or extreme reactionaries. The typology of land reform takes no real account of the stages or phases of economic development.

Land reform is a subject seldom treated objectively; extant literature abounds with ax-grinding, partisan writing. A fruitful task would have been to analyze some part of this literature to demonstrate where its fallacies lie, how facts and ideas are twisted in the process of open or disguised propaganda. By sampling land reform literature for his purposes, Tuma has fallen into a great many of the traps set for him, and merely added another biased book to the many we already have.

FOLKE DOVRING
University of Illinois

The Emergence of Liberal Humanism: An Intellectual History of Western Europe. Vol. I: From the Italian Renaissance to the French Revolution *by Willson H. Coates, Hayden V. White, and J. Salwyn Schapiro. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill, 1966.—x, 357 pp. $6.95.*

This book is a survey on a high level, rather more essay than textbook, performing services of inventory while concentrating on problems of interpretation. In two parts, each of six chapters, the reader is given evidence of, first, "The Breakdown of Medieval Civilization and the Beginnings of Modern Times" between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, and, second, the "Formation of the Modern Mind in the Eighteenth Century." The theme suggested by the book's title, "The Emergence of Liberal Humanism," is not meant by the authors to be their sole organizing principle but is clearly central to their thinking. They see the ebbing of religious beliefs from their former fullness as inspiration and guides, and a gradual reorientation toward man as end and means. Ap-

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propriately, the tentative title of their projected second volume is "The Ordeal of Liberal Humanism." In this first volume the topics of intellectual history are analyzed chiefly through the device of introducing leading figures but also by providing information about their historical settings. There are some descriptions of popular opinion but generally the emphasis is on the leaders. The book is unusually rich in quotations and the authors' own writing is careful and effective, offering tantalizing syntheses and summaries. Only occasionally is the high level of discussion backed by too little introductory explanation.

There could scarcely be a more dramatic intellectual development than the challenge of liberal humanism as defined by the authors. The question of values—nothing less than the deification of man—makes questions of fact—concerning the coming together of secularism, humanism, rationalism, and so on, and the state of health of rival doctrines—at every stage of history utterly absorbing. There is probably no way of satisfying our curiosity about the relative strengths of these movements of thought, but the present work with its emphasis on leading examples successfully elucidates their qualities. It is the reviewer's impression that the authors are at their best in dealing with philosophical, religious, esthetic, and historiographical ideas, but they are strong in all areas where they choose to concentrate their attention. One could wish for a fuller explanation of French (as opposed to English) mercantilism, of Vico's views of history, of Kant's political theory (to go with an otherwise fine treatment of his thought), of human nature as the *philosophes* conceived of it, of the interaction of ideas with circumstances in the French Revolution, and of the influence of the Revolution's avalanche of new experiences on people's views (other than Burke's) of man, history, and social science. There is one reference to Robespierre that is uncharacteristically oversimplified. These are exceptions in a long book. For the most part the quality of the authors' performance is so well sustained that one looks forward to continued use of this volume and to the appearance of the next.

PAUL H. BEIK
Swarthmore College

Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics *by Joel Colton. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.—xv, 512, xiv, pp. $10.00.*

Professor Colton's massive biography of Blum has been in the making for a decade or more. Those who have looked forward to its appearance

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will not be disappointed. Thorough, judicious, fair-minded, it is undoubtedly the best study of the man in English, and it compares favorably with Gilbert Ziebura's still incomplete two-volume analysis in German. It is engagingly written, in a style that is almost French in its lucidity; and it is handsomely packaged by a publisher who understands the bookmaker's art, and who even knows where footnotes belong.

Colton has chosen to focus primarily on the Popular Front years; half the book is devoted to the nineteen-thirties. His decision is undoubtedly sound, for that was the crucial phase of Blum's political career. Each aspect of the Popular Front experiment is carefully analyzed, with special emphasis being placed on foreign policy. So much has already been written about the period that Colton could scarcely hope to offer any revelations; but he has weighed with fine discrimination the bitterly contested arguments over Blum's leadership, and has come up with an interpretation that is essentially sympathetic but that recognizes Blum's shortcomings. This man of undoubted brilliance, courage, and honesty lacked political flexibility and boldness; the Hamlet in him could not be repressed. Blum's record, Colton concludes, was one of complete personal integrity and mixed political success, his most fitting epitaph the words of Machiavelli:

> "A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good." In the age of Hitler and lesser tyrants Blum's integrity shone like a beacon, yet he lacked the ruthlessness to cope with ruthless men (p. 483).

Biography is a difficult art when the biographer lacks access to personal papers of the more intimate sort—letters, diaries, and so on. Unfortunately, Blum was not one to indulge in this kind of writing, and such personal files as he possessed disappeared during the war years. Colton has been able to use a few personal letters from the war period (mostly written from prison), but on the whole he has had to rely on Blum's voluminous published writings and other printed materials. One gets some sense, therefore, of viewing the man from the outside and at a distance. It is not Colton's fault that what he has written is more history than biography, that the Léon Blum who emerges from his pages is the public figure rather than the man. In any case, Blum would probably have preferred it that way.

GORDON WRIGHT
Stanford University

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The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962 *by John Steward Ambler. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1966.—x, 427 pp. $6.50.*

The United States and France have never been declared enemies, as General de Gaulle is perversely fond of reminding his press conferences. Too rarely, however, are Frenchmen and Americans adept at understanding what is peculiar to each country. Nevertheless, a number of exceptions—Tocqueville being only the greatest—rise high above the boneyard of fatuous cliché. Happily, Professor Ambler's work on the French Army in politics is a book in the superior tradition. He treats the problem in the only terms in which it can be made real, keeping the focus on France (penetratingly so) and away from common truisms about Atlantic solidarity, democratic behavior, and all the sticky normative gambits that cloud the drama and perplexity of the recent civil-military crisis. A few obeisances to theory do not interfere with his grasping the scope and uniqueness of the French case. The reporting and analysis are crisp and resourceful. Judiciously managing a rich range of sources, Ambler avoids bookishness and fastens with sure competence on meaningful events and issues. A cool writer, he stays balanced on the fine edge of objective comprehension as he unfolds the performance of this bewildered military group.

There is little to record in this review but agreement and admiration. I concur wholeheartedly with Ambler's departure from Professor Meisel's thesis about the fascist background of military sedition (p. 336) and with his positive statement of the correct premise (p. 195): "Had the French Army not experienced long and direct involvement in a highly political form of war, other factors pushing toward politicization would not have produced military disobedience and revolt." His descriptions of the Third Republic and Vichy background are excellent; so are his moderate, sensible comments on the relation of class recruitment in the officer corps to political attitudes (p. 128 f.). He is also, I think, correct in concluding that the threat of modernization played a very minor role in the rebellious activity of 1958-61 (p. 297). His unwillingness to make substantial predictions for the future political course of the French Army is a consequence of his view of the military as an indirect agent of conspiracy, acted on by a variety of pressures before parts of it chose to act. That, too, is a sound position. A multitude of other points are well made in this impressive study.

The criticisms are trivial by comparison. Perhaps a more chronological treatment of the period would have conveyed a clearer sense of the civil-military dilemma, since the explosion was essentially cumulative.

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On page 264, I think there is some exaggeration of the single factor of de Gaulle in the failure of the 1961 *putsch;* general war-weariness counted for much. On pages 286-87, I think that the antipathy between officers and colons in Algeria is overstressed. And I do not detect in a book professing to focus on the "problem of civilian control" any real discussion of the control patterns themselves, important to the terms of the study but not very exciting. I also miss somewhat the echo of the wars out of which the sedition arose.

Professor Ambler has unquestionably given a sensitive and informed interpretation of the anguishes of *la grande muette,* accurate in its particulars, trustworthy in its judgments. He deserves high compliments and many readers.

GEORGE A. KELLY
Harvard University

Wahlen und Parteien in Österreich *edited by Rodney Stiefbold et al. Vienna, Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1966; Vol. I: 512 pp.; Vol. II: 976 pp.; Vol. III: 796 pp.; 695 Sch.*

The Institute for Advanced Studies and Scientific Research in Vienna has published three volumes on elections and parties in Austria, 2,284 pages, format 8 by 11½ inches.

The first volume, *Wahlrecht* devotes most of its space to constitutional provisions, laws, and ordinances that regulate suffrage, nominations of candidates, and procedures of elections to office at the local, provincial, and national level. Sources for such information are cited back to 1848, while pertinent provisions that were enacted and amended from 1918 till 1962 are cited in detail, as are relevant decisions by the Constitutional Court. This volume also contains facsimiles of legal ballots, voters' identity cards, voters' registries, police registration blanks, and other documents relevant to electoral procedures.

Besides descriptions of electoral systems we also find debates on proposed changes. Hans Kelsen's astute advocacy of proportionate representation should find a place in textbooks on this topic. A great deal of space is devoted to proposed amendments and arguments in their favor that would incline the electoral system either in the direction of a more personalized choice of candidates or in the direction of making the distribution of party strength in parliament a more perfect replica of the distribution of party strength in the electorate. Other proposals would

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rearrange geographical boundaries of multimember constituencies. The present system is highly complex and somewhat favors large parties over splinter parties. The significance of proposed electoral reforms is illustrated by contrasting the actual composition of parliament with what it would be were seats distributed according to the proposed changes.

The second volume presents the organizational structures and membership statistics of political parties together with extensive quotations from party programs and references to the party press. Election campaigns of the parties are described in all phases, from the phrasing of posters to the teamwork involved in bringing out the vote. Of special interest are the references to the unique organizational structure of the Socialist party that enrolls every sixth Austrian voter as a dues-paying member and whose affiliates engulf many aspects of social life that are remote from politics as such.

Treatises on the nature of political parties are of interest, as are some of the theoretical articles on politics in general that are reproduced in this volume. Here students of political institutions also find references to the uniquely Austrian institution of *Kammern* ("chambers"), semi-official representative bodies elected by members of various occupational groups.

Most of the public opinion polls that take up nearly a hundred pages are trivial, but the careful analysis of voting participation and its variations within and outside of Austria are of interest.

It is explained in the introduction to the third volume that the authors endeavored to present the selected statistics "in new contexts and certain logical arrangements, and (for that reason) found apparent repetitions unavoidable." Repetitions abound without apparent reason.

The introduction also indicates the division of the volume into six chapters, each with a number of sub-chapters. Neither the table of contents nor the volume itself shows any division into chapters, while the themes of sub-chapters show a great deal of overlap.

All thirteen presidential and parliamentary elections held in the First Republic of Austria and in the Second before 1966 are tabulated at the levels of provinces, electoral districts, and counties from pages 25 to 242. On pages 396 to 662 we find the results of Austria's last three parliamentary elections before 1966 and the last presidential elections for Austria's four thousand incorporated communities, as well as the results at the levels of provinces, electoral districts, and counties recorded previously. These data are taken from official sources that cite pertinent legal provisions as well as comparisons with previous elections. This results in further duplication.

In this volume we also find a large number of maps and of pictorially represented statistics as graphic presentations of the proportionate dis-

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tribution of party strength, as well as maps that present Austria's administrative structure by provinces and electoral districts.

Maps and pictorial presentations accompany the tabulations of census data from pages 247 to 273 and from pages 308 to 383. Most of the census data refer to the country as a whole and have no bearing upon election results or politics—such as breakdowns by age, sex, and nationality of residents in the various provinces. Census data by occupation are presented at the county level and by religion at the level of the nine provinces. Pertinent to the theme of the volume is a tabulation of correlation coefficients between voting and occupational groups, but this tabulation suffers from inadequate presentation, profuse footnoting, and crowding of data from too many different elections and from two different censuses.

The selection of material, its arrangement, and its indexing leave a great deal to be desired, but these shortcomings have to be viewed in relation to the magnitude of the task that has been undertaken. Every one of these three volumes will serve students of Austrian politics as a valuable source.

WALTER B. SIMON
Western Reserve University

Anpassung oder Widerstand *by Alice Meyer. Frauenfeld, Huber, 1965.—227 pp. 18.50 sfr.*

When Jon Kimche's *Spying for Peace* was published four years ago it caused a small sensation in Switzerland, as it was the first attempt so far to describe the internal situation of the Swiss government during the Second World War. The particular difficulty in writing such an account came from the stubborn refusal of the Swiss Federal Archives to publish any acts and papers on that period so long as many members of the war government were still alive. The historian may expect such publications only by the end of this century.

Alice Meyer's book is an important supplement, not only because she contributes some new aspects to the discussion, but also because she happens to be the widow of Professor Karl Meyer, the outstanding Swiss historian of the war era, who was himself one of the most prominent and active promoters of the so-called *geistige Landesverteidigung*, the spiritual defense of his country when it was surrounded by the militaristic powers of the Axis.

Anpassung oder Widerstand is the history of Swiss neutrality at the

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time of its hardest test. It is not a heroic story; there were too many personal failures and shortcomings, caused by the intensive and effective propaganda from Berlin, even among politicians of the highest rank. During the war both the Allies and the Axis accused Switzerland of not being neutral enough. The permanent threat of the militaristic neighbor in the north caused the government to be too indulgent toward the requests of Germany and their irritated and confused citizens who expected of their politicians a clear and determined stand.

The role of the Swiss army as a factor in the preservation of neutrality was decisive. The air force especially gained respect for its quick reactions in protecting the borders of the small country against foreign intruders.

Protection against the fifth column did not work out so well. Only in 1936, when the Jewish immigrant David Frankfurter shot and killed Wilhelm Gustloff, the leader of the German colony in Switzerland, did the Swiss realize that they had within their frontiers a superbly organized Nazi party which trained paramilitary organizations, camouflaged as athletic clubs, for the day when they would receive orders from the *Führer* to seize power. The government's reaction to that discovery again was quite weak, but this time public opinion forced it to act. The Nazi party in Switzerland, as well as the few small groups of Swiss extremists, were declared illegal. From that time to the end of the war none of the Nazi movements, carefully watched by the public, could expect ever to gain control in Switzeland.

Alice Meyer's book is full of valuable information, although, for reasons that are obvious, it sometimes lacks the objectivity and cool distance which are expected from the true historian. Mrs. Meyer took part in many of her late husband's political activities, and her volume has therefore much of a personal testimony. It is a stimulating book, but not the final contribution to the understanding of a little known field in modern European history.

ROLF KIESER
Queens College

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Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey *by Lord Kinross. New York, William Morrow, 1965.—ix, 615 pp. $7.50.*

The Turkish Political Elite *by Frederick W. Frey. Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1965.—xvi, 483 pp. $12.50.*

Here are two excellent books on political leadership in Turkey's First Republic, one focusing on the republic's founder and the other on its parliamentary deputies. The authors shared this in common: neither one rushed into print. Moreover, each showed great ingenuity in amassing, sorting, and sifting the raw materials. Both stress that the major problem of republican Turkish politics was to bridge the two cultures, representing, according to the Kinross label, the literate bourgeoisie and the illiterate peasantry. Yet the studies could hardly be more antithetical in method, for one is descriptive and the other analytical.

The biography by Lord Kinross surpasses all preceding biographies of Atatürk in scope, depth of inquiry, authenticity, and—as to be expected from a consummate stylist—the pure pleasure of reading. Kinross made enviable use of his privileged access to the presidential archives in Ankara. These he enriched by scanning other unpublished papers in Turkey, the United States, and Britain, by interviewing those Turks who had served Atatürk in varying spheres, and by consulting diplomats and scholars with special knowledge of the tricky transition from the Ottoman empire to the Turkish Republic. His examination of the facts was minute and critical. Although Kinross laced his narrative together with impression where the facts failed to provide connective tissue, it is informed impression and therefore inoffensive to the scholar. The biography, above all, is a work of art in the grand traditional manner, virtually stripped of annotation; even the scattered notes are of little use to the researcher. The only "scholarly" trappings are an appended chronology and a selected bibliography of works in Turkish and in Western languages.

Atatürk, among his countrymen, remained larger than life, just as among Westerners he was often smaller. Kinross has contrived to cut his subject to size, in part by allocating most of his space to the early years and to the war of independence in which Mustafa Kemal, as he was then known, grew from the military hero of Gallipoli into the Gazi or savior of his country. The final section of the book on the presidency of the republic is the shortest. It is also the best known. Kinross does not gloss over Mustafa Kemal's low tolerance for political rivals and his preference for aides over colleagues, men whom he could command and did

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not have to consult. Long before the end of the war of independence he had set aside, not physically but politically, his co-authors of the revolution, so that he was already a dictator at the birth of the republic. On the period before 1923 Kinross has unearthed a great deal of new evidence, some of it revealing Mustafa Kemal's private affairs, which receive merited attention in the perspective of his total career. Women passed in and out of his life, and the only one who became his wife he divorced in less than three years. To lust he added zest for good food and heavy drink, "governing the country in effect from his dinner table." Kinross, however, lets us down by not illustrating how the Turkish autocrat presided over that dinner table, by not telling us who brought what influence to bear on the framing of what policies.

Sharply contrasting with Kinross' literary biography is the quantitative analysis of Frederick W. Frey, a member of MIT's behavioral consortium. His inquiry into the social backgrounds of the parliamentary deputies rests on an essentially complete enumeration of the 2,210 persons who filled 4,387 incumbencies in ten of the eleven assemblies (1920-57) of the First Republic, which a "gentle" military coup d'état brought to an abrupt end in May 1960. The comparable evidence that the author was able to code included date and place of birth, province represented, formal education, foreign language(s) claimed, prior occupations, assembly—and where pertinent—ministerial experience, party roles, and membership in other organizations. Most of the data he culled from the annual directories issued, after 1928, by the assembly's secretariat and from a retrospective album on the first (provisional) assembly, published in 1945. To plug the gaps Frey searched the encyclopedias, biographies, political party publications, and school yearbooks and histories. He eked out the published records with personal interviews and correspondence and even, though least rewardingly, with formal questionnaires.

Wholly sensitive to the limits of his evidence, Frey used it in imaginative combination to extract full cross-sectional and trend returns. Under the tutelary, single-party system that Atatürk inaugurated in 1923 and Inönü kept until 1946, the assemblies were staffed by co-optation, formally managed by indirect elections. Thereafter, the coming of the multiparty system brought in its train direct democratic elections. With the changing electoral procedures the parliamentary profile also changed from one that was shaped by the predominance of national officials from the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and education to one that was shaped by the prevalence of lawyers and merchants with strong provincial ties. The leading deputies in both periods "usually possessed the highest level of education obtainable" and were "urban in background and habits." Also demonstrably present, but only as a minority in all the assemblies,

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was the local leader, "usually of moderate education, less urban, and less broad in his cultural values, but a power in his own community and probably viewed as a man of great capacity at that lower level."

Frey does not explain persuasively how politics at the provincial level related to politics at the national level. Contrary to his contention, there are ample grounds for assuming that the party machines continued co-opting most provincial candidates for the assembly under the multiparty system of the nineteen-fifties. The assembly deputies apart, the only other elective officers were those of the municipal and village governments, since the Ottoman vilâyet regime of provincial administration, inaugurated in 1864, survived intact into the Second Republic. Under this centralized regime even the elected officers of the towns and villages are still not free agents. All their decisions are subject to approval or reversal by the appointed provincial officials, who may even nullify local elections. To this day the towns and villages thus do not serve as an effective training ground for national politics, and the absence of responsible locality politics keeps alive the practice of the "co-optative" recruitment of local candidates.

When all is said and done, *The Turkish Political Elite* is an impressive and innovative work. It is the first systematic, full-length assessment of political leadership in a Middle East country. Frey has shown the pertinence of behavioral techniques to the study of politics in a transitional society such as Turkey's. His enviable familiarity with the Turkish language and with Turkish history, society, and culture was put to indispensable use in fleshing out the statistical skeleton. He leaves no doubt that the skills of the quantifier must be combined with the skills of the historian for meaningful judgments.

J. C. Hurewitz
Columbia University

Africa's Search for Identity *by Victor C. Ferkiss. New York, George Braziller, 1966.—346 pp. $6.50.*

It is difficult to know what yardstick to apply in evaluating Professor Ferkiss' book. As a primer on African politics for those who know next to nothing about the subject, it deserves to be rated highly for its width, breadth, lucidity, empathy, and generally good judgment. But for more sophisticated readers its method and style rob it of much of its value.

Professor Ferkiss knows his Africa, and his judgments are unusually

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reliable; this makes such mistakes as there are in this book hard to understand. For example, he repeats tired and untrue platitudes about the African leadership of Rhodesia; he confuses ideology and rationalization in suggesting that the major impetus to one-party rule comes from "the doctrine of African socialism" (p. 119); and he misleads in suggesting that the creation of the United Republic of Tanzania was motivated largely by a desire on President Nyerere's part to contain Communist bloc influence in East Africa (p. 135). It is not Professor Ferkiss' habit to judge African developments through the focus of Western ethnocentricity, but where he lapses from his own strict standards he perpetrates the kind of error he makes about the origins of Tanzania. The formation of this Republic was planned jointly by President Nyerere and Zanzibar's President Karume because of long-standing mutual interests which had been reinforced by the security and economic interests of their countries after the revolution in Zanzibar. Among the many factors they took into account was the interplay of external forces both on the mainland and on the island; the attempts by Communist countries to use the Zanzibar revolution for their own purposes were not necessarily more disturbing to Nyerere than the efforts of Western countries to interfere in the affairs of East Africa.

Although Professor Ferkiss provides a useful guide to African nationalism, he seems to me to make a singularly confusing mistake by failing to distinguish sufficiently between nationalism and Pan-Africanism. These movements have a common origin, but nationalism is not simply an agent of Pan-Africanism; too often it is its enemy. The basic conflicts among Africa's plural nationalisms and between them and Pan-Africanism are crucial to our understanding of what has been going wrong in the continent since 1960.

It would be wrong to judge the value of this book simply by focusing on some of its errors. For whatever its errors, its broad conclusions and its emphases are more often right than wrong.

COLIN LEGUM
London, England

Kingdoms of the Savanna *by Jan Vansina. Madison and Milwaukee, University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.—ix, 364 pp. $6.75.*

Readers of this valuable collection on Central African political units in colonial times and before are fortunate in the frankness of the author: his sources compel him to focus on political aspects to the detriment of the

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rest; there are "appalling" gaps in the literature, making synthesis impossible; there can be little overall coherence in time or space. Surveying past work by Europeans, including explorers, missionaries, and colonial administrators, and more recent work by social scientists, he very properly and helpfully devotes as much space to pointing out research needs as he does to summarizing what is known. Yet—and the book would be worth having on this count alone—there are some eighty pages of reference material compared with a text of just under 250 pages. If the author's description, "a modest introduction," be accepted, then future historians of this part of Africa are put on their mettle.

The areas covered extend from Angola through much of the former Belgian Congo to Zambia and a fringe of Tanzania. Time periods range from the late fifteenth century to 1900. Attention is given to Europeans and Arabs as well as to Africans, and there is discussion of historiography and of the problems and contributions of other disciplines.

When dealing with subjects as atomized and under-documented as these it is sometimes thought appropriate to serve up as much substance as possible, then restate the limitations and let it go at that. We are given conclusions: ruler personality is said to have been the determining factor in politics, whereas, earlier, trade was described as having been transcendingly important. Vassal autonomy is noted, but it is unclear whether this was an engine or a symptom. The slave trade—we are told it began in 1500—is disapproved without its part in the whole social process being adequately described.

There are some trivial questions. Is lack of interest the main explanation for the dearth of work on Africa before the nineteen-fifties? Is the principal weakness of oral traditions in the realm of chronology? Should a survey work assert and reject controversially without details? When treating constitutionalism without being able to document practical workings, should the distinction be made clearer? Do contemporary ethnography together with oral traditions constitute an adequate cross-check on historical situations? Is the use of such words as "duke," "marquis," and "knight" consistent with the stated aim of clarity in terminology and is it fair to Africa?

Less trivial is the question whether this book has a double standard. African shortcomings are not blinked and are presented with admirable coolness and detachment. On Europe itself we find a curiously thin diversion about Portugal and Holland, the relevance being obvious but the presentation creaking a bit and there being no room for perspective. On Europe *in* Africa the treatment is worrisome. After several chapters of dispassionate narrative we suddenly crash into such adjectives as "barbarous" and "ruthless" to describe the Portuguese; though there is little

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discussion of British rule we are told that Barotseland "slipped into the grip of indirect administration." Is the complex subject of race relations in Africa best approached in this way?

These thoughts do not detract from one's feeling of gratitude for a masterly rendition in a needy area.

R. HEUSSLER
Moscow, Vermont

Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches *by H. V. Wiseman. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.—ix, 254 pp. $6.00.*

This book's jacket calls it an introduction to political sociology, and the works summarized by Professor Wiseman, including some of my own, would certainly lend credence to the claim. Across the volume's pages, in not always intellectually orderly cadence, march such social science luminaries as Parsons, Easton, Riggs, Pye, Verba, Lipset, Merton, Almond, Levy, Johnson, Shils, Apter, Binder, Coleman, Sutton, Lerner, Dahl, Hoselitz, Bottomore, Runciman, and almost everyone else who has had something to say about comparative politics, political development, or political sociology. The author's purpose is admittedly descriptive summary *plus* the demonstration of the utility of structural-functionalism in comparative analysis. I am not certain whether he has succeeded in the first of these aims, for such a judgment would depend on the readers to whom the book is directed. For undergraduates it would be essentially undesirable, for the author's attempt at simple, straightforward description cannot overcome the confusion inherent in much of the language of modern social science and, alas, in many of the theoretical formulations Mr. Wiseman seeks to explicate. As a text for beginning graduate students in political science and sociology, the volume might serve the purpose (latent, unintended function?) of a quick survey of "the literature" without the need for consulting original works. Only the purists and the innocents on the teaching side would object to such short cuts in the midst of what may be Western man's "publish and perish" impulse. As essentially uncritical summaries of many works, the book is acceptable.

But there is also latent danger in exposing beginning graduate students to this work, for the more perceptive among them will quickly discover the seemingly hopeless conceptual and theoretical morass, the incredible

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banality, the anarchy that is typical of much of the cited literature. For those students who do not retreat in horror but push on instead to join the fray and to discover the many subtleties the author deliberately ignores, reflections on this volume will not be entirely favorable.

Some things cannot—in any event should not—be simplified. How does one really simplify Parsons' four-sector framework for analyzing social systems? Can one really reduce Binder's complex discussion of power and legitimacy to a few pages of straight-talk? Is there anyone fully prepared to explicate the prolific outpourings of Riggs by brief references to a number of his most difficult concepts? Should the basic tenets of structural-functional analysis be made to appear so deceptively simple that they emerge as only simplistic?

The author is apparently aware of some of this, for he sometimes slips into analysis or criticism, but he manages to hew very close to his decision to have the authors he treats speak for themselves. This is a pity; a critical essay might have given the volume the coherence and value it lacks. Thus we never learn what the author thinks about what in fact exists in the "black box" between inputs and outputs of the political system. We find at least a half-dozen definitions of the political system, with no comment from the author about the famous "boundary problem" except an evasive (approving?) summary of a work by Barnard. The chapter purporting to appraise structural-functionalism ignores Hempel as well as the recently edited monograph by Martindale and winds up inconclusively. Functionalists will need fewer critics when defenders of this stripe are at hand.

The volume is replete with typographical errors (pp. 11, 43, 45, 51, 57, 91, 105); it abounds in clichés dear to the British social scientist (for example, there are more interest groups in the United States than in Britain and U.S. groups have more influence over policy); it contains dozens of questionable assertions (immobilism in France and Communist votes outside Iron Curtain countries are problems of "integration" rather than anything else; or that successful political leadership is always endowed with some charisma, which leads one to think of Harding, Coolidge, Moro).

Some errors of fact reflect defective proofreading or wishful thinking, as when the author (p. 123) prematurely disposes of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. Some attempts at humor will derail the reader, as I was by this comment (p. 18) following a reference to Sutton's illustration of affective behavior by distinguishing "loving" feelings about wife and "business-like" feelings about secretary: "Norms are not always respected!" Some presumed laws of sociology are so manifestly tautologous, one wonders whether Wiseman is not in fact among Britain's severest critics

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of modern social science. Here is an example (p. 6): "It is agreed that the social structure of every system does to some extent succeed in solving these [pattern maintenance, adaptation, integration, goal-attainment] problems or the system ceases to exist."

The truth is that the author does sociology no service at all when, in perhaps the most banal discussion in the book, he ascribes to sociologists such insightful contributions to the literature of political science as: (1) "a nation and the state are not necessarily the same thing" (p. 104); (2) power and influence are concepts of deep concern to sociologists (p. 104); (3) in all societies effective government consists of a minority of the population (p. 106); (4) while every government claims to be legitimate, legitimacy is never the sole basis of governmental power (p. 106).

To be sure, most of the time Mr. Wiseman is summarizing others, and he is moved (he is a graduate of Balliol College) to remind his colleagues that some of these insights and others may have preceded sociology by some centuries. Perhaps political sociology will not reach the intellectual maturity we all desire until the interdisciplinary excursions take more sociologists back over the route traveled by "traditional" political scientists.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

Freedom and Development. *New York, Asia Publishing House for the India International Centre, 1966.—xvi, 82 pp. $3.75.*

The Real World of Democracy *by C. B. Macpherson. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.—67 pp. $2.00.*

Political Power and Social Change *by Peter H. Odegard. New Brunswick; Rutgers University Press, 1966.—111 pp. $3.50.*

Three volumes of lectures. I shall begin with Professor Macpherson's Massey Lectures, originally broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. They are so compact that a brief review can scarcely sketch their argument, let alone offer a critique. Somewhat arbitrarily, I shall select three themes as comprising the central argument. (1) In addition to the original idea of democracy, defined (*pace* Pericles *contra!*) as "government by and for the poor and oppressed" (p. 35), three different concepts prevail today: liberal democracy, the Communist version, and the ideas prevalent in the underdeveloped world. The ultimate goal of each is the same—"to provide for the full and free development of the essential hu-

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man capacities of all the members of the society" (p. 37). In other respects they differ, and those held by the Communists and developing nations have much in common with the original idea. (2) Liberal democracy "came as an adjunct to the competitive liberal society and state" (p. 10). It is adapted to an economy of scarcity. Now that we are on the verge of attaining an economy of abundance, institutions and ideas suited to scarcity and to the attendant goals of possession and acquisition are threatened. (3) The best chance for saving liberal democracy is for the Western nations to remedy "the inequality of human rights as between ourselves and the poor nations" (p. 67) by massive economic aid. This is the final conclusion of the book and it is alleged to follow from the proposition that "the societies which can best meet the demand of their own people for equal human rights, equal freedom for their members to realize their essential humanity, will be the ones to survive" (p. 66). This reasoning, if I have followed it aright, involves a massive *non sequitur*. The proposition, oft-repeated in these lectures, that we must substitute spiritual for material values has much to commend it; it is also arguable (as Macpherson does argue) that unless we do so our polities will cease to command the support of citizens; but the conclusion that we must increase our material aid to underdeveloped nations, sound though it may be in its own right, does not follow from the premises.

Freedom and Development comprises a series of five lectures, by as many individuals, delivered in 1963 at the India International Centre. Each lecture deals with freedom as a factor in a particular aspect of development. With this frame of reference T. H. Marshall, Gabriel Almond, V. K. R. V. Rao, Samuel Mathai, and Kali Prasad discuss, in turn, "social development," "political development," "economic development," "educational development," and "individual development." Professor Marshall shows that Maine's famous generalization about the movement from status to contract has its applicability to today's developing societies, but also that it is subject to an important qualification in the form of a tendency for a society that has started along the road toward modernization to routinize its transitional pattern and resist further change. Professor Rao demonstrates both the need for greater freedom in India, if economic development is to proceed satisfactorily, and the fact that freedom alone is not enough.

Unlike the other two volumes, Peter Odegard's lectures (delivered in 1965 at the University of Puget Sound) make no special reference to the problems of developing societies. Their broad scope is perhaps best conveyed by their titles: " 'No Single Thing Abides' "; "Political Science: Knowledge for What?"; and "Use and Abuse of Political Power." Of special interest for many readers will be his judicious appraisal of be-

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havioralism in political science. While recognizing and expounding the great contributions it has made to the profession, he at the same time launches a vigorous attack upon those who would rest content with a value-free science. "It is this posture, as much as anything," he declares,

> that accounts for the failure of the behavioral frame of reference to give new life and new direction to political science. It is this assumption that helps to explain the monumental collection of data and the meager crop of significant concepts. What pass for concepts are often little more than semantic neologisms, useless as scientific concepts and incomprehensible to everyone but their inventors (pp. 65-66).

J. ROLAND PENNOCK
Swarthmore College

Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States *by G. H. Jansen. New York and Washington, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.—432 pp. $10.00.*

The concept of non-alignment, the book before us convincingly demonstrates, has been in the author's words, "a prime victim of the tyranny of words." G. H. Jansen, a former Indian diplomat and journalist, is surely correct in his assertion that over the years non-alignment has become overlaid and encrusted with a multitude of extraneous ideas and doctrines having nothing essentially to do with it, including "peaceful co-existence," Gandhian non-violence, Afro-Asian solidarity, moral-ethical neutrality, and the principle of diplomatic "equidistance" between the cold war power blocs. He is no less justified in calling attention on nearly every page to the ambiguity of the concept, to the often divergent national goals concealed by it, and to the lack of conspicuous success achieved by neutralist countries themselves in trying to define their cherished doctrine rigorously and unequivocally.

On the questionable premise that devotion to non-alignment is the "one factor in common" uniting the Afro-Asian nations, Jansen has supplied us with what is in effect an analysis of intra-neutralist relations. And this is an aspect of the subject too long neglected by other commentators on Afro-Asian affairs. By the author's own admission, his appraisal is a "tract for the times"; it is a plea to the devotees of non-alignment to examine their doctrine critically and realistically and, perhaps most urgently, to strip it of the excrescences which, in Jansen's judgment, have too long distorted the concept and produced confusion about its meaning and implications within the neutralist community. The frame

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of reference he uses for analysis is the series of Asian, African, Afro-Asian, and neutralist conferences held from the early postwar period to 1965.

Many of Jansen's assertions and insights, it must be said, are timely and illuminating. He has a clear sense (which some proponents of neutralism clearly lack) of the semantic confusion surrounding the concept, of its inherent flexibility (if not ambiguity), and of the impact of the international political environment upon its essential meaning. He sees that it can and does accommodate, under one diplomatic credo, an often bewildering multiplicity of national viewpoints and policies, which are in some cases antagonistic.

Jansen makes no attempt to eschew value judgments; his own intimate association with Indian viewpoints frequently colors his evaluation, particularly when he discusses India's recent and traumatic encounter with Red China. Understandably, if regrettably, his grasp of Asian attitudes and objectives surpasses his knowledge of the Arab and African worlds. Yet sometimes his assessment of even Indian diplomatic behavior is misleading and oversimplified. This author ought to know better than most students, for example, that on numerous occasions Prime Minister Nehru rejected Gandhian non-violence as a viable principle of statecraft. And in several instances, Jansen is much less prone to give other neutralist nations the benefit of the doubt than he is when dealing with New Delhi's policies and behavior.

The author concludes what is, on balance, a highly critical evaluation of neutralist behavior with the assertion that the non-aligned nations have amassed a record of "solid achievement" and have amply "justified" their attachment to this diplomatic posture. Perhaps they have. In fact, I am inclined to believe Jansen is right. But this verdict—so out of harmony with most of what is said or implied in preceding pages—is both a surprising and intriguing judgment. It is not a conclusion following logically from his own study. The reader is bound to wonder how the author himself arrived at it and why.

CECIL V. CRABB JR.
Vassar College

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The Revolution in International Relations: A Study in the Changing Nature and Balance of Power *by E. F. Penrose. New York, Humanities Press, 1965.—xxii, 290 pp. $6.75.*

International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast *by David W. Wainhouse. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press in cooperation with The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced Studies, 1966.—xvii, 663 pp. $10.00.*

These two studies written from differing perspectives complement and reinforce each other to a remarkable degree. E. F. Penrose's *The Revolution in International Relations* falls within the tradition of the general treatise in international politics. *International Peace Observation* adds to the literature of international organization seventy case studies of peace observation drawn from experiences of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States. Its agenda for study includes the composition, training, size, and selection of teams; their terms of references, methods, and procedures; their record of success and failure in the maintenance of peace and the furtherance of peaceful settlement; and their fact-gathering and reporting techniques. The major function of the two studies is to delineate the past and present structure of international society and the role and limitations of international machinery in war and peace.

Professor Penrose writes from the vantage point both of scholar and practitioner; he has served as a teacher of international history and relations in Britain, Japan, the Middle East, and the United States. He draws on practical experience in such international bodies as the International Labor Organization and as economic adviser to the late U.S. Ambassador Winant. He brings to his study a tentative and pragmatic outlook while seeking to differentiate his views from those of some of the more outspoken "political realists." He sees balance of power considerations as far outweighing political doctrines as mainsprings of foreign policy formulation. The strong emphasis that many postwar leaders have given to cold war concepts such as international communism and free world unity is highly questionable in his view. He sees the balance of power conceived as a moving equilibrium of forces as essential but not sufficient for world peace. He writes: "There is no substitute for disarmament but progress toward disarmament must be linked with progress toward the removal of the sources of international friction" (p. 278). Britain's future lies with Europe and not with a wider Atlantic Community, and while nationalism is supreme in Africa and Asia, Penrose sees some hope for integration movements in East Africa and North Africa.

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He is roundly critical of the American practice of linking diplomatic recognition with approval. His book is a civilized, humane, and rational inquiry, but its fault may lie in a certain impatience with the pathos of decision-making of great power statesmen in a nuclear age. He may also underestimate the continuing role of dependence for security that nations must have on the nuclear powers. Notwithstanding, he has helped us to realize the many-sided character of national power and the dispersion of influence to new centers of power in the world.

David Wainhouse is one of our most thoughtful interpreters of international organization. He, too, has viewed international relations both as a policy-maker and an objective observer. He and his colleagues have given us a study to which serious students of international organization will have recourse for years to come. It is a valuable companion volume to the classic Goodrich-Hambro study of the United Nations Charter.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
New York City

Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964 *by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths. Cambridge, Mass., and London, The M.I.T. Press, 1966.—xi, 338 pp. $10.00, 15 s.*

Is it useful to study arms control and disarmament as a subject in itself? Bloomfield, Clemens, and Griffiths have proceeded on the assumption that arms control is only part of a larger complex. The decision of the Arms Control Project of M. I. T. to examine the problem in its larger framework is indicative of the increasing sophistication of the "arms controllers." At the end of the fifties when interest in the possibility of some disarmament measures became significant, the discussion was of limited utility. One group assumed that the United States was responsible for the arms race, that the Soviet Union had merely reacted to American militarism and that now the United States had to make amends by making concessions until Soviet mistrust would be overcome. Their opponents argued that since the Soviet Union was aggressive, it could not possibly be seriously interested in disarmament and, therefore, pursued only political objectives in talking about disarmament. As might have been expected, neither approach contributed much to our understanding of Soviet policies. It is the virtue of the book under review that it seeks to understand rather than to strike a posture.

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The problem the authors have set themselves is indeed formidable. It is nothing less than an analysis of the forces at play in Soviet politics. What did Khrushchev really want in the way of disarmament measures at various times; what was his political authority at different times; what was the role of the military men; how did the Soviet economic situation influence military and disarmament choices; what was the role of technology; and, finally, what was their perception of the trend of international developments? It is indicative of our inadequate knowledge of the workings of Soviet politics that the authors must give only tentative answers to the questions they raise, and not all scholars would agree with the conclusions they do reach. Many would question, for example, the early date assigned to the Soviet search for a *détente* with the West and would prefer to view the search for accommodation as one alternative among others, including the hope of besting the United States in the quality of weapons. After all, Soviet policies, like those of other great powers, often represent a compromise of conflicting views rather than a logically consistent plan.

Whatever differences there might be about the interpretation of individual details, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race* establishes that arms control and disarmament is a genuine concern of Soviet leaders. True, at times instrumental use is made of disarmament negotiations, but at other times it plays a major role in Soviet relations with other powers. In all likelihood, the Test Ban Agreement of 1963 was not the first and last Soviet agreement to arms limitation and when others are seriously discussed, this thoughtful and thorough book will be a useful companion.

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN
The RAND Corporation

Soviet Mongolia: A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite *by George G. S. Murphy. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.—ix, 224 pp. $5.95.*

Many people are interested in the revolutions of our time—their generic resemblances and their particular differences, which are sometimes obvious but often subtle. Among the most interesting is the Mongolian Revolution, because it took place in a very large country with a very small population (estimates for the time vary; Murphy gives 750,000, which is probably too high, since it is even now only about 1,100,000) situated between two much more powerful and sophisticated countries, Russia and China, and within striking distance of imperialist Japan. Rev-

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olutionary sentiment in Mongolia proper, moreover, the present Mongolian People's Republic, had ramifying connections with the minority nationalisms of Chinese Inner Mongolia, the Buryats of Siberia, the Mongol minority in what was then Uryanghai or Tannu-Tuva, and the Western Mongols in China's Sinkiang Province. As a consequence of these connections a number of Mongol leaders, both right wing and left wing, who would have been classified as ignorant on any ordinary educational test, had in fact a considerable knowledge of the structures of power that impinged on them and frequently showed that they were capable of shrewd thinking.

Unfortunately Murphy, though he contributes some important information and cites sources that are important and often little known, botches his opportunity by starting off with a thesis and trying grimly to prove it all through the book. His most interesting sources are in Russian, especially unpublished material at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, but he is handicapped by being unable to use Mongolian sources, except the very few that are available in translation.

His thesis is that the Mongolian "revolutionary party" was manufactured in Russia, that with twenty party members and four hundred troops it was quantitively ridiculous, and that there was no "revolutionary situation" in the Mongolia of 1921 (p. 28). This whole approach is absurd. Mongolia *was* in revolutionary ferment. For decades there had been sporadic mutinies and outbreaks, and increasing numbers of *sain ere khün* ("bold fellows" of a Robin Hood type), and since 1911 there had been a genuine revolutionary ferment. This is evident from the narratives of some two hundred of the Partisans, published in Mongolia (*Mongol Ardyn Juramt Tsergiin Durdatgaluud* [1961]), most of whom briefly describe their early lives and say why they joined the Partisans.

Of the senior leaders a number were what Marxists would call "bourgeois chauvinists" who were forced over to the Left by the exigencies of the nationalism for which they fought. Maksarjav, of whom there is a biography by Choibalsang, was distinguished by the ferocity with which he fought against the Chinese from 1911 onward. He accepted a post briefly under Ungern-Sternberg, but then crossed over to the Left. Manglai Baatar Damdinsüren was another "conventional" nationalist. He entered Mongolia from Inner Mongolia, served as minister of war under the Urga Living Buddha, and wrote increasingly radical memoranda on what ought to be done, which the Living Buddha turned down. He died with great bravery, under torture by Chinese warlord troops. Sumia Beise is dismissed casually by Murphy because he did not command more than one hundred men, and is listed in the index as "Beise Somia," evidently under the impression that Beise (a prince of the fourth rank) is a

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name. I do not have a biography of him, but it is known that he was a man who, refusing to live in Sinkiang under Chinese rule, migrated into Mongolia with his followers and was granted land there. He was in fact part of the "revolutionary" situation the existence of which Murphy denies.

The important thing that the Mongols have always recognized, but which Murphy is unable to see, is that the Russians decided the outcome not by manufacturing a revolution in Mongolia, but by winning one in Russia. Once there was a revolutionary course of action on one of their frontiers to which they could attach themselves as allies, and from which they could hope for aid of a revolutionary, not imperialistic kind, the Mongols caught fire.

OWEN LATTIMORE
University of Leeds

Food and Agriculture in Communist China *by John Lossing Buck, Owen L. Dawson, and Yuan-li Wu. New York and Washington, Frederick A. Praeger and London, Pall Mall Press, for The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966.—xiii, 171 pp. $6.00.*

This book comprises four essays by three economists. The first, by Buck, compares the food grain output of China before and after the Communist government was established. Wu's essay also concerns the measurement of food grain output throughout the Communist period but in addition it discusses aspects of the institutional reform of Chinese agriculture. The last two papers are by Mr. Dawson, on the significance of chemical fertilizers in China's agricultural production and on the great need for more irrigation.

Dr. Buck's main thesis and the tone of his paper are indicated in his opening words: "By reference to records of production during the period prior to the Communist regime, one may arrive at an objective evaluation of the reliability of Communist food grain statistics and claims of progress which have been accepted by many people as evidence of progress." Data published by the Communist government, according to Buck, are not merely inaccurate, but have been "manipulated" to indicate an increase in production. The fundamental part of his case is that the Chinese government overstated the extent to which food grain production in 1949 was below "average." Buck argues that the government adjusted the statistics for cultivated area but failed to make proper adjustment to

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these for output. The argument hangs on Buck's belief that Dawson is right in putting 1949 output at twelve per cent below average as opposed to the Chinese government's figure of eighteen per cent. Unfortunately the statistical basis of Dawson's claim is not given. Buck concludes that there was less grain "on average," 1949-58, than in 1929-33 and fewer calories, on average, per head. It is difficult, however, to see the usefulness of this concept of "average" when considering growth over a period of eight to nine years. Buck's mass of figures may perhaps impress some people, but readers should instead note carefully the author's admission (pp. 32-33) that his own, adjusted annual figures for 1949-58 may be quite wrong. He offers the not-too-helpful conclusion: "Possibly, the average 1949-58 production might have been somewhat higher than the 163 million metric tons. Or, possibly, the yearly series would indicate a downward rather than an upward trend." One must agree that it was most probably upward *or* downward.

When, occasionally, Dr. Buck strays from his figures into the complex subject of economic development his comments are almost charmingly unsophisticated. The following quotation (p. 51) should require no comment: "If the Communists had left farming to the farmers and had concentrated on providing them with the necessary production supplies; adequate credit, including land credit; extensive education in tested and improved agricultural techniques; and had allowed them control of their own organisations, agricultural progress could have been great." It is particularly disturbing that Dr. Buck, whose prewar researches provided more statistical data on Chinese agriculture than are available for any other poor country in the world, should have gone into print on the Communist period without consulting the bulk of sources available. No one would deny that his prewar surveys are an indispensable basis for studying more recent developments, but he would have performed a better service to scholars if he had indicated some of the problems involved in using them to make this important comparison.

Although it provides some useful advice on the pitfalls of Chinese agricultural statistics, Dr. Wu's essay, like Buck's, lacks adequate supporting evidence for its many assertions. He describes his re-estimation of agricultural output for 1950-57 as a "hypothetical model," which presumably means that the figures are not to be taken too literally. I failed, after reading the text and notes very carefully, to discover exactly how Dr. Wu had calculated his series. Again, like Buck, his main assumption is that in the early nineteen-fifties there was under-reporting, but he fails to explain how he arrives at his estimates (p. 87) for the extent of this. When discussing the relationship between institutional reform and production, he concludes (p. 91) that, according to "available estimates" of

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crop yield per hectare in 1955, the "results" (of what, is not clear) were "generally unfavourable in comparison with average yields of 1931-37. . . ." On page 93 we further read: "Apparently, the cooperative farm did not succeed in raising unit area yield." No meaningful evidence is presented in support of either of these claims.

Wu, like his co-authors, does not give a single reference to any local Chinese newspaper (the richest source of data), but he quotes such remarkable sources as the *Wall Street Journal* for Chou En-lai's famous announcement of 1959 in which he scaled down the production statistics for 1958; the *New China Yearbook* (Tokyo), for the decision to increase the number of brigades in 1962; and the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), for the number of tractors in China, 1959-62. His final conclusion, though unnecessarily cautious, is hardly profound: "Consequently, success in agricultural recovery may [?] become a pre-requisite of economic growth in general."

Happily, Mr. Dawson's essay on fertilizers in China is a valuable contribution. His balanced approach and careful marshaling of the statistics are to be admired. He argues that experiments in China have shown a "great potential increase" in yields of rice and other grains where chemical fertilizers are applied correctly. If they were used at the same rate as in Taiwan, Dawson estimates that China would need an annual supply of fifty to sixty million tons. To raise farm output sufficient to feed the growing population and sustain a modest overall growth rate in the economy, fifteen million tons will be needed per year by the mid-nineteen-seventies. The current annual supplies available, by contrast, are around five million tons. Dawson rightly wonders if the Chinese leaders are acting on this urgent need for fertilizer and the additional water supplies implied. Finally, in a less detailed paper, Mr. Dawson gives some interesting data on irrigation, although one would have wished to see its relationship with the use of fertilizers more closely explored.

Summing up, much of this book is unscholarly and misleading. It will be a useful reference work to the few economists who study Chinese agriculture, particularly for Mr. Dawson's essay on fertilizers. It cannot, however, be recommended to the more general reader. The only thing political scientists are likely to obtain by reading it is a healthy skepticism for some of the methods of contemporary economic analysis.

KENNETH R. WALKER
School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London

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Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for U.S. Policy *by Alexander Eckstein. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966.—xi, 366 pp. $8.50.*

About one-third of Professor Eckstein's book is devoted to economic growth and about two-thirds to foreign trade. In both of these fields the principal emphasis is put on economic statistics. The book, in other words, is one of the fairly large number which have appeared in recent years which try to make sense out of Communist statistics. Dr. Eckstein, however, faced more than the normal problems because of his subject matter. Chinese Communist statistics are considerably worse than Communist statistics in general, particularly since the great leap in the dark. Further, they publish only the most aggregated statistics on foreign trade, his principal subject. Altogether he faced formidable difficulties, and it is a matter for congratulation that he was able to do as well as he did.

One of the problems in this sort of research which is seldom discussed is the research assistants. Vast amounts of literature in several languages must be surveyed and long tedious computations carried out. Of necessity much of this work is done by research assistants, and it is impossible to prevent them from making at least some mistakes. The first table in Eckstein's book (pp. 20-21), for example, has its two right columns labeled "ratios" although they are actually percentages. Of more significance, the table lists total and per capita output of various commodities. The bottom third of the table, however, lists only the total ouput, and the per capita columns simply say "not applicable." Presumably the research assistant tired of dividing by population.

The basic problem, however, is in the Communist statistics themselves. The German invasion of Russia and our own temporary occupation of North Korea made it possible to examine the "internal" figures used by the Communists themselves. From this evidence it is clear that they do not keep two sets of books, one for planning and one for propaganda. The figures they announce are the ones they use themselves in planning. The propaganda effect is obtained by careful selection of the particular figures published and by various subtle distortions of the labels they give them. There is little direct lying in the statistics they release.

Nevertheless, the figures released are clearly very bad. Since we know that the Communists use these figures in planning, this inferiority of their statistical work probably is one reason for the difficulties they have with their economic system. The current move toward the use of market criteria in most of the Communist world is, in part, evidence that the Com-

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munist leaders themselves have the same kind of difficulties that faced Eckstein in attempting to deduce what is really going on from their statistical reports. It is unfortunate that China, where the statistics are exceptionally bad even by Communist standards, is not presently willing to put the practical objective of expediting growth above religious principles.

The general level of difficulties encountered may be illustrated by Eckstein's remark at one point that in a certain series there is "fairly complete though inconsistent information" (p. 159). His efforts to make use of the information to try to resolve the inconsistencies take up many pages of ingenious and learned discussion. In the end, however, the inconsistencies are only partially resolved. It is unfortunate but true that the figures in this particular series are considerably better than those available for most of the problems Eckstein deals with. In most cases where figures are consistent, they are consistent largely because they are so scanty that they cannot be put in apposition to each other. In the foreign trade section of the book the main dependence has been put not on the scanty and unreliable Chinese figures, but on the figures put out by their trading partners. This expedient raises quite a number of statistical difficulties, which Eckstein discusses in some detail. He then points out, correctly, that "the data thus derived are still better and much more detailed than the official statistics" (p. 92) from Chinese sources.

All of this is not to criticize either Dr. Eckstein or the book. The figures he produces are fragmentary and of dubious accuracy, but this does not reflect upon his professional competence. The problem is the basic data with which he must work. Dr. Eckstein has put a great deal of labor, patience, learning, and ingenuity into this book. He has surely improved our knowledge of the basic economic magnitudes very considerably. The large remaining uncertainties should be blamed not on him, but on the Communists.

GORDON TULLOCK
University of Virginia

Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949 *by Y. C. Wang. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1966.—xx, 557 pp. $10.00.*

Professor Wang's study consists of two principal parts which might perhaps have made two quite separate books. They are only loosely held together by the thesis that the intrusion of the West over the past century destroyed the traditional intellectual elite of China and replaced them by

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Western-educated men who, whatever their technical expertise, no longer possessed real political power. Following an introduction which presents an idealized picture of "Men and Ideas in Traditional China" (although with occasional important insights into the weaknesses of Confucian society on the eve of the Western impact), Part II, "The Genesis of a New Elite," is devoted to a detailed account of the movement for study abroad which involved perhaps 100,000 students in the eight decades before the establishment of the Communist government in 1949. At least twenty thousand young Chinese attended colleges or universities in the United States during these years; two or three times that number studied in Japan, many in secondary schools or "quickie" institutions intended primarily for sojourning Chinese; and several thousand more studied in Europe. Apart from Professor Saneto's detailed account of Chinese students in Japan, Professor Wang's is the first overall survey of what is indeed a striking phenomenon in China's recent history. He has assembled data from many scattered sources to produce a useful picture of the motives, the numbers, the training, and the later careers in China of these students.

Professor Wang demonstrates how almost every facet of China's "modernization" in the past century was influenced, if not led, by men who had been educated abroad. At the same time, he is extremely pessimistic about the results. The moral and ethical values of Confucianism were dissolved, he argues, but replaced by no substitute suitable to Chinese conditions. The returned student was exalted but often unemployed, concentrated in urban centers and cut off from the rural hinterland as his gentry-literati ancestor had not been. Part III, "Facets of the Impact on China," consists of seven independent essays which explore a number of aspects of modern Chinese history in which the foreign educated played leading roles. Professor Wang writes, for example, on "The Political Thought of Yen Fu and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao: A Prelude to Revolution," "Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911," "The May Fourth Movement: Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Sun Yat-sen," and "The Kuomintang Finance: T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung." These essays are intended to provide case histories buttressing the pessimism about the whole process of contact between Chinese intellectuals and the West which pervades the book. Some, as the examples cited may indicate, treat this theme only tangentially, although as brief historical sketches of their respective topics they are well done.

Perhaps Professor Wang's principal conclusion is that "the whole Western-educated elite was . . . politically weak. Among other things, this situation meant that moral and political leadership, so important to people accustomed to the collective and paternal way of life, had to come

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from men other than the most Westernized and democratically-inclined group." In spite of the influence of the West, one may suggest that under the late Ch'ing, under the warlord governments, under Chiang Kai-shek, and continuing now under Mao Tse-tung, there has been a remarkable continuity of political power in China in the hands of men whose exposure to Western values was minimal, whose own education and training was obtained within China, but who had abandoned Confucius' dictum that "the accomplished scholar is not a utensil" (*Analects*, II, 12).

ALBERT FEUERWERKER
University of Michigan

Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912-1924 *by George T. Yu. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.—xiv, 204 pp. $6.00.*

This lucid, well researched monograph explores a relatively neglected area of contemporary research on China, the evolution of the ideology and organization of the Kuomintang. It also offers us an interesting case study of the mutation of the democratic ideal in a non-Western environment.

The author interprets the KMT as a product of Western ideological impact on China. In its earlier years, "with full faith in the democratic process," it sought to graft the concepts and institutions of Western democracy on a largely illiterate and apolitical society. After defeats and disillusionment, in 1914 it turned to the idea of "party tutelage," the world's first articulation of the concept of "guided democracy." Mr. Yu sees this doctrine, and the elitist authoritarian party created by the Party Congress of 1924—with Communist participation—as an amalgam of Western ideas and Chinese traditional practice.

He examines some of the environmental factors that contributed to the party's evolution: the influence of Western-educated students, support by overseas Chinese, and the problems peculiar to a party-in-exile. Especially useful is his analysis of the movement for provincial self-rule, advocated as a check on centralized government authority.

Mr. Yu points out the importance of local loyalties on party factionalism: Sun Yat-sen and most of his personal retinue were from South China, and controversy often split the party along regional lines. However, his suggestion that this state of affairs ended in 1914 may not be justified, considering the dominant role of the South China clique during the faction fights of the nineteen-twenties.

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In view of the many valuable contributions of Mr. Yu's perceptive study, it seems disproportionate to single out for objections his evaluation of the Reorganization Congress of 1924. Yet he shares with many other writers certain assumptions which need to be questioned.

One of them is that the Congress transformed the KMT from Sun's personal satrapy into a disciplined, cohesive organization. Did the party envisioned in 1924 ever become a reality? Sun consistently violated or ignored the 1924 Constitution, and attempts to resurrect it after his death dissolved in factional strife.

Another is treating Sun's decision in 1922 to admit the Communists as a concession to Moscow in return for assistance: the so-called "Soviet Alliance." Since we lack any real evidence of Soviet commitment for material aid, at least before Chiang Kai-shek's mission to Moscow in late 1923, I submit that this cliché needs re-examination. Did Sun's decision have other motivations? Did it perhaps reflect what Mr. Yu depicts as his almost Confucian image of himself as sole leader of the revolution and father of the nation—and of his doctrine, which pretended to embrace and transcend all other "isms"? How much did this image contribute to what Mr. Yu calls the KMT's "search for identity"—lasting until 1949?

A major virtue of Mr. Yu's book is that it supplies a solid foundation of fact on which to raise such questions. A valuable departure point for further studies, it should be of interest not only to the specialist on China, but to other scholars as well.

WALTER E. GOURLAY
Harvard University

Australian Policies and Attitudes Toward China *by Henry S. Albinski. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965.—xvi, 511 pp. $12.50.*

Recent events in Southeast Asia accentuate rather than diminish the value of this study of Australian attitudes toward Communist China. Australia has become increasingly involved in the Vietnam war. Shifts of power in Indonesia have led to the abandonment of "confrontation" with Malaysia, and to an apparent Indonesian willingness to abate one source of possible trouble by seeking an accurate definition of the boundary between Australian and Indonesian New Guinea. Such developments have modified the priorities in Australia's dealings with Southeast Asia. Yet despite these alterations, the central problem of relations with China remains substantially unchanged.

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The problem confronting Australia is a diplomatic perennial: how to take prudent measures against possible aggression without seeming to be provocative. In seeking answers to this, Australia has for years occupied positions now being sought, somewhat uneasily, by the United States, maintaining firm opposition to Chinese expansionism while at the same time allowing an increasing number of cultural and commercial contacts with Peking. Australian participation in SEATO and in the recently formed association of Asian and Pacific nations, non-recognition of Communist China and opposition to Peking's admission to the United Nations, and the use of Australian military forces in Korea, Malaysia, and Vienam are all part of the containment policy. But Australian newspapers carry advertisements inviting the public to join in group travel ventures to China; the Australian Wheat Board, a quasi-public agency, eagerly seeks larger markets for Australian wheat in China; and private firms are supported in their efforts to sell to the Communists. Travel between the two countries is comparatively unimpeded, and some, though not all, Chinese Communist fraternal delegates have been admitted to attend trade union and Communist party gatherings in Australia. And all of this during the years of Liberal-Country party power in Australian political life, under the leadership of that foe of communism, Sir Robert Menzies.

Professor Albinski contends that there would have been little change in this policy even if the opposition Australian Labor party had been in power, and that there is more of a national consensus on the general policy than would be suggested by the bitter attacks from the Right on the Labor party as pro-Communist. While properly deprecating the pathological, paranoid quality of some of these attacks, however, especially those of the largely Catholic Democratic Labor party, Professor Albinski does not pay sufficient attention to the facts that make the Labor party vulnerable to such attacks: its long record of indifference to the power of Communists in important trade unions, its complacent attitude toward its members who share positions on trade union ballots with Communists despite prohibitions against such "unity tickets," and the strange and erratic behavior of its former leader, Herbert Evatt. The author's harsh assessment of the behavior of the DLP should have taken these ALP tergiversations into account.

Much of the material in this study was obtained by interviews with more than one hundred persons: government officials, political leaders, journalists, diplomats, and members of various pressure groups. It was inevitable that many of these people would not wish to be quoted directly, and the reader is dependent on Professor Albinski's estimate of the representative nature of opinions given. One is also left in doubt as to

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the inclusion among the interviewees of this or that formulator of opinion. But despite such limitations, which are surely not the fault of the author, the work is a useful study of the policies pursued by an American ally in the struggle against Chinese expansion, an ally that has found alternatives to many of the policies currently followed by the United States.

DONALD C. GORDON
University of Maryland

The Challenge of Industrial Relations in the Pacific-Asian Countries *by Harold S. Roberts and Paul F. Brissenden (eds.). Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1965.—viii, 259 pp. $6.50.*

This volume is an outgrowth of a 1962 conference held in Honolulu by the Institute of Advanced Projects of the East-West Center. Eleven scholars were in attendance: Professor Ayusawa and Mr. Taishiro Shirai came from Japan; Professor A. W. R. Carrothers from Canada; Professor A. S. Mathur and Mr. Asoka Mehti from India; Sir Arthur Tyndall from New Zealand; and Dr. Kingsley M. Laffer and Professor Edward I. Sykes came from Australia. The American participants were Professor Paul F. Brissenden, Professor Harold S. Roberts, and Mr. David J. Saposs. The volume is evidence of their effort to survey three specific topics: (1) industrial relations research in the various countries, (2) the processing of labor disputes, and (3) the impact of ideology on industrial relations systems.

Of these three efforts, in many ways the most successful was the first. Mr. Shirai provides the reader with an overview of what some of the principal industrial relations projects in Japan are, and who is doing them. One, probably of some interest to American scholars, is the compilation of a "documentary history of the Japanese labor movement." The commission undertaking this important work will publish its results in the "usual" eleven volumes (Commons' comparable effort was also published in eleven volumes). Carrothers' report on industrial relations research in Canada, although useful, is somewhat less unique; the Industrial Relations Research Association has kept most Americans informed on this topic. Edward I. Sykes provides a very brief paper on industrial relations research in Australia, but manages to point out the principal focuses of activity.

The second part of the book deals with the problems of dispute settlement. Laffer writes on the Australian system: his article provides rela-

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tively little that is new; perhaps it even over-condenses a vast literature. Mathur's essay on statutory dispute settlement in India is essentially episodic, drawing upon the description of some resolutions and laws. Sir Arthur Tyndall's capsular summary of the New Zealand Act describes how the court is supposed to work. Professor Ayusawa provides an account of the objectives of the law in Japan. In this area, I thought that Professor Brissenden's essay was the most valuable. It provides useful comparisons of Australia and the United States concerning the content of labor relations, strikes, the various practices of collective bargaining, methods of conciliation, and the role of arbitration.

The third topic, the impact of ideology, has an overview paper by David Saposs and a useful historical description of the evolution of the industrial relations system's relationship to the evolution of the New Zealand economy by Sir Arthur Tyndall.

It is hard to know how successful the conference was. Certainly most, if not all, of the observers were well acquainted with all of the material in each other's country. The volume suggests that there were no insights coming out of the conference. All of the papers have been well edited and are pleasant, if not always stimulating, reading. All of the countries are democratic and have a major commitment to and experience with industrialization. The degrees of industrialization vary considerably, and certainly the cultural milieus, although democratic, are vastly different. There is no attempt to identify either the degree of industrialization or differences in cultural background with the differences between the countries' experiences. In a way, the principal things the countries had in common were that they were democratic and border on the Pacific Ocean and that representatives came from them.

Professor Roberts presents at the beginning an "Introduction and Summary." I think he goes beyond the papers which are included in the volume. But, in my opinion, he is wise to do so. My reaction is that his introduction is probably the most suggestive part of the book. The bulk of the book is useful for anyone trying to gain a quick appreciation of the topics, as they appear country by country. His introduction offers some relatively useful questions for further analysis. There is also a useful list of recommended readings.

MARK PERLMAN
University of Pittsburgh

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Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 *by George R. Packard III. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xiv, 423 pp. $9.00.*

George R. Packard III's long anticipated book on the 1960 security treaty struggle in Japan is well worth the wait. While focusing on the series of events which forced the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan, the work emerges as one of the best descriptive accounts of postwar Japanese domestic politics. Utilizing a variety of sources, including interviews with leading participants, Dr. Packard presents the confusing events of May and June 1960 with surprising clarity. The demonstrations and violence are shown to be neither the work of an anti-American Communist conspiracy nor the spontaneous rioting of unruly students. Instead the affair is depicted as the product of re-emergent Japanese nationalism, a long standing plan by those opposed to the monopoly of power exerted by the Liberal Democratic party, and the questionable tactics of Kishi in pushing the revised United States-Japan security treaty through the House of Representatives. The demonstrations, which failed to prevent ratification, are placed in their proper context by noting the heavy role played by the Japanese press and the Tokyo intellectual community, both of which helped arouse popular sentiment.

In the preface Dr. Packard suggests that his objectives were to determine what actually happened in May and June 1960 and why it happened. No other account in English or Japanese has answered the first of these questions as well as this excellent book. The second question will have to await, as the author admits, the perspective provided by time. He generally considers the reappearance of nationalism as the root cause of the anti-security treaty struggle. While the revival of nationalist feeling in Japan is an undeniable fact, its role in the crisis of 1960 raises a number of interesting questions, such as the leadership provided by the Japan Socialist party, the Communists, and Zengakuren whose ideological positions are far less nationalistic than those of the conservative government which they sought to topple. Perhaps of greater value than the account of the crisis itself is the excellent description of the Japanese political process and the severe factionalism in the ruling Liberal Democratic party. The treatment of the latter in Chapter II is one of the best to appear in recent years, particularly since it details the intraparty divisions in terms of individuals and their sources of support. The discussion of Kishi's rise to the premiership through the manipulation of these factions is also of considerable value. The shortcomings of the book are minor and mainly in the nature of questions raised for future considera-

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tion. These include the problem of the psychological motivation of the demonstrators and the almost total absence of reference to the influence of the Korean student movement which was frequently cited at the time. There is also a tendency toward the use of superlatives, a practice not uncommon in Japan. This, however, does not detract from a book that is to be highly recommended to all as the best treatment that is likely to appear in the near future.

DANIEL B. RAMSDELL
Bowling Green State University

The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation *by Bruce L. R. Smith. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—xiii, 332 pp. $7.95.*

For several years we have needed a scholarly examination of one of the nonprofit research and advisory corporations employed by the federal government for assistance in national security planning, not only as a valuable aid in appraising top-level decision-making, but also as a probe into serious and authoritative warnings of a "military-industrial complex."

Now from the Harvard University Press comes a pioneer study of the RAND corporation, most successful of the "think factories" and the most frequently condemned. Based on over four hundred interviews and an unspecified number of internal RAND papers, this book (originally a doctoral dissertation for the university's department of government) attempts to describe RAND's history, its internal structure, current operations, and future prospects.

For a number of reasons the study is disappointing. The author is extremely partisan in favor of his subject, justifying and praising RAND's almost every move and aspiration. (It is not unfair to note that his adviser at Harvard, Don K. Price, is on RAND's Board of Trustees, and that Smith himself was a RAND employe while rewriting his thesis.) The deeper issues are evaded, and the facts and arguments of such critics as C. Wright Mills, Fred J. Cook, Saul Friedman, and Kenneth Boulding are briskly dismissed. Few unfamiliar contributions of the corporation appear—an important omission not only because of the millions of dollars involved but because of the author's emphasis on the nation's need to possess "the broadest possible advisory base." The book's thesis, that the major role played by RAND "consists principally in encouraging debate,

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intellectual discussion, and further research on complex long-range problems," is documented with too few examples of meaningful debate and discussion. The author's prose is turgid and riddled with jargon; his footnotes remain stuffed with the pedantic padding regretfully associated with many Ph.D. requirements.

Moreover, Mr. Smith is not candid about restrictions placed upon his study by RAND. Perhaps there were none, but much mystery remains, even about such elementary considerations as RAND's employment procedures (in spite of thirteen pages on "The Staffing Problem"). And we learn almost nothing of the sources to which he had access; typical citations include: "These observations are based largely on interviews with a number of RAND trustees," "Internal RAND materials dated 1960," and simply "Confidential Interviews."

There are valuable items to be culled from the book, however. RAND's organizational development is carefully detailed. The portrayal of squabbles and struggles for prestige and pay within RAND and the military makes interesting reading. The scramble for federal funds between profit-making and non-profit-making advisory corporations is suggestive. Private papers of Albert Wohlstetter were used to advantage in a case study of a RAND project. Concepts of systems analysis and nuclear strategy are intelligently discussed.

But, in sum, RAND remains essentially a secret organization, its relevance to the present and future still too debatable. Clearer glimpses into similar institutions, perhaps, are not likely to appear until the cold war gets cooler.

THOMAS C. REEVES
University of Colorado

Private Power and American Democracy *by Grant McConnell. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.—397, vi pp. $7.95.*

The misuse of power has been among man's foremost concerns at least since Antigone. And, as the example of Antigone might suggest, men have frequently identified the government as the most flagrant misuser of power. Americans especially have been inclined to assume that power exercised by government will be misused. Our response has been to minimize abuses of power by reducing the role of government.

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Yet in an incisive and disturbing indictment of American democracy, Grant McConnell records the process by which, ironically, the very attempt to prevent tyranny in America has led to an even greater tyranny. In the quest to prevent public tyranny, Americans have accepted a theory and practice that facilitate widespread private tyranny, the more pernicious for going unrecognized.

McConnell examines how American political theory and practice have led to a dispersion of public power. Power has not been limited, however, but instead has been appropriated by those outside the government. Power has gravitated away from the national government and toward local governments and private groups. The process signifies not a diminution of power but a narrowing of the effective constituency within which power is exercised. Power is decentralized, functionally and geographically. Those who make policy decisions are responsible to small specialized constituencies, not to the broad national constituency. A political theory of majoritarian democracy in small constituencies and private groups permits leaders to exercise absolute power. And it is the author's thesis that politics organized into small constituencies tends, in practice, to "enforce uniformity, discriminate in favor of elites and eliminate public values from effective public consideration."

McConnell describes in superb fashion the doctrines and practices that underlie the erosion of American democracy by private power. Yet it is curious that he does not analyze the New Left which, while sharing his democratic goals, pursues a diametrically opposite strategy of radical decentralization and local direct action.

McConnell is at his best in describing how and why American democracy is deficient. His solution—the "alchemy" of the broad constituency that transforms "base parochialisms and particularisms into something higher"—is less persuasive. Precisely how does the large constituency remedy the shortcomings of power exercised in small units? The author does not divulge the workings of the alchemical process nor does he provide standards for identifying the "something higher."

More generally, a definition and discussion of democracy would be warranted in the book under review. What kinds of political actions does McConnell consider democratic? In particular, what procedural and substantive criteria does he use to measure democracy? Might there not be a conflict between procedure and substance? In the broad constituency, is not stalemate as likely a result as policies in the public interest? And if a vigorous executive is the remedy (as Alexander Hamilton proposed and McConnell accepts), is not democracy diluted in consequence?

Reservations may remain—the book is inherently controversial—but *Private Power and American Democracy* has an important point to

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make and, with the help of careful scholarship, makes its point effectively. The result is an original, significant statement about American politics.

MARK KESSELMAN
Columbia University

The Washington Community, 1800-1828 *by James Sterling Young. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966.—xvi, 307 pp. $7.95.*

In his widely read article, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," Robert Dahl complained that behavioral political science was excessively "ahistorical." And he called for a new unity between the two disciplines. James Young's book about congressional and executive politics in the Jeffersonian era represents (from the political science side) the best testimony in recent memory to the wisdom of Dahl's advice. Indeed, with this superb example in hand, Dahl's advice seems almost superfluous. Using the perspectives and skills of mid-twentieth-century political science, Young has fashioned a striking portrait and a major reinterpretation of national politics in the early nineteenth century. So penetrating are his questions and so persuasive his answers concerning relationships within and between the legislative and executive branches from 1800 to 1828 that their power of illumination is nearly as great for the same relationships today. The book provides us with an extraordinarily complete and well crafted model against which students of the present-day American polity can profitably compare their understanding of part to part and part to whole.

The author takes as his subject the Washington community, and he gets "all the way around" this relatively small, isolated governing group much in the manner of the anthropologist. With impressive documentation, in great detail, and with imagination, he describes the physical layout, the living arrangements, the relationship to the country, the cultural values, the social structure, and the social behavior of official Washington. From all of these angles, he finds that early officialdom helped to create, nourish, and maintain a fissiparous political structure of "separate and rival interests" which fulfilled—if it did not in fact outdo—the plans of those who wrote the constitution.

In the light of this pervasive fragmentation, the author insistently raises the timeless question: from what source came the capacity to govern? Traditional political history has it that—for the eight years under

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Jefferson—a cohesive congressional party led by the President provided the answer. Young convincingly demonstrates, instead, the weakness of the party as an instrument of cohesion and policy-making. Most stunningly, he does so by unearthing data about the boardinghouse memberships of legislators, the fraternity-like culture thereof, and the crucial importance of these social blocs rather than party blocs as the voting elements of legislative majorities. He adduces a great deal more evidence, too, to buttress his argument that neither the congressional party nor the Congress nor the President nor the executive establishment possessed an institutionalized capacity to govern at any point in the Jeffersonian era.

Young's institutional analysis is masterful throughout. But what seems even more provocative to this reviewer is the extent to which he employs an analysis of the community's political culture to help explain his institutional findings. Underlying the structural incapacities at every turn, he finds the anti-power, anti-politics, anti-politician, anti-leadership, anti-followership values of the Washington community. Thus his historical study reveals the importance of the study of political culture to the study of political institutions—a relationship which is easily overlooked by students of one political system at one point in time. More specifically, the analysis raises the question whether this same constellation of political values rather than institutional inadequacy per se may not underpin such present-day incapacity to govern as does exist.

Students of American politics will hope that the author will want to apply his talents as a political scientist (and as a fine writer of English prose) to other historical periods—perhaps one in which power-seeking and the political career were somewhat more highly valued. If he does not, the lesson of this splendid book is clear: others must.

RICHARD F. FENNO JR.
University of Rochester

Social Insecurity: The Politics of Welfare *by Gilbert Y. Steiner. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966.—ix, 270 pp. $6.00.*

Because political scientists have devoted less attention to the "social services" than they have to overlapping fields like group subsidies, economic regulation, public enterprise, or civil liberties, Gilbert Steiner's study of public assistance is especially welcome. It provides a critical history of the program with emphasis on the fallacy that public assistance (specifi-

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cally, old-age assistance) would "wither away" as social insurance took over, on socioeconomic conditions that helped invalidate this assumption, and on the assumption's role in preserving policy from challenge and change. Steiner also gives a good description of the groups and interests involved in public assistance policy.

There are at least two fruitful ways to study a subject such as public assistance. One is to ask why the program is what it is: what governmental structures, social forces, ideologies, and administrative problems tended to direct and constrain it. The other is to analyze the program's effects according to some set of goals. Steiner does both, sometimes implicitly; but in his conclusions he separates these approaches explicitly. His diagnosis is focused on several factors: the open-end federal appropriation, which he feels has discouraged congressional attention to policy; the absence of organized group competition, which has had a similar effect; and the lack of presidential leadership traceable, he believes, to the program's poor location in the executive branch. Steiner is also sharply critical of social work's professional doctrines and skeptical about their relevance to public assistance. He notes the large role of the states in policy-making, despite the growing federal role in finance, and he suggests that states'-rights interests do provide some group conflict over policy—though he does not carry out a full analysis of the political, administrative, and fiscal elements involved in this federal program.

Most of Steiner's recommendations for change in policy appear to derive from the foregoing diagnosis. He would abolish OAA, transferring its caseload to OASI. He evidently favors more federal standard setting and financing in the rest of the program. He would de-emphasize professional social work's role and reverse the present "services" policy by making financial relief (instead of personal rehabilitation) the primary goal, by providing more adequate financial aid, and by directing services to cases where the chance of a payoff is favorable. The last point would require more knowledge than we now have; the others would presumably put the program more squarely into federal legislative politics.

This is a useful study, helpfully balancing analysis of process and policy. Its conclusions reach many, though not all, of the seemingly central issues in public assistance. Some relatively neglected issues include the administrative relations between casework and financial aid, the mechanics and standards of eligibility determination, the calculation of "adequate" grants, the proper scope of the program (the "categories"), and—perhaps the leading issue today—whether another form of income maintenance is preferable to the public assistance program. Still, Steiner has done the most important things. He has forcefully shown the need for re-examination of the program, demonstrated the necessary place of

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its political and governmental framework in any analysis of it, and set forth proposals for change that merit careful discussion.

CHARLES E. GILBERT
Swarthmore College

The Politics of Zoning: The New York Experience *by Stanislaw J. Makielski Jr. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966.—x, 241 pp. $6.00.*

The Politics of Zoning is a saga of efforts to regulate the use of land in New York City during the last half-century. Now that zoning has come to be accepted as an essential land-use regulation throughout the nation, it is difficult to reconcile the fact that the first zoning resolution was adopted in New York City only fifty years ago.

Professor Makielski tells a story that will have great meaning to alert citizens in and out of government service. He gives a vivid presentation not only of the meaning and application of zoning but of what has to be done in order to bring the dreams and efforts of planners and community leaders into reality. He portrays the urgent necessity of bargain and compromise—sometimes in smoke-filled rooms, sometimes at Board of Estimate hearings—in order to fashion a zoning ordinance which may not have attained near perfection but which was immeasurably superior to the outmoded ordinance it was replacing.

The author brings the reader to realize various currents and undercurrents in politics which so often make it impossible to win a one hundred per cent victory. The hard decision for planners is the amount of discount they are warranted in taking in order to assure passage.

Professor Makielski tells of the pioneer efforts in the early skirmishes of George McAneny and Edward M. Bassett, both reformers who were largely responsible for the passage of the 1916 resolution and who continued to exert their influence in improving New York City for decades thereafter.

Interlaced in an historical sense are the persistent efforts leading to the establishment of the City Planning Commission in 1938, the early years of Berle and Tugwell, the influence of Bob Moses, and the key positions played by Mayor Wagner, as chairman of the City Planning Commission and as mayor of the city.

The Politics of Zoning contains excellent background information for those interested in change and reform. It explains what goes on behind

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the scenes. And, of course, the study of planning provides an opportunity to examine the urban political system in action because zoning touches the lives and activities of all who live and work in the city.

The author points out that those who develop a zoning resolution which is ultimately approved by the governing board of a city often sacrifice some of the very elements they would like to protect in order to ward off defeat and assure passage. He indicates steps that had to be taken and sacrifices that had to be made. If the so-called "grace period" had not been included in the 1961 ordinance at the last moment, it is virtually certain that the resolution would have failed in its entirety.

As one ardent supporter of the Zoning Resolution recently stated, "To those who participated in the battle, this book serves not only as a reminder of the particular battlefields on which they played a part but as a panoramic view of the entire engagement. To those who were not involved in the rezoning of New York City, it details not only the particulars of that struggle but also demonstrates the intensive efforts, often unknown to the general populace, which are always necessary to achieve significant progress."

JAMES FELT
New York City

Social Change in Modern India *by M. N. Srinivas. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.—xv, 194 pp. $5.00.*

The European or American visiting India for the first time is likely to be impressed by what he feels is the depressing state of Indian social and economic life: the primitiveness of agriculture, the degree of hierarchy in social life, the extent of religiosity and the widespread presence of unscientific attitudes, the squalor of urban areas, and the rigidities of the bureaucracy. He may also react to the sense of futility, the lack of self-esteem, and the slothfulness which often seem to characterize so many Indians, and above all he may react to what he feels is the slow pace of change. One can point to many books by recent visitors to India—Ronald Segal's much-reviewed book at once comes to mind—which not only express these reactions but leap to the conclusion that rapid change and modernization in India are therefore most unlikely.

This view of India and of Indians is more widespread in Western Europe and in the United States than many Indians and many Western experts on India care to recognize. In fact, there is hardly a society in the

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world today about which there is such a gap in outlook between the expert and the layman, for in contrast with the layman the expert is far more likely to be impressed by the many changes which have taken place in India and to be much more optimistic about the future.

Though in no sense explicitly attempting to answer the criticisms posed by India's critics, Professor M. N. Srinivas throws some interesting light on why this gap exists. This book describes some of the vast social changes which have taken place within India during the past decade, focusing in particular upon changes in India's social structure. In fact the book might well have been called "India's Changing Social Structure," for, in the tradition of social anthropology to which Professor Srinivas belongs, the focus is primarily on one aspect of social change—namely, how social structure is being modified.

Those who already know the many thoughtful articles and books by Professor Srinivas of the department of sociology at the University of Delhi will spend several pleasant hours reading his attempt to describe, in brief compass, some of the major changes he sees going on in contemporary India. And for those not familiar with the growing literature on social change in India, this is also an excellent introduction to contemporary anthropological studies on India and an excellent corrective to the popular view that there is little social change in India.

A central theme of the book is that substantial social mobility occurred in pre-contemporary India, but that traditional patterns of legitimizing mobility served to disguise changes. Thus, militant tribesmen who achieved power in some regions had their genealogies rewritten so as to prove the antiquity of their caste affiliation. According to Srinivas, it was the institutional structure of Indian social life which remained rigid even while social mobility took place within it. It is Srinivas' thesis, too, that an increasing amount of social mobility is now taking place in India but that traditional forms of legitimizing change are still being employed. Thus, contrary to the familiar French adage that the more things appear to change, the more they remain the same, he suggests that in India things appear to remain the same even while they have in fact changed. Srinivas demonstrates that many of the changes which have taken place—in marriage patterns, styles of living, occupations, ritual practices and caste organization—have occurred within a social and ideological framework which obscures these changes to the casual observer who fails to compare what exists now with what existed before.

From the point of view of a political scientist, Srinivas' theme implies a proposition of considerable theoretical importance: that political stability may be less a function of the rate of social change than the extent to which social change is legitimized.

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This book, in my judgment, is the most successful attempt thus far to make some generalizations about social change in India on the basis of an examination of many recent anthropological studies of particular villages, castes, and tribes in India. If there are limitations to what Srinivas says about social change in India, they are as much a reflection of the present state of anthropological research in India as his own. This book also has an ease of style which reflects the fact that it was originally prepared as a series of four lectures delivered at the University of California in 1962-63, though subsequently revised and brought up to date.

MYRON WEINER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation *by Granville Austin. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.—xvii, 390 pp. $7.20.*

Indian Political Associations and Reform of Legislature (1818-1917) *by Bimanbehari Majumdar. Calcutta, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1965.—viii, 477 pp. 25.00 Rs.*

History conserves but also liberates; often, by recalling the circumstances that shaped an institution, it keeps the way clear for adaptation amid change while respecting the essence of the original purpose. The history of the making of a constitution offers this paradox in a special form. For a constitution seeks to give lasting expression to certain norms and procedures. Yet it would be a self-defeating use of facts about the choices and intentions of constitutional draftsmen to fix unduly the meaning of words. Certainly this caution applies to a constitution like that of the United States. It is also true, though to a lesser extent, of India's lengthy organic law with its several flexible ways of amendment. A valuable service has been done by Granville Austin in tracing the nearly three years' work of India's Constituent Assembly. His carefully detailed, step-by-step analysis is realistic in its attention not only to the argumentative play but also to decision-making and the role of the inner leadership. The appraisal is almost wholly commendatory, including incidental comment on the experience of a decade and a half under the constitution. The story is evidence for the author of India's capacity for consensus and for the kind of "accommodation" (to be distinguished from compromise) that can combine different principles without inconsistency by using them at several levels.

On certain points Austin notes the formative thinking of the Indian National Congress. Thus his treatment bridges the gap left by Majumdar's

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narrative of the rise and influence of political associations in shaping constitutional ideals from 1818 to 1917, in the period before Gandhi enlisted India's masses in the cause of independence.

The Constituent Assembly virtually bypassed a main alternative: the idea of a national society that would be partyless as well as casteless, rising (as Gandhi imagined and Jayaprakash Nayaran has later pictured) on the basis of village unanimity through indirect election at successively higher levels. Such a system might have been a novel adventure in statecraft. In practice, Austin assumes (correctly, I think) that it would have served to "entrench caste at the village level, keeping power in the hands of the traditional upper caste or some economically ascendent minority" (p. 47). Instead, a parliamentary pattern was chosen unhesitatingly. The draftsmen saw little reason to disregard Britain's long-tested model. They were repelled by the risks of executive-legislative friction in presidential systems, perhaps unduly slighting the presidency's integrative effect in offsetting the segmental tendency that marks so many uses of the parliamentary form. Austin concludes that India's structure (from which the Assembly stripped nearly all barriers against majority rule except the temporary reservation of seats for scheduled castes and tribes) has worked as envisaged by its framers, although he admits that a favorable factor has been the "almost unchallenged ascendency" of one party, the Congress (p. 139).

Contrary to Britain's tradition but in line with a widespread trend, certain rights were justiciably guaranteed. For Austin, however, "the conscience of the Constitution" and its nature as a "social document" appear even more clearly in the non-justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy. Scope for their implementation is aided by the conferral of powers in India's unique version of federalism. The distribution of powers on the formal side has not been affected by the subsequent reorganization of states on linguistic lines—a retreat now carried to the Punjab. Austin might well have given more attention to the original hopes of the draftsmen on this crucial aspect of national coherence. The question of a national language ended in what the author calls a "half-hearted compromise," not an accommodation. Unsettled issues survive in the fact that "there is today no version of the Constitution with legal standing in any Indian language" (p. 281).

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
Poughkeepsie, N.Y.

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L'essence du politique *by Julien Freund. Paris, Éditions Sirey, 1965. —764 pp. 50 F.*

"The political" is an innate human "essence," resilient to the variations of time and space and separate from the other human essences: religion, economics, science, and the like. It must be explained not by the objects to which political activity applies, but in terms of itself, that is, by the polemical aspect which it gives to them. This is the basic contention of Julien Freund's *L'essence du politique* which seeks to elucidate "the political" phenomenologically. Structured in the form of a rigorous schema, the great bulk of the analysis (pp. 101-633) is presented under the headings "command/obedience," "private/public," and "friend/enemy." Within this framework most of the topics of traditional political science are discussed, from constitutionalism to alienation, from representation to the right of resistance. But the analytical and polemical focus peculiar to the work is never abandoned, so that despite its vast scope and schematic organization it does not become a political science treatise. The method by which Professor Freund proceeds he calls "political philosophy *propre-ment dite*," which turns out to mean conceptual analysis, highly "traditionalist" by present-day American standards but thoroughly positivistic philosophically. Allergic to all normative considerations, whether ethical, religious, or ideological, Professor Freund, like many positivists, is a bit quick to unmask as ideologists those who do not share his methodological purism. Thus, fighting a war in the name of humanity or conscience is *always* a fraud (p. 447). And all theories, Marxist or other, positing a harmonious society are metapolitical eschatologies, a point doubtless difficult to argue with but also cheap to come by.

The sort of positivism pervading this book, and the aura of tough-minded complacency which, rightly or wrongly, it seems to convey, suffer from the sterility with which all "pure" theories (*vide* Kelsenism) are fated to purchase their undeniably great critical thrust. The impression of tough-mindedness is reinforced by the strong imprint on this work of Carl Schmitt's decisionist thought. Freund makes much of the point that power cannot simply be dissolved into law and that this fact is particularly illuminated by the emergency situation. He does so with grateful acknowledgment to Schmitt, but without so much as mentioning the name of John Locke, who taught some 230 years before Schmitt that in the crisis legal normativity succumbs to "prerogative" fiat. For Schmitt, sovereignty is the opposite of law, and only the emergency "reveals the kernel of the state in its concrete peculiarity" (Schmitt). As one of his early critics has observed, "the normal situation proves nothing, the exception everything . . . the rule only lives off the exception" (S. Jesel-

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sohn, 1929). Apparently undismayed by the well known connection between Schmitt's hyperopia for the marginal and his *quondam* contempt for constitutional legality, Freund, too, makes the crisis the touchstone of his concept of sovereignty and thus an essential element of "the political" (pp. 124-26). And we find the same overvaluation of the marginal case in his handling of the friend/enemy dichotomy. Like his teacher Schmitt, he views "the political"as the relation between friend and foe. Here, too, the essence of the thing is revealed in its most extreme manifestation: "War," which is "always latent . . . , expresses directly the fundamental and characteristic reality of politics" (p. 591). This reviewer finds Freund's hard-boiled positivism and, especially, Schmittian decisionism as irritating as some philosophies of history. But that this is a distinguished work there can be no doubt. Showing impressive learning, philosophic training, and analytical ability, it is thoroughly rewarding to read and ponder.

FREDERIC S. BURIN
The American University

The Independent Satellite: Society and Politics in Poland Since 1945 *by Hansjakob Stehle. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.—xiv, 361 pp. $6.95.*

The subtitle given to this revised version of a book originally published in German (*Nachbar Polen* [1963]) is a misnomer. The volume in fact deals hardly at all with the period between 1945 and the "October" revolution of 1956; attention is focused almost exclusively on 1956-64, during five years of which Dr. Stehle was the *Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung*'s correspondent in Warsaw. While stimulating in its analysis and rich in factual information, the book remains somewhat impressionistic It is not always easy to grasp from its pages either the sequence of events from 1956 or the significance of the Stalinist decade for the subsequent Gomulka period.

Dr. Stehle opens his account with an analysis of the position of the Communist party (PZPR) vis-à-vis the Polish community at large and the communist bloc. In maintaining its difficult balancing trick between the dangerous alternatives of full dictatorship and unrestricted liberalism, the regime has had to contend not merely with the skepticism of the younger generation ("Only 9 per cent of party members are under twenty-five" [p. 14]); it has had to battle with widespread apathy and indifference within the party ranks.

The only major organized force in Poland today that still retains its

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independence of the Communist state is, of course, the Roman Catholic church, whose position Dr. Stehle discusses next. As in the case of the party, the church, too, has to face indifference and growing materialism inside its own membership and skepticism and mental confusion among the young. The author stresses the church's moral authority and its relative freedom in Poland today. Two essentially totalitarian systems compelled by circumstances to mutual toleration of each other and to policies of moderation (despite periodic crises between church and state and continuous minor irritations on each side) is how Dr. Stehle defines the basic relationship between the two powers inside the country.

The last two sections of the book discuss the peculiarities of "the Polish Way to Socialism" and German-Polish relations, respectively. Uncollectivized agriculture, a small but substantial private sector in trade and industry, a genuine—though limited—parliamentary opposition, extensive—though restricted—travel abroad by ordinary citizens, and considerable cultural freedom have marked hitherto this "Polish Way." The Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, expressive of the Polish government's desire, while remaining within the Communist bloc, to act as a bridge between East and West, may likewise be regarded as an expression of Communist Poland's individuality in the sphere of foreign policy. Dr. Stehle concludes his book with a courageous appeal for West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

Dr. Stehle indeed writes on present-day Poland with considerable knowledge and sympathy. The translation by D. J. S. Thompson has on the whole been carried out most competently. A map and a number of useful documents are appended. However, this English edition omits all Polish diacritical signs as well as the sixteen pages of excellent photographs included in the German version. For the bibliography in four languages there has been substituted a book list confined solely to English titles—with the unaccountable omission of both Richard Hiscocks, *Poland: Bridge for the Abyss* (1963) and Richard F. Staar, *Poland 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People* (1962). All this is a pity.

PETER BROCK
University of Toronto

Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience *by Jiri Kolaja. New York and Washington, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.—xii, 84 pp. $4.50.*

This is a useful small-scale study of the functioning of the social system in two Yugoslav factories. The workers' councils, prominently mentioned

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in the title of the book, are actually only one of the various formal organizations that function in the plant, and though undoubtedly important, perhaps not always the dominant group. However, since the role assigned to the councils is basic for the entire Yugoslav experience, the author devoted most attention to the composition and the operations of the councils.

The method of investigation is a mixture of content analysis of the proceedings of the councils, informal interviews, and—in one plant—information obtained by a brief questionnaire. Compared, say, with Montuclard's elaborate statistical analysis of the work of four French plant communities, this is a very simple study. The author is at his best when he reports personal impressions and incidental remarks of employes or management people. I am less clear about how valid the generalizations are that can be derived from such meager and inevitably subjective impressions. While I find little to disagree with in the author's more general conclusions, I do not always see how they are connected with his empirical findings.

Among the latter, the most interesting I believe are the predominance of the managerial personnel in council decisions, the fact that the union is largely displaced by the managing board and the director in the business of handling individual grievances, the difficulty for the union to define its own role in the life of the plant, and the subordinate role it plays in the thinking of the employes. As one might expect, the role of the Communist organization in the two plants is less clearly presented in this study. Apart from the fact that the majority of the key personnel in both plants belonged to the party, the channels through which party influence flows are not readily ascertainable to the outside observer. That, of course, symbolizes one of the major achievements of the Yugoslav system. It is only fair to add that Tito's popularity makes it possible for the Yugoslav League of Communists to exert its influence in a less obtrusive fashion than one observes in, say, East Germany or even Poland. Still, how to combine industrial self-government with a dictatorial regime is a problem that even the experiment-prone Yugoslav regime has not succeeded in solving. At the moment, it would appear that in this tug of war the dictatorship seems to be retreating on this point. Mr. Kolaja's unpretentious study may help in the understanding of some of the factors involved in this evolution.

ADOLF STURMTHAL
University of Illinois

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Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela *by John D. Martz. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xv, 443 pp. $12.50.*

In "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," a seminal article which appeared in the March 1957 issue of the *Western Political Quarterly*, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, dean of "North American" Latin Americanists, said:

> The field is one which needs a vast amount of spade work of a primary sort and on top of that additional synthesis in order to put the raw materials in proper arrangement and perspective. I commend the field of Latin-American political parties to a whole generation of prospective graduate students in political science (pp. 21-22).

Fitzgibbon's goad was, and remains, very much in order. As of the time he expressed it, only one Latin American political party had been the object of a full-blown monographic study written in English. That was Harry Kantor's *The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement*, which had been published by the University of California Press at Berkeley in 1953.

Now, more than a dozen years later, John D. Martz has presented us with what is only the second book-length study of a Latin American political party to be published in English. It thus remains true that—whatever the explanation might be—very little research on Latin American political parties has been published in English.

It is useful to accept Martz' study of Venezuela's Acción Democrática party in that context. If nothing else, Martz has sought to act on Fitzgibbon's invocation in a fairly literal-minded fashion. Spade work was part of what was called for. Essentially, it is what is delivered in *Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela.* Far more energy and attention have been devoted to the spade work than to synthesis or analysis. As the book's subtitle implies, the work is primarily a chronological account of the basic political history of Acción Democrática. The volume is divided into three parts—an historical review of the major relevant events since 1928; a description of the organization and structure of Acción Democrática; and a discussion of the party's relationships with such sectors of Venezuelan society as organized labor and the military. One of the concluding chapters is devoted to the hectic and crucial presidential election campaign of 1963, and appendixes contain useful electoral data. Martz handles much of the foregoing, including the emotion-charged crisis of 1963, with commendable professional objectivity.

Thus the book combines a review of the history of Acción Democrática with a description of the party's organization and structure. Perhaps

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nothing more is needed to establish the value of the volume's contribution than to point out that this material had not previously been readily available in English and that it deals with one of the most important political parties on the contemporary Latin American scene. What is missing, however, is an indication by Martz of why it should be expected that what he has to say about Acción Democrática should be of especial professional interest to political scientists or, for that matter, other social scientists. This reviewer is not holding out for a major theoretical sortie. He would be quite willing to settle for even a minimal indication by Martz of why his study should be of concern to political scientists *qua* political scientists or social scientists *qua* social scientists. Should we be interested in Acción Democrática simply because, as political—or social—scientists, we ought to know about the history and structure of that party? Is the party significant for the party's sake, or does it perform some political function or functions of significance either within the Venezuelan system or on an international scene for which the events of 1963 might have been crucial? Such questions are ignored by Martz.

To raise such issues is not merely to quibble. Among the social sciences, political science is perhaps peculiarly susceptible to the disease of gathering data or describing structures in a theoretical vacuum. Time was when we described the formal structures of public governments provided for by written constitutions long after we had forgotten—if, indeed, we had ever really known—why this had been thought a meaningful activity. There was even a time when we studied elections after having lost touch with the reasons why the theoretical pioneers in the electoral field had assigned significance to such research. (At this point in time it is healthful and perhaps sobering to reflect upon the proposition that even quantitative studies should not be conducted in isolation from their *raison d'être.*) Are we now about to embark upon a spate of descriptions of Latin American political parties without facing specifically the theoretical question of why this might be considered a useful thing for political scientists to do at this stage in the development of social science? Fitzgibbon, of course, can speak for himself, but this reviewer suspects that that was not the intended message of "The Party Potpourri in Latin America."

GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN
Northwestern University

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Book Notes

This volume—*Les Slaves: Peuples et Nations*, by Roger Portal (Paris, Armand Colin, 1965; 518 pp., 48.30 F)—forms part of the distinguished series *Destins du Monde*, founded by Lucien Febvre and directed today by Fernand Braudel. Professor Portal, president of the Institut d'Etudes Slaves, presents us with a history of all the Slavic peoples from the eighth to the second half of the twentieth century. This history is written with sympathy, discrimination, and style. Whenever Portal discusses the great emotional controversies (for instance, the Normanist-anti-Normanist argument on the role of the Vikings in the early Russian state) he summarizes the arguments of both sides and suggests the most balanced and reasonable solution. The task he undertook is enormous in scope and conception—a synthesis of the histories of diverse and distinct peoples and civilization united, occasionally, by vague self-consciousness and by very diffuse ethnic and linguistic features only. In this task he succeeded exceptionally well. In one single volume, this is a unique contribution for both specialist and layman.—MICHAEL CHERNIAVSKY, *University of Rochester.*

In Joe S. Bain, *International Differences in Industrial Structure: Eight Nations in the 1950's* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966; xiv, 209 pp., $5.00), the author accurately notes that "this volume has assembled and organized a good deal of information on the comparative industrial structures of eight countries, has given this information a sort of broad-brush statistical analysis, and interpreted the major findings which emerged." This summation is misleadingly modest. Actually Bain has produced an immensely useful book—the first rigorous comparison of the manufacturing structures of major Western economies. His handling of the plethora of unstandardized statistics could hardly be better, for he neither belittles them nor tortures them with uses that they cannot support. A number of surprising and puzzling conclusions emerge in the study. Bain's favorite in this category is the unmistakable fact that the United States tends to have substantially bigger plants than six of the other seven countries surveyed. This reviewer's favorite enigma was the failure of these seven to produce many large multi-plant monop-

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olies even though they imposed almost no antitrust-type restrictions on mergers. One notes with satisfaction that the author's firmly held and well known policy views are not obliterated by the weight of the statistics he must sift. Bain does not doubt that the American economy is economically superior to the other seven studied. Nor does he doubt that American superiority is ascribable to the blessings of the antitrust laws.—DONALD DEWEY, *Columbia University.*

The Mexican Mining Industry, 1890-1950, by Marvin D. Bernstein (Albany, The State University of New York, 1964; xvi, 412 pp., $10.00), is a substantial historical work, covering in meticulous detail the origins and development of that industry. The endless zest for facts that so characterized the author's wonderful old mentor, Erich W. Zimmermann, shines through in Bernstein's work as well. No major company, no important mining area, is neglected. Every Mexican administration from Porfirio Díaz to Adolfo López Mateos is surveyed. The major national policies bearing on the mining industry's performance, such as those in the fields of labor, taxation, and investment, are faithfully reviewed. Bernstein's descriptive work is an objective contribution in a field in which most of the works are impressionistic and polemical. But the objectivity is achieved at a price, as usual. In the continuous flow of facts large and small, it is sometimes difficult to sort out those that have some enduring significance from those that represent only local color. On the other hand, it is perhaps just as well that a book devoted to a single industry should not try to generalize too much about larger issues. The occasional passages in the book which relate the mining industry to the larger economic processes of Mexico are not the strongest portions of the book. Bernstein, for instance, attributes the miserable conditions of Mexico's modern-day miners to the forced saving and inflation "which has been deliberately stimulated by the government." But the allegation that Mexico's inflation, such as it is, has shifted income away from Mexico's workers is very much suspect, and the data on which the allegation is based have long since been discredited.—RAYMOND VERNON, *Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.*

Although much has been done to delineate the origins and nature of the recovery program formulated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his advisers in the days of the First New Deal, we are much less in-

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formed about the administration of Roosevelt's recovery legislation. This void is in part remedied by the publication of *New Deal Mosaic: Roosevelt Confers with His National Emergency Council, 1933-1936* (Eugene, University of Oregon, 1965; xxix, 578 pp., $10.00) edited by Lester G. Seligman and Elmer E. Cornwell Jr. This is indeed a mosaic and an informative one. The body of the work contains the minutes of the NEC, which are located in the National Archives. There is elucidated Roosevelt's interest in improving administrative efficiency and coordination, and his passion for fiscal economy; his zeal for improving the lot of the common man (particularly interesting is his moving statement of aspirations for the people affected by the Tennessee Valley project); Frances Perkins' penchant for institutionalizing the consumers' interest in the economy; the paucity of statistical evidence on the impact of New Deal legislation; the concern for harmonizing state and federal efforts at recovery; and the evolution of formal procedures for securing legislative clearance through a central agency in the administration. Professor Seligman's introduction places the NEC in proper perspective. He does not magnify its role and candidly acknowledges Roosevelt's propensity to seek advice from all sorts of sources and usually on a personal basis. The notes and appendixes contributed by Professor Cornwell are useful for the understanding of topics under discussion and for the identification of participants. The NEC, created by Roosevelt on November 13, 1933, was designed to coordinate the work of NRA, AAA, FERA, CWA, HOLC, and other agencies designed to lift the nation from the slough of depression. Though minimally effective as an institution, its minutes are nevertheless enlightening as an unfeigned exposition of Roosevelt's thinking and of the convictions and problems of subordinates such as Frances Perkins, Harry Hopkins, Daniel Roper, Lewis Douglas, and John Fahey. The picture of Roosevelt at work with an assortment of New Deal administrators, and the substance of their discussions, is invaluable for those interested in the vicissitudes of Roosevelt's attempts at economic recovery and in the institutional development of the executive branch of government.—Elliot A. Rosen, *Rutgers, The State University.*

Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel are justifiably lauded as pathbreakers in promoting empirical research on contemporary social issues in Spain in the prologue to their latest report on the Spanish entrepreneur—*Los Empresarios ante el Poder Público* (Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1966; xxvii, 279 pp., 225 pesetas). However, the reader who approaches this book with the expectation of finding more than tenuous

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clues to the nature of contemporary political change in Spain will find himself straining hard to read between the lines. The volume is as noteworthy for the painstaking detail with which certain aspects of business elite action and perceptions are reported as for the judicious reserve that is maintained regarding crucial aspects of the context in which business interest representation must unfold. The reviewer found only one passing allusion to "the movement" (the regime's political organization) in the entire volume. While six types of business interest groups are discriminated, the reader is told little about the actual status and operations of these groups except as they are guardedly evaluated by the business leadership. This is particularly disappointing if one is acquainted with Linz' penetrating characterization of the Spanish political system as it has evolved over the past three decades ("An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems,* edited by E. Allardt and Y. Littunen [Helsinki, 1964]). One may surmise that the knowledgeable Spanish reader or specialist can indeed read well between the lines and can draw more inferences than the authors seem disposed to make regarding the significance of the power dispersion, fragmentation, apathy, and low sense of efficacy among business leaders, who emerge in this study as a privileged but largely impotent elite (p. 119). The present volume, of course, reports only a small part of the rich material on entrepreneurs gathered by the authors and reported over the last three years. It is to be hoped that a further effort at synthesis and a more forthright treatment of the political context in which industrial Spain has begun to show a new vitality will prove possible. In any case, the authors can hardly be commended enough for their determination and success in bringing their obviously highly sophisticated research talents to bear on problems of this nature in a plainly difficult setting.—FRANK BONILLA, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

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